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WORLD GOVERNMENT

95

Edited by

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FOREWORD

THIS volume contains all but one of the addresses given at the Fifty-third Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on April 8 and 9, 1949, on the general topic, "World Government: Why? When? How?"

The address by Dr. Joza Vilfan, Permanent Representative of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, on the subject of "The United Nations and the World Government Idea," could not be printed because the author found it impossible to send a corrected version in time for inclusion.

There has also been added an article on "Denazification from an American's Viewpoint," submitted as a response to, or in further clarification of, a problem discussed from a German point of view in our November 1948 volume, which dealt with "Postwar Reconstruction in Western Germany."

THORSTEN SELLIN

World Government as a Goal

By Mauricio Nabuco

THE occupancy of the world by the human race is fraught with problems, the multiplicity and complexity of which tend to become greater with the increase in population, the progress in communications, and the intervention of many other major factors, too numerous to mention here. It is up to us, therefore, the tenants of this world, to set our house in order and adjust ourselves to changing conditions; otherwise havoc will certainly prevail.

Political borders have become wider and wider. In the dawn of civilization the family group constituted the limit, which was later extended to a political union still confined to allegiance owed to some prince or lord. The nations of the modern world then came into being, characterized by national borders and giving rise to the spirit of patriotism and to the development of the concept of nationalism. As recently as seventy years ago, Italy was still a patchwork of nations, of small principalities; and not until 1870 did Germany become a unified nation. We now see the tendency going farther and farther, as, for instance, in the grouping of the nations of the Western European Union.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, there appears to be a trend toward the development of continental groups which may involve the spirit of continentalism and eventually alter the concept of patriotism. The progress of mankind, especially in the field of communications, will continue to make political borders wider and wider, and these will probably disappear completely by the time we are ready for world government.

Of course, as these groups grow larger, wars will be fewer in number, but they will become bloodier until one group, if it goes that way, dominates the entire world. And so I believe that before the world settles down to reasonable wisdom, intercontinental warfare, or intergroup warfare, is more probable than not.

Restricted Movement of Persons and Goods

Every day we hear of new and great progress in the field of communications; but such progress is only on the technical and scientific side, for although fast ships, airplanes, and automobiles make it technically possible or theoretically possible to get more quickly from one place to another, the actual over-all picture is quite different. Bureaucratic restrictions are so great that many parts of the world that could be reached by the old means of transportation—sailing ships and animal-drawn vehicles and others—are today inaccessible with the finest of modern available means of communication.

I feel sure that when public opinion is more enlightened, it will not permit that the very advancement of science, the fruit of the intelligence which God gave to man, should retard man's communion instead of broadening it. There will have to be a world organization, not alone to ensure personal transportation but so that goods and foodstuffs may be able to move easily, without the tremendous loss that goes on nowadays due to political and economic restrictions of all kinds—that a world population which is growing in geometrical

proportions may be fed and clothed and housed adequately.

There are two ways in which this might be accomplished. One would be through a liberal system of economics, and that would require a sort of world understanding which would abolish customs duties and other difficulties. The other would be by central government. World trade and commerce cannot remain forever throttled. If man's political wisdom does not lead us to a free flow of goods, man's practical needs will.

I believe that practical forces vitally at work today would impose upon all governments of the world such an understanding; for the central agency necessary to carry out this kind of work would be of such magnitude that it would amount to world government. When we consider, for instance, what a big thing the Universal Postal Union has grown to be, and that simply for the purpose of the exchange of letters on a world scale—and letters are very tiny things—we can see what a vast organization would have to be set up in order that food shall eventually reach each man's mouth.

MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING

Man's ambition to make money is not his only incentive in great undertakings. It was trade, for instance, that made the British Empire. But the ambition to make money is strengthened and ennobled by the service rendered to one's fellowmen. Mr. Oscar Newfang, in his book *World Government,* mentions the mental and social reasons why men should "hang together in order that they should not hang separately," as Benjamin Franklin said. But the moral progress of mankind is not as great as the material progress. The lower quality in us has to evolve upwards, and this adaptation should lead us, as it well may, to a better system, in which the two forces may be more equally balanced.

There are other reasons why man, in spite of the divergences which plague him, is by nature socially minded. There are people who believe, and I place myself among them, that man has never gone to war of his own will but has always been dragged into it or led into it. The United States was dragged into a war—in fact, it was dragged into two wars in the last thirty years. The leaders of Germany led her people to war twice in the same time.

If people all over the world had been able to have their say about how their countries should be run, instead of getting warmongers as their leaders, they would have chosen for their leaders lovers of peace. And when they become able to do that, those men will very probably seek world government, so that man's social traits will have collective expression rather than individual expression. And once countries find a way of life that will satisfy their aspirations and interests, stability of position will be attained.

WORLD GOVERNMENT—WHEN?

There are those who believe that now is the time for the establishment of world government, or at least for the adoption of definite measures toward that end. Others, and there are many, reject altogether the possibility of its achievement. A realistic appreciation of the circumstances leads us to discount both the enthusiasm of the first group and the skepticism of the second.

The movement originated by Mr. Clarence K. Streit is gaining the support of many men of thought and action, and its development can undoubtedly exert considerable influence on the time factor in the trend toward world government. I feel, however, that the opportunity will come only when the

world is truly educated to receive it. And that is a big problem. It is evident that we cannot have national government without education, and we shall not be able to have world government without education; and there are several billion people who would have to be educated before we could have real world government. That is a task of which we have not yet seen the beginning, and therefore we do not know when we shall see the end of it.

I feel that the opportunity will come, with God's blessing, but it is a long, long way off. Granted, however, that the approach lies through democracy, the very concept of that system has to evolve; it could not be possible within a structure, of which the Greek democracy was the prototype, wherein an "elite," however great or however small, held the reins. That would be the only sort of world government we could have for the present.

Education is an instrument of evolution. It must be placed equally in the hands of all men—not a mere smattering of instruction. We see how much instruction a man needs for his municipal problems. In fact, it was the very high education of the men who discussed municipal problems in the United States that made this great country. And so it is not difficult to realize what a very much higher degree of education would be necessary to take part in world government. How long it will take to accomplish that is anybody's guess. But hope is the parent of faith, and once we realize that the work is to be done, let us do it.

Institutions can be conceived great, but whatever may be their destiny (and of course the biggest destiny of any of the material institutions in this world would be world government), none of them is born great; greatness can come only from inner effort. And so it will be with world government.

National Groupings

Three decades ago I was in Cambridge talking to Dr. Lowell, who was then President of Harvard University. I had just come from Lisbon, where there was a considerable movement in favor of having Portugal, our mother country, join the Brazilian Federation. Historically there would be nothing strange about that, for during the Napoleonic invasion the Portuguese Court fled to Brazil, and Brazil became the metropolis and Portugal the colony. This fact expedited the coming of our independence, without bloodshed; for once the King returned to Portugal, Brazil was ipso facto an independent country.

As I was talking to Dr. Lowell about this possibility, I said jokingly that I thought it would be difficult for Brazil to have a colony in Europe before the United States had one there; and Dr. Lowell answered, "That is very easy; we can take Ireland." At that time that seemed to be rather farfetched, and I know, of course, that the United States will not "take" anything. It is neither your policy nor your nature, nor, I imagine, your interest.

But a very short time ago Newfoundland joined the Canadian Federation. When the subject was discussed in Newfoundland, one of the suggestions was that it should join the American Federation; and with Newfoundland there went Labrador, a sizable piece of very rich land. And here we have a curious movement which, if carried on, would bring world government.

I imagine there are in the world today many distinct lands that would be very pleased to join the American Federation if the way were open to them. In fact, I think there are so many that it would amount to world government. Mexico came near joining you at one time. I believe statehood was offered

to Mexico shortly after the Mexican War. And at the time the reciprocity treaty was negotiated with Canada forty-some years ago, Canada was not so far from joining the American Federation.

We are all acquainted with movements here in the United States headed by eminent citizens, including educators, scientists, writers, financiers, and statesmen, envisaging the amalgamation of democratic nations of North America with those of western Europe into a Federal Union. If such a movement crystalized, there is no knowing where it would stop, provided the many difficulties were overcome. One of them, a very fundamental one to me, would be the establishment of a universal language. English seems to be on its way to becoming that. And if really big federations are made, those regions that are left out will find that the solution will be for them to join, too. I personally would like to see world government, when it comes, grow of its own accord.

ENCOURAGING SIGNS

I have mentioned some difficulties. I do not know them all, and I do not think the world knows them all; because once we start working with them, a lot of new ones arise. But that is no reason for despair. The peoples of the world do meet together and have met together for generations to run their principal administrative organizations, such as the Postal Union and others, which reach the farthermost corners of the earth. There is no reason why other organizations should not develop, and if we got many of those organizations, we should really have world government.

Lecomte du Noüy, in his book *Human Destiny,* one of the greatest books that has been written lately, gives us much room for thought and still more room for optimism based on reason. According to that eminent author, certainly the moral development of man has begun; and if so, it will run its course. He says: "The evolved man has reached a state of development of his conscience which enables him to broaden his outlook and to become fully aware of the magnificent role he can play as a responsible actor in Evolution." That is something to look forward to.

WORLD GOVERNMENT—HOW?

There are, of course, various ways by which world government can come about. Unfortunately, the most probable one would be by domination by one man, with physical force and ideological frenzy to support him. The world has not been so far from that, and perhaps we are not certain that it will not occur yet. The disadvantages of one-man rule are well known to all of us. In my view, it has only one advantage—it can never last longer than a lifetime. In fact, very few dictators have ever attained their majority in power—have ever ruled over twenty-one years.

Another way of reaching world government—and this seems the most plausible way—would be by the federation of all nations, which I have mentioned before. Some few might stay out, as San Marino has stayed out of Italy for I believe a good deal over a thousand years, or Andorra has stayed out of France, keeping entirely aloof from what is going on around them. They seem to be nonetheless happy on that account. This makes us think that we shall never have complete world federation, because probably many countries would desire to stay out; but nonetheless the generic title would represent the actual state of the world. We could never have a multilingual federal government as we have multilingual countries, like Switzerland, where three languages are com-

monly spoken, but every part of the Helvetian Federation is bilingual.

The third way would be by the establishment of a world state. It may sound a little utopian at present to speak of a world state in which every man would be a citizen of the world and not of his own particular country; but it may not seem so utopian when we realize that only a short time ago the English Parliament discussed the possibility of granting British nationality to all people within the Commonwealth, irrespective of race, creed, or any other difference that existed.

If such an idea can be put forward for present-day discussion for so vast an area of the world as the British Commonwealth of Nations, it would not be a much greater step to do it for the entire world; and in that case we might even do it before the whole world is educated, for in that great Commonwealth of Nations there are a great many people who are not educated. I imagine the majority of the people in the British Commonwealth are illiterate.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this modest statement of one man's opinion, I wish to say that the hopes which I have long nourished for a trend in human affairs that might lead to the achievement of that desirable goal of world government, however far in the future, have received no small encouragement from the fact that a group of people so highly representative of American thought and vision as those who are gathered at the behest of the American Academy of Political and Social Science are devoting such studious attention to the problem and its solution.

Dr. Mauricio Nabuco, Washington, D. C., is Brazilian Ambassador to the United States. He spent most of his official life in the Foreign Office in Rio de Janeiro, of which he was Secretary General at one time. He has been Ambassador to Chile and to the Holy See, and was head of the Brazilian delegation at the Havana Conference in 1940.

A Plea for World Government

By Cord Meyer, Jr.

THE creation by peaceful consent in our time of some form of world government is a tremendously difficult undertaking, and success is obviously uncertain. Because of that fact a good many people feel that those who are practically working today for world government must be utopian idealists.

Yet in spite of the monumental difficulties and in the face of active opposition by official policy makers, the popular movements that are working for world government continue to grow, and at the same time an increasing number of able and respected men are devoting their energies and time to it.

Before all this activity can be dismissed as irrelevant, as escapism from the problems of the real world, it seems to me that the objective observer should take a moment to consider the facts and the logic which force the United World Federalists to the position they take today. A process of elimination and a thorough analysis of the other available courses of action and their consequences have led the federalists to believe that the only way to preserve peace and the values of civilized life is through the creation of a structure of enforceable world law above the nations.

Let me briefly review, therefore, the reasons that we have for rejecting as inadequate the usual courses of action that are advocated for our country and the world.

Futility of Armament Policy

First, there is the present policy of the American Government. I will define that policy as an attempt to maintain a preponderance of power so great that no nation will dare to attack us. Thereby it is hoped that peace will be maintained. In following that policy we are pursuing a program of domestic rearmament at the cost of fifteen billion dollars a year.

We are also engaged in a program of economic and military aid to our prospective allies in order to ensure strong and loyal allies when the war starts, and we are using an economic boycott in an attempt to weaken the economies of our probable opponents.

Finally, we are forming military alliances, such as the Atlantic Pact, in order to gain strategic bases for the eventual war.

Now, given the nation-state system in which we live, granted the fact that every nation today is free to prepare for war, in view of the fact there is no assurance in the world that aggression can be effectively dealt with, we in this country have no choice, it seems to me, but to maintain our military defenses. I think most federalists would agree with that.

However, to admit that arms, bases, and allies are necessary today is not to prove that they can ensure either peace or American security in the future. They cannot. They are only temporary, dangerous, stopgap expedients to buy time; and the question is, What are we going to do with the time that we are buying by building up a military force sufficient for a temporary period to stop aggression?

The reasons why we can decide conclusively that military rearmament and bases are not enough are well known to most of us. First, of course, there is the revolution that has taken place in the nature of war itself—a revolution characterized by the new weapons, atomic and biological, and the long-

range aircraft. We can have no lasting monopoly on these weapons. The informed military observers and the scientists are in agreement that there can be no effective defense against an air attack launched with atomic and biological weapons against the cities of a modern nation.

Therefore, our present preparations for war are not designed to defend our people and our cities. What we are trying to do is build up so great a striking force, so well dispersed, that even after we have lost our major cities and most of their people, we can counterattack from the ruins and wreak equal or greater devastation on the opposition. And the hope is expressed that fear of our ability to counterattack will prevent any nation from destroying our cities in the first place.

COSTS OF ARMAMENT POLICY

The full cost of this program is becoming evident. We have to keep ahead of all other nations in the production of ever more destructive weapons. We are faced with the necessity of maintaining a large standing army. We must in the immediate future undertake a program of industrial dispersal and decentralization if we seek to keep any part of our war industry functioning after the war has started. And all this costs astronomical sums, fifteen billion dollars this year and an increasing amount in the years to come, which means a steady decline in our living standards.

At the same time, the building of an armed camp to enable this country to carry on a war after it has lost its two hundred major cities is necessarily going to demand a steady loss of democratic practice and of civil liberties, and is now doing so, as I think most of us are aware.

Every country where effective preparation for modern war is undertaken must in the process become an armed camp, a barracks society, with its people regimented and disciplined, its living standards steadily depressed, and its liberties lost.

The obvious reaction of other nations in the world to this program is to follow the same course, they also believing that they can be safe only if they are stronger than we are, they also feeling that the only security is preponderant power. They regiment their people, spend increasing sums on armaments, disperse their industries, and the result is not security for any one of the separate nations, but increasing insecurity for all, mutual fear, hysteria, incidents, and eventual war.

If that war is allowed to occur, we can say with assurance that it will be the most destructive war in history. The large-scale use of atomic weapons will involve the destruction of most of our urban and industrial society. The survivors will have little left but ruins to live with, and the whole course of human events and history will be set back many, many years.

In the light of these facts we must conclude that military preparedness in this country is necessary today but that it is not enough.

SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS

There is another course of action that is often proposed. It is urged that we support to the limit the United Nations as it is presently constituted; that we try through every possible economic and social means to improve the living standards in the world and to spread a general sense of world community and good will, and that no attempt be made to change the structure of the U.N. for a long time—until, in fact, a general sense of world community is built up throughout the earth.

The hope expressed by the people who follow this line of thought is that

gradually differences will be compromised, and living standards will be improved to the point where at some future, indeterminate date, say some hundred years from now, we can move to the establishment of some form of government for the world.

In speaking to that position, let me say that the World Federalists have supported the United Nations as a first step. We believe other steps should be taken, but we support the U.N. as the only existing international organization, and we particularly support the work of the functional agencies—the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the like—that are doing indispensable work in repairing the damage caused by the last war.

WEAKNESS OF UNITED NATIONS

But we have never felt that the best way to support the U.N. is to give it blind and uncritical worship. We feel that in the field of security the U.N. is fatally weak. We feel that the events of the last three years and the size of the present competitive national armament budgets are a measure of its weakness and its failure to protect its members and provide genuine international security. We also feel that only by understanding what its weaknesses are and by taking energetic and immediate action to remedy them can we in fact save the U.N. and end the arms race that threatens it. Our analysis of the weakness of the U.N. is somewhat as follows.

The General Assembly was designed as the town meeting of the world, but its recommendations are not binding on any member nation. As a result, they have been consistently ignored whenever it has been to the national interest of a country to ignore them.

The Security Council is the agency with the obligation to enforce the peace. However, it cannot act except against a small state that is without the support of any of the larger ones. As a result, the Security Council is incapable of dealing with the real problems that lead to major war, because a small country that is without the support of any of the Big Five is not a nation that is likely to provoke the third world war.

The International Court of Justice lacks compulsory jurisdiction in the sense that a nation need not appear before it unless it wishes to, and it lacks jurisdiction over the individual. In other words, the U.N. is founded on the concept of collective guilt, on the idea that sanctions are to be directed against an entire people—the men, women, and children of a whole nation. The U.N. is not founded on the principle that we tried to establish at Nuremberg, the principle of individual responsibility under the law.

Finally, there is no U.N. police force. Under the U.N. every nation is free to arm, and therefore every nation has to arm in self-defense against the armament of others.

As a result of these weaknesses it is evident that no nation can depend upon the U.N. as it is today for protection. All nations must depend on their own competitive national armaments, on rival military alliances, on strategic bases.

EFFECTS OF ARMS RACE

This arms race destroys the possibility of effective economic reconstruction throughout most of the world. Sixty billion dollars is now being spent on armament throughout the world and over twenty million men are under arms. In this situation is it not naïve to hope for a general rise in living standards and for a gradual improvement of conditions? Rather, the opposite is to be expected.

In addition to the economic cost, the effect of the competition for military power on the minds of the people is real. Mutual fear and hatred grow. Look for a moment at what has happened during the last three years. National governments are involved in an attempt to ensure loyal soldiery in the event of conflict, who believe in their cause and who hate and fear the enemy, and that attempt naturally necessitates propaganda. This propaganda war that goes on at the same time as the competition for armament and bases makes impossible a gradual growth of mutual good will and trust. Rather, increase in mutual hatred, fear, and suspicion is to be expected and is occurring.

It seems to me only realistic, therefore, to admit that the U.N. has failed to provide international security and that the main cause of that failure is its own weakness, for which it is not responsible. The responsibility for that weakness must be shared jointly by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia; which at San Francisco in 1945 insisted together on the veto power and on restricting and limiting the authority of the U.N. in every important respect.

TRANSFORM U.N.

The fact that neither American military power nor the U.N.'s present structure can in the long run preserve peace or end the arms race has led us, the federalists, to advocate immediate steps to strengthen the U.N. and to transform it, giving it the power of a federal government stronger than its members and capable of protecting them as against each other.

In the last three years there has been a great deal of debate and discussion as to what changes are necessary in the U.N., what kind of a government it should become, and what powers should be given to it. Very briefly I wish to discuss from my own personal point of view those problems, because there are real and meaningful differences of opinions on these issues among men who share a common belief in the necessity for some type of world federal government.

PROPOSED POWERS OF U.N.

If the U.N. is to be able to protect its members, it must be given the constitutional authority to make and enforce law that is binding on national governments and on their individual citizens as their first duty. But once one has said that, one must add that this lawmaking power must be very clearly defined and strictly limited.

I think much of the opposition to the cause of world government comes from the fact that people do not understand what is actually being advocated. We do not advocate the creation of a world superstate with vast power to change the domestic institutions of the various nations and stamp out the differences between peoples and impose a common form of economic and social structure on the world. That is neither desirable nor necessary nor possible.

What we do advocate is that the U.N. should be given certain clearly defined and limited lawmaking powers sufficient to preserve the peace between the member states, and no more than that. The powers specifically necessary in the security field seem to be the following:

1. Power to prohibit the use of force by national governments in the settlement of their disputes, and to require the peaceful arbitration or judicial settlement of those disputes.

2. Power to control effectively the means of making war.

3. Power to limit and regulate national armed forces so that no nation is permitted to maintain more military power than it needs for preservation of order among its own citizens.

4. Power to control atomic energy in its potentially dangerous aspects, and to control certain other types of scientific development that can be easily diverted secretly to mass destruction.

5. Power to levy taxes to provide a dependable source of revenue, independent of the action taken by national governments.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN U.N. STRUCTURE

If even these minimum powers are to be given to the U.N., some change in its structure is required.

The present system of representation in the General Assembly is indefensible. One nation, one vote; Luxembourg one vote; Great Britain one vote; Nicaragua one vote; the United States one vote. We cannot expect any real authority ever to be given to an assembly based on that system of representation.

On the other hand, representation cannot be based on population alone. There are too many differences in the level of development between countries to permit that at this time, although it is an end toward which we must work.

It seems to me that a possible compromise can be found in a weighted system of representation in which population, literacy, and levels of economic development are taken together to determine the actual voting strength to which each country would be entitled.

Now, the Security Council. Obviously, the Security Council under its present structure is not an effective executive agency. It should be replaced by a cabinet responsible for the execution of the laws, operating without veto.

World courts are required with compulsory jurisdiction over the individual. We must recognize once and for all the futility of attempting to prevent war by trying to enforce sanctions against entire countries. We must base the enforcement procedure of any workable international organization on the principle of individual responsibility, which can be determined only in a court, according to known and established laws.

Finally, law is meaningless unless it can be promptly and decisively enforced. Therefore a world police force is required larger than the forces maintained by any separate state, and world inspection forces are needed with free access into every country to make sure that the prohibited armament is not being secretly manufactured.

That, very briefly, is the kind of security structure that seems to be the skeleton of any workable organization having a chance of keeping the peace.

LIMITATIONS OF U.N.

This structure of enforceable world law will not solve all the world's problems, and I think many federalists are guilty of believing that world government is a panacea. It is obviously no such thing. All it can do is give us a chance to solve the real economic and social problems of the world, freed from the fear of imminent war and from the pressures of a competitive arms race. If the power struggle could be ended by an enforceable rule of law, the resources that are now being squandered in that struggle could be used to raise living standards here and abroad and to extend the area of personal freedom.

The functional agencies of the U.N. will obviously have to be steadily strengthened in the authority they have and the powers they exercise, so that cooperative measures can be undertaken on the international level to deal with the real and long-term problem of mass starvation and low living standards.

STEPS TOWARD GOAL

Here at least are the objectives toward which we in the United World Federalists are working, and these are the prac-

tical steps that we think are necessary to reach these objectives.

First, we see the obvious need for an informed and aroused American public opinion, an insistent popular demand, focused on our legislators. And that demand is growing today. In Connecticut in an official ballot we got an eleven-to-one majority on a question as to whether our country should take the lead in the transformation of the U.N. into a world federal government. Similar majorities occur when the question is put elsewhere, as in Massachusetts, where the majority was nine to one. We think that is an impressive indication of the fact that the people are ahead of their leaders on this issue, that they are ready now to pay the price in terms of some limitation of national sovereignty in order to get a chance to live in peace.

This aroused opinion must then be focused through effective political action, so that we can be assured of a majority in the House and the Senate. We have now, I would say, about sixty men in the House and about eight Senators who are informed and active on our side. Our supporters expect in the near future to introduce a bill in the House which will, if passed, put the Congress on record on this issue. We hope and expect to get fifty to sixty men behind that bill when it is introduced, and we think we have a chance of passage.

In the state legislatures we are sponsoring a number of different types of legislation. Particularly interesting is the fact that recently the legislatures of Maine and California passed legislation calling upon the Congress to initiate a National Constitutional Convention under Article 5 of our Constitution for the purpose of making such amendments as are necessary to enable the United States to ratify and enter a world federal structure.

Once we have an assured majority in the House and the Senate, we can expect and demand action by the administration and the President, and we feel that that action should be a declaration that it is the goal of American foreign policy to move steadily toward the transformation and strengthening of the U.N. into an actual federation. Once that declaration is made, the next step is a careful and patient negotiation with all the other members of the U.N. to see if we can get initial broad agreement. If we can get that agreement, then and only then should a General Conference be called under Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations.

A review conference under Article 109 would act as a constitutional convention, and the results would have to be referred to each country for ratification; and in this country that would necessarily involve some amendment of our Constitution. It is a hard road and a long one, and we know it. But we really see no other way out of the dilemmas that we now face.

Small Nations Favorable

Fortunately, many of the smaller nations are with us. They fought for this at San Francisco in 1945, and they have fought for it since then. The constitutions of France and Italy provide that those governments can go into a world federation on condition that other nations join with them in doing so. The leaders of India, like Nehru and Dr. Sen, are strong advocates of our cause. Also the Prime Minister of Belgium, the President of France, the Ambassador of the Philippines, and the Ambassador of New Zealand have given us their support. Backed by strong, well-organized movements, there is very little doubt as to what the smaller countries would do if our country would lead with a specific proposal along these lines.

THE CASE OF RUSSIA

The problem of Russia remains. First, we know that Russia is a dictatorship, not a democracy, that it has no civil liberties as we know them. But we also feel that democracy is not going to be established in Russia by conquest through atomic war nor by threatening such a war. The effect of that kind of action is to strengthen the position of the present leaders in relation to their own people, since it gives the leaders the best propaganda card they have in trying to convince their people that our intentions are aggressive and that they must band together for defense against us.

Second, it seems to me quite clear that it would be much better and safer all around to have Russia in a world federation rather than outside. Outside it, she would remain free to compete for armament and prepare for war and she would be capable of secret and sudden attack. Inside it, she, together with other nations, would be subject to a common law; she would be subject to substantial national disarmament controlled by the world police force, the courts, and the inspectors.

Once all those assumptions have been made, I have to admit that the present leadership in the Kremlin is opposed to the idea of world government. As a matter of fact, the Moscow radio has spent some time attacking us, and it attacked me personally not so long ago as the fig leaf of American imperialism; I think that was the nice phrase used.

But it seems to me that we cannot assume that this opposition will last forever, and that there is a chance of acceptance by the Kremlin. That chance depends on how the proposal is made.

We must recognize that the transformation of the U.N. into a working security structure capable of making and enforcing law cannot be made without some kind of general settlement of the outstanding specific issues, and that, in fact, the two things are interdependent. There is no chance of settling specific issues such as Germany and Korea as separate problems; they are part of the over-all power struggle.

The chance of a settlement rests on an agreement to a working security structure that can guarantee that settlement. A mere treaty that can be torn up ten days after it is made is inadequate because there is too much distrust for nations to go into that kind of a treaty again. There must be assurance of effective enforcement if any settlement is to be made, and the achievement of a settlement and the achievement of a working security structure are interdependent, and it is in that context that the proposal should be made.

The possibility of acceptance by Russian leaders is due simply to the fact that in an atomic and biological war they stand to lose as much as or more than we do. They stand to be totally destroyed—their people, their cities, and the industries they have built up. There is a possibility that they may be realistic enough to change some parts of their present doctrine to conform to the facts, the reality being that war is no longer a means of advancing the national interests of any country, but has become a method of collective suicide for entire nations. There is a chance that both we and they may recognize that fact in time.

IF RUSSIA STAYS OUT

If at first, after patient negotiation, the Russians do not come in, I think we should then have no choice but to hold the U.N. together for all it is worth as a forum for discussion, but proceeding within it to form a federation of all those nations willing to join, providing that a majority are ready to go ahead. We should have to maintain the mili-

tary strength of that partial federation; we should have to improve its economic health; we should have to demonstrate that it was not an instrument for American domination and control; and, most important of all, we should have to hold out a standing offer of membership to those who remained outside, and reach the people of those countries with the knowledge that here was a fair and honorable opportunity to end the arms race that was continually open to them. We could then hope, over a period of time, through a wise course in the pursuit of that policy, to gain either a change of policy or leadership on the part of those nations that at first might remain outside.

The Chance of Success

This sequence of action provides the best practical chance of success. It is that for which we, the United World Federalists, are working, and we are encouraged by the growing popular support we are receiving and by the political support we are winning in Washington.

Our most effective opposition is not our active opposition, such as the extreme right and the extreme left. Our most effective opposition is the despair and the resignation to inevitable war of able and intelligent men who could do much fighting if they were on our side.

We must act and think and live in the profound conviction that men are neither so stupid nor so brutal as to be condemned to self-destruction. There were good words written recently by Robert Oppenheimer; they express hope and warning: "It is in our hands to see that the hope of the future is not lost because we were too sure that we knew the answers, too sure that there was no hope."

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What Road to World Government?

By Roger N. Baldwin

IN THE aspirations toward world government and in our effort to find a way out of the confused desperation of world conflict, I dismiss those idealistic blueprints which indicate that there is some way of beginning at some place where we are not, to go to the place where we want to go.

World Law Necessary

We must start where we are in order ultimately to get world government. And where we are is at a point in the United Nations of developing forms of world law which, like the aspirations for world government, will work directly upon individuals over and above the claims of national sovereignty.

I know my world-government friends do not conceive the United Nations in any such terms. They conceive the United Nations in terms of the supremacy of sovereign states who will not yield in matters of domestic concern any of their sovereign powers. And yet the United Nations is engaged today in work for an International Bill of Rights, both in conventions already adopted and in some in process, which will override the sovereignty of national states and will in fact deal with matters of domestic concern.

Within the United Nations there are varied approaches to the jurisdiction of international power over nations and over individuals, which undercut national sovereignty. The atomic energy proposals do so. Other proposals dealing with armed power hit straight at that mark—though quite impractical at the moment.

But the one on which I place chief emphasis is the series of proposals aimed at establishing bases for human rights, first envisaged in the Charter at San Francisco and then carried through repeatedly in document after document, culminating in the first Declaration of Universal Human Rights adopted at Paris in 1948 by the General Assembly. But it is only a piece of paper, say the critics. Surely; but principles come first, action after. That 48 out of the 58 nations agreed upon a statement of universal principles, is a hopeful augury for the more practical work of enforcement of those principles which inevitably must follow.

My world-government friends tell me we cannot wait for the slow process of developing international law to create a jurisdiction over individuals through international courts of justice. They maintain that the danger of war in the conflict between East and West is so profound that we must hurry on to a new and superior form of association of peoples throughout the world, resting the fundamental power of government in the peoples themselves, not in the representatives of governments, as in the United Nations.

Another World War Unlikely

If I believed that the present crisis of mankind was going to develop into another holocaust, I would accept any extremist measure of endeavoring to find a solution to the present impasse. But I do not think there is to be another world holocaust. In a half-dozen centers civil wars are raging, but I do not see, because of the nature of the conflict between East and West, the imminence of a world war.

On the side of Russia there is the powerful weapon of the infiltration of the Communist movement into the de-

mocracies and into the vacuums created throughout the colonial world by alien rule. With such a weapon there is no need of military ventures.

On our side, I do not conceive it possible that we will venture to meet the Communist challenge by any other than the means we are now using, namely, the support of weakened economies by the power of the dollar, the military alliance of the western peoples for what I believe are genuinely defensive purposes, and the hesitant aid we are beginning to give to democratic forces throughout the world.

COMPETITION WITH COMMUNISM

In the long run this impasse between East and West can be resolved only by demonstrating a superior system on the part of the western peoples. We have as yet failed to develop a system so superior to the rosy promises of the Communists to remedy the world's ills that we can appeal successfully to the peoples of the world to follow our leadership. Many embrace the Communist methods of salvation because they believe those methods to be at least able to overcome the evils from which they suffer under western systems.

In Japan and Germany recently I watched the unprecedented experiments of the United States and the Allied powers in selling democracy to the Japanese and German people. The Allies have done considerable in revising the institutional arrangements in those countries, looking toward democratic processes and solutions. But they have failed to encourage those centrist forces of democratic power based on the trade unions, the co-operatives, and the allied middle classes which alone can withstand subversion either by reaction on the right or Communism on the left.

The degree to which American foreign policy supports reactionary elements throughout the world is the degree to which it encourages the countermovement of Communism. Apparently our Government in Washington has still to learn the lesson that not all anti-Communists are our friends. The forces defending the existing order against change, and of course anti-Communist, are no friends of democracy.

When American policy supports the trade union movement everywhere, when it accepts socialism as the most effective opponent of Communism, when it makes distinctions between the democratic socialist approach to progress and the police-state Communist approach then it will have gained the highroad toward the democracy of the future.

EXPANSION OF STATE POWER

Today's discussion of the balance of power in relation to world government presumes on the one hand that the world could have peace without world government, and on the other hand that world government is the only guarantee of peace.

I do not think a balance of power between East and West is possible today, nor is there any possible reconciliation of democratic methods with the police state. In the long run, the power of democracy depends upon securing the allegiance of men's minds and the loyalty of people who see that in our free system lies salvation. As long as Communism holds a wide allegiance, there will be a powerful Communist anti-democratic movement. But as in England, the Communist appeal can be minimized by a vigorous and expanding democracy. Communism there is negligible, though annoying, because the British Labor Party offers to the average Britisher the means for solving the problems which beset England, by expanding democracy in industry, by enlarging the area of public ownership, and by planning controls, at the same time maintaining individual liberty and

political democracy. The British are traveling the road of democracy while they expand the power of the state.

Many critics in this country hold that the power of the state cannot be expanded without sacrificing liberty. But the brief experiment in England indicates that in a people like the British, with a strong tradition of liberty, the expansion of governmental power can be reconciled with the preservation of democratic liberties. It is a difficult experiment, but it is necessary if the world is to have those controls over the economy and that development of international order which require collective planning.

NECESSITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Those in the United States who hold that democracy is inseparable from free private enterprise and that socialism and communism are the equal enemies of democracy simply do not understand the necessities of other economies than our own. Here in the United States we can with some show of reason maintain that democracy and free private enterprise are inseparable, because we have enormous reservoirs of private capital on which to count in expanding our economic system. But most other countries are comparatively bankrupt, and the only way they can raise the capital necessary to maintain and expand their economies (except by borrowing from Uncle Sam, which seems to be the popular method today) is to reach into the tax pockets of the people.

These lessons are fundamental to any concept of human rights and of international order, because they concern the bases of power, out of which all rights grow. They need to be understood much more thoroughly by those too easily deluded by some mechanistic conception of a constitutional convention to create out of hand a world government. It is an alluring prospect, but one which totally ignores the bases of political and economic power in the vast majority of nations.

STEPS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the United Nations, on the other hand, there are hopeful tendencies toward practical international law which too few recognize as a highroad. They are to be found in the agreement of 48 out of 58 nations on a Declaration of Universal Human Rights, in the convention to outlaw genocide, in the drafting of a covenant to implement the Declaration of Human Rights which the Human Rights Commission will undertake shortly. There is also a commission at Lake Success which is undertaking a more significant and immediately practical task—that of devising a covenant among the nations for free communication through press, radio, and newsreels. That would break the scores of censorships, both commercial and political, which now impede the free flow of knowledge, opinion, and news among the peoples of the world. It would be an epochal contribution to international democracy among the signatory nations to get a common denominator of understanding based on correctly informed public opinion.

These steps tend to create the framework of that "one-worldism" and that international scheme of law which the advocates of world government visualize as the products only of a world governmental system. And yet we can thus apparently get at least some of the functions of a system of world government which its more extreme proponents wish to get only by a wholly new start.

BASES OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

But the essential foundations of world organization lie not within the United Nations machinery but in the universality of national power. Thus, the most essential development in the years

since the war is the rise to national independence of Oriental peoples long held under subjection by the western imperialist powers. Almost one-third of the faces at the United Nations today are not white, in contrast with the situation a few years ago. The darker peoples are rising to the full stature of nationhood and international equality. No world democracy is possible under imperialism. Only as these subject peoples all win their freedom and join in the comity of nations can the United Nations represent the world or can world government be considered.

There is a second force, equally significant, developing toward world democracy. As we examine the United Nations and see the character of their governments, we will recognize that more and more of them have, within a few years' time, come under the control of labor and its allies in the middle class. The labor and socialist governments, from Australia to Sweden, mark the progressive politics of a world showing an almost revolutionary change from governments dominated primarily by private property interests.

A very conservative Harvard professor said recently in an article in the *New York Times* that now in the United States we live in a "laboristic society." That is a professorial word. A laboristic society means one which tends to be dominated by values inherent in labor, not in property. And he interpreted the surprising election of last November in the United States as attributable to the sense of the American people that their interests lie with those sources of political power which will give us the "welfare state" to protect the interests, rights, and liberties of the masses.

These revolutionary transformations in the imperialist system and in the control of governments by labor and the middle class rather than by the propertied class are a hopeful basis for the kind of internationalism which the United Nations is capable of building. Whatever the United Nations can do rests ultimately on the sources and the character of the political power of the nations of which it consists.

When we can reach the grass roots of consumers and producers throughout the world, rather than the privileged classes who in the past have controlled them, we shall have begun to create those bases of power in the United Nations which make possible a world government over and beyond sovereign nations.

A third process that I have already implied is the system of world economic planning which is beginning to characterize such instruments of the United Nations as the International Trade Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and half a dozen others. They are planning the economics of the world to serve the people of the world. Even the limited Marshall plan is part of it. So is Mr. Truman's "Point Four," which is apparently going to be administered largely through the United Nations, as the Marshall plan should have been. These new forms of large-scale planning reflect a new type of "collectivism," representing the collective power and authority of nations and economic forces in the interests of the masses of the people.

These are all hopeful tendencies. These are the major developments around the United Nations, which, despite the impasse of power politics, offer hope that power politics and the resort to arms may be by-passed by creating conditions which will make war and armaments far less threatening.

QUESTIONS OF ENFORCEMENT

Some will ask, How are you going to get through even a strengthened United

Nations the enforcement of rights that will build genuine international law?

It is clear that nothing yet in the field of human rights suggests a means for enforcement. But there are proposals under active discussion for expanding the power of the world court so that individuals and associations may petition for "redress of grievances" and put cases before the court as we put them before the United States Supreme Court. A decision of the world court would then be binding even as against the courts of a signatory nation. That is, of course, a very far-reaching view of the jurisdiction of the world court, but it is one on which almost all the thinking of those who have visualized practical steps has been based.

The critics further ask: How will a world court enforce decisions without a world army or navy, or marshals such as the United States Supreme Court has at its command?

I suggest that the world court, enforcing what signatory nations have agreed to support as a Bill of Rights, will not much need the instruments of power. For if we have a common agreement that nations will abide by the decisions, they will do it, just as we do in the United States. When in the United States does the Supreme Court call in the army, the navy, or even the marshals to enforce a decision? Very rarely. Generally speaking, we accept without challenge the decisions of the Supreme Court as the ultimate power.

When the world comes to a similar point of agreement upon world law, we shall have established world government at a point of the utmost practicality. The judicial power can then reach way down to the Negroes of South Africa—perhaps even the Negroes of Alabama—to enforce the rights of the humblest minority anywhere in the world. At least, that is the vision of this possible line of progress toward an international jurisdiction over individuals which does not involve any great new scheme of world government.

NECESSITY FOR WORLD COURT

With the steps already taken, the vision comes nearer. Within a year or two, enforcement provisions for an International Bill of Rights will necessitate a judicial tribunal with power as against the courts of the nations. Before the Senate of the United States will shortly come the genocide convention, which gives United Nations agencies the power of enforcement as against violation by any signatory nation. There will be objections in the Senate. The American Bar Association is opposed to yielding the sovereignty of the United States to any international tribunal. But the power of those who support the expansion of international jurisdiction will, I think, succeed in getting Senate approval for this first document in history making the killing of people because of race or religion an international crime. It will be difficult to follow that through with a larger jurisdiction on the part of an international court, but this first necessary step is fortunately to be taken on an almost undebatable issue.

I have already suggested that in order to secure the wider jurisdiction of international agencies, it is necessary to have within the nations themselves those bases of popular power which tend to create a common standard of recognition of rights. World sources of power must be democratic enough to hold the allegiance of the peoples against the divisive appeals of Communism. The struggle is therefore both internal and international. It is a struggle in which the two parts complement each other. As the United Nations grows, it will grow more powerful out of the roots of increased understanding by the peoples of their common democratic goals.

PEACE THROUGH POPULAR SATISFACTION

There are those who hold that this is a futile road—tinkering with judicial machinery and courts—just pieces of paper. So is the Constitution of the United States a piece of paper, and the Supreme Court of the United States is only judicial machinery. The critics maintain that the real issues do not lie there; they lie in the control of arms, the machinery of physical power, and an international police force, which alone would make it possible to keep the peace.

But I suggest that even more relevant is the very intimate relation between peace and human rights. If once we strike at the causes of war by satisfying the claims and needs of people the world over, we shall undercut the resort to war and make unnecessary in the long run the instruments of war. Agreements on disarmament would follow the sense of unity which people would feel in the satisfaction of their political rights and economic needs.

Successful international machinery for peace is the result, not the creator, of the sources of democratic power. Only as those sources of power are strengthened by expansion of political, economic, and social democracy will the United Nations succeed in achieving a world order or open the highroad for the advance of the larger vision of world government.

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World Government via the United Nations

By Clark M. Eichelberger

THE answer to the subject of "World Government via the United Nations" can, according to my point of view, be given easily. World government has evolved and will evolve through the United Nations as the people are willing for it to evolve. The process has already begun.

I believe that all people who want peace realize that there must be some degree of world government, but we may disagree as to the timing, the form, and the amount. Among the peoples of the world and the member states of the United Nations, I would have just enough government to accomplish three objectives: political security, economic advancement, and the guarantee of human rights. I do not want any more government either locally or in the world than is absolutely necessary. But I believe a considerable degree of world government is needed in the highly complex and integrated world of today.

Basic Principles of World Government

Those who believe in world government want essentially a few definite things.

First, the law of the world community must be above the sovereignty of the individual nation. There must be a supreme law against war.

Second, there must be an executive authority strong enough to use police force or whatever measures are necessary to preserve the peace.

Third, there must be a constant procedure for producing such regulations as are necessary to lessen friction among the peoples of the world and enable them to grow and expand in their world community. It might be called the legislative process.

And above everything else there must be a sense on the part of the peoples of the world that they are members of a common society with common objectives and ideals toward world peace, toward economic advancement, and toward respect for human rights and the dignity of the individual.

I think every supporter of the United Nations and every advocate of any particular brand of world government or federation agrees on those fundamental principles.

The United Nations is the beginning of the processes that we need; any drastic revision of the Charter at this time would be not only unnecessary but dangerous. I wish to show briefly that the executive, legislative, and judicial processes are to be found in the present Charter.

World Solidarity Through U.N.

Government must be based on a community of interests and ideals. Without at least a minimum of common interests, world government cannot begin. So we start with the belief that people must understand that in an atomic age, in a world of such capacity for universal destruction, they have certain common interests.

It is perfectly natural that people in a certain neighborhood or community will reach an identity of ideals and interests that does not at present exist for the whole world. Yet, as I attend meetings of the United Nations, I am impressed with the fact that people of very great differences of historical background and philosophy and legal sys-

tems, faced with a great threat of world destruction, are finding common ideals through the United Nations. Nothing was more revealing than the third session of the General Assembly. As I listened to the representatives of India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and other representatives of the vast peoples of the Pacific, I was impressed with the fact that all the people of the world, with their ideological differences, are groping toward common standards of justice, democracy, fair conduct, and economic advancement. The very beginning of world government is that unity of understanding.

The greatest achievement of the United Nations to date has been its ability to hold the world together in the ideals that the nations accepted at San Francisco—ideals which they might not voluntarily have accepted several years later. Not only has the United Nations held the world together, but it has made possible year after year, day after day, the admission of additional peoples, particularly those of Asia. The solidarity developing in the United Nations is the very foundation of world government.

FLEXIBILITY OF U.N. CHARTER

Now let us examine the United Nations as a growing institution and scan its Charter.

Two years ago I spoke before the American Academy on "The United Nations Charter: A Growing Document." [1] I outlined four ways in which the United Nations Charter and organization might develop, and today it does not seem to have been very bad prophecy. I made the point then, and reaffirm it now, that the Charter is a comprehensive but loosely worded document; that almost any step we want to take toward greater world authority is possible under the present Charter if the nations will take full advantage of its provisions.

There are, of course, strict constructionists and liberal constructionists in the interpretation of the Charter, just as there were in the interpretation of the United States Constitution in early American history. There were those who said that the Government could do only what was expressly permitted in the Constitution. But this country did not then have railroads or the intensive economic and industrial development that came a few generations later. Today, within the provisions of the Constitution, Americans have found it possible to create the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and other bodies for regulation and control of this vast economic and industrial development.

There are those who say the United Nations Charter permits only the very narrowest interpretation, and under its authority only those steps may be taken that are clearly defined. On the other hand, there are those who say the nations may do by agreement whatever is not expressly prohibited in the Charter. Let me give you an illustration of the evolution that is taking place as to that point.

One of the men reputed to have had much to do with the drafting of the United Nations Charter told me at San Francisco that the American Association for the United Nations was wrong when we advocated an independent military force for the United Nations—that there was nothing in the Charter that permitted it. Yet the General Assembly meeting in May 1949 appointed a committee of fourteen to prepare a plan for a United Nations guard force, to be submitted at the next session of the General Assembly in September.

[1] *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 252 (July 1947), pp. 97–105.

The Secretary General will then have a guard force composed of men enlisting directly in it, wearing the uniform of the United Nations and marching under its flag. This force will be able to accompany United Nations officials on their various missions. Today there are 750 representatives of the United Nations in five troubled areas of the world, attempting the mediation and conciliation of disputes. In each case such a guard force is necessary.

Another illustration of the growing jurisdiction of the United Nations is to be found in the increasing authority given a recommendation of the General Assembly. It will be remembered that after adoption by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947 of its resolution providing for the partition of Palestine with economic union, some of the great powers became timid on the plan. They fell back on the excuse that a resolution of the General Assembly was, obviously only a recommendation and could not be enforced. At last, after months of negotiation and conflict, Israel has become a member of the United Nations. I doubt if any statesman would now assert that a recommendation of the General Assembly cannot be enforced, because in the last year and a half its resolutions have come to have greater and greater authority.

U.N. AS A SOVEREIGN BODY

One of the favorite clichés frequently heard is the statement that the United Nations is "just another League of Nations" and of course leagues never preserved the peace. Examination shows that the United Nations is not "another League." Time and again the Charter refers to the organization itself. If you will examine the Charter carefully you will find that the United Nations is a sovereign body in itself, and that its principal organs and the Secretary General may create such additional staff and bodies as are necessary to perform the functions of the organization. The nations, at a considerable sacrifice of sovereignty, are constantly building up a sovereign body in the United Nations.

The United Nations is far from a league—it is the beginning of world government. If it were not for the veto, the Security Council would contain all the aspects of executive authority that the World Federalists have advocated. In the Charter the nations confer upon the Security Council primary authority for the maintenance of international peace and security, and pledge themselves without any reservation to carry out in good faith the recommendations of the Security Council to that end.

In addition, the United Nations can establish whatever bodies are necessary to fulfill its functions.

It is doubtful if there were five men at San Francisco that knew that the atomic bomb was soon to be dropped on Japan. Obviously, the Charter could say nothing concerning atomic energy. However, there was nothing in the Charter to prevent the appointment of an Atomic Energy Commission. There was nothing to prevent the Commission from working out a program for atomic control, which program provides not only for U.N. inspection but for actual operation of certain plants. The plan even provides for a system of punishment of the individual as well as the nation that violates the atomic energy agreement. The members of the United Nations by general agreement can set in motion, through the U.N., processes of government as drastic as the Atomic Energy Commission recommends.

QUESTION OF ENFORCEMENT

A skeptic may say, But who is to force the adoption of the Atomic Energy Report on Russia? My reply is that no power is going to come down from

heaven and impose a greater sacrifice of sovereignty upon the nations. They must evolve and work toward it.

In this connection, it is healthy to remember that although the Government of the United States has been in existence over one hundred and fifty years, the Senate recently experienced a filibuster to prevent the enforcement of the human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the American Bill of Rights in a large part of our country which is denying them to people of the Negro race. We must not expect the United Nations in four years to develop the enforcement machinery for a guarantee of human rights that the United States Government has not been able to develop in over a century and a half.

NO OBSTACLE BUT THE VETO

As already stated, the General Assembly has started a process for setting up an international guard force. The American Association for the United Nations has advocated such a guard force for three years. The absolute necessity for it was proved by the assassination of Count Bernadotte.

There is nothing to prevent the United Nations from establishing a great military force. Except for the use of the veto, there is nothing that the world needs for the solution of its problems that cannot be accomplished through the present United Nations Charter. Of course, in time the veto must be done away with to a very great extent. It could be done away with by renunciation as far as the admission of new members is concerned, and settlements made under Chapter VI. The Charter provides that a decision of the Security Council shall be taken by a majority of seven including the votes of the five permanent members. However, it is now agreed that an abstention is not a veto, and frequently the great powers, including the Soviet Union, have abstained rather than cast a negative vote and have it count as a veto. I suppose the time will come when there will be a constitutional convention to revise the Charter as far as the veto is concerned.

REVISION NOT DESIRABLE NOW

Why am I opposed to the program of the United World Federalists for a constitutional convention to revise the Charter in the near future? Because I believe the Soviet Union and other governments would not attend. At San Francisco the nations agreed upon ideals expressed in the Charter, which they would not have agreed upon in the postwar reaction a year afterward. I would not want to risk impairing the present Charter by having a convention for its revision at this moment.

When the time is ripe for a revision of the Charter, the American Association for the United Nations will have its suggestions. We now have a committee to consider what recommendations we would make to such a convention. We are not making the studies of the committee public, for two reasons. In the first place, I think too much public discussion of revision of the Charter is harmful. In the second place, the United Nations may evolve along the lines I am indicating, far beyond any proposals that might be made for revisions in the Charter at a constitutional convention held in 1951 in accordance with provisions of the Charter.

DANGERS IN WORLD FEDERATION MOVEMENT

I should like to warn against certain dangers which are inherent in the movement for world federation. I have the greatest respect for my friends in the Federalist movement and in other world-government schools. Their contribution is breaking down the concept of supreme national sovereignty. All going

in the same general direction are making their contribution. So with all friendliness I may indicate certain things that I think they should guard against.

First, the advocates of world government should guard against a religious mysticism surrounding the subject. The attitude of some of their speakers is a bit like that of the old-fashioned evangelists who say that if one does not "believe," he is "lost." World government will be a long, evolutionary process, which has already begun. I resent the religious fervor that is now being stirred up, as if one must believe in the immediate absolute of world government and find salvation thereby, or be against it and be lost.

Second, those in the world federation movement should avoid giving the idea that the world can be saved by a constitution. The world can be saved only by the insistence of men and women that their governments fulfill their obligations under the United Nations Charter. If all the governments of the world were to make the United Nations the foundation of their foreign policy instead of making it an instrument of convenience to be used or not, as expediency demands, if all the nations were to put 100 per cent of their national energy into making the United Nations work, nobody would need to talk of world government and federation.

There are times when the task confronting men and nations is one of mind and spirit—to bring their practices up to the constitution that they adopt. That is our task today. Our practices are not yet up to the constitution that we adopted at San Francisco. It may be that three or ten or thirty years from now, the major task will again be a constitutional one—to revise the United Nations Charter. Our task now is to make the United Nations the foundation of our ideals and our foreign policy.

DANGER OF ESCAPISM

Finally, I would warn against escapism. It is very easy to say, Well, if there were a world federation instead of the United Nations Charter, all these problems would be solved easily.

One of the most nearly perfect illustrations of escapism I have seen was in one of the World Federalist publications, where there was a statement to the effect that the United Nations was not strong enough to deal with the Palestine problem, but if we had a world federation there would not be any Palestine problem. There *was* a Palestine problem. It was properly resolved in the resolution of November 29, 1947. The governments went through a period of hesitancy in trying to reduce the effectiveness of that resolution. They could not do it. Now we have the great pleasure of seeing Israel admitted as a member of the United Nations. And we shall see a great political and economic advance in the Middle East.

We cannot escape from the task of making the United Nations work. I am afraid that much of the advocacy of world government is taking people's minds off the task of seeing to it that the United Nations meets the problems before it.

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN U.N.

I think we all believe in whatever sacrifices of sovereignty and legislative practices are necessary to achieve political security, economic advancement, and human rights. We may not be agreed as to the means of accomplishment. For illustration, I believe that regional federalism will develop, but I do not believe that the American federal experience can be imposed upon sixty nations with such a variety of historical experience. However, I believe that world government is coming

through new forms—many of them administrative forms, such as the agency recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission.

These developments will take place within the United Nations. I believe that the United Nations is the beginning of world government and law. I believe if we work zealously to fulfill the obligations under the Charter, and expand it by interpretation, we can do anything we want to do in evolving toward world government. And I would caution again against the escapism that insists that we cannot do anything until we have changed the document. Nothing will take the place of hard work of men and women in this country and throughout the world.

The United States is the strongest member of the United Nations. Public opinion in this country counts. Therefore, American public opinion can be a most important factor in the world today. Let us therefore see to it that we are a part of the overwhelming public opinion to make the United Nations work.

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The United Nations or World Government

By Robert Mills McClintock

AT THE outset I wish to say that the views expressed here are my own, and not necessarily those of the Department of State.

However, the Department of State, or any foreign office, has a dual function to fulfill. In considering the question of the United Nations or World Government, or any other question, we have to formulate our foreign policy in response to the mandate of the American people, and at the same time we must formulate a policy that is worthy of that mandate. We performed this latter function in doing spadework for the United Nations. From the outset, when the first draft was made at Dumbarton Oaks, and again at San Francisco, the State Department sought to formulate policies which we hoped would be responsive to and meet with response from the American people.

Now on this world government problem, we have the other function. We must face the questions, Do the American people want world government? If so, how should they get it? What foreign policy should be devised to achieve that goal?—knowing, as we do, that the American people, like the people of every country, I think, have as their primary goal the achievement of an enduring peace based on *freedom*.

No one can question the sincerity of those who advocate world government as the formula which will bring surcease from sorrow and bring about the primary goal that all right-thinking nations want—that is, enduring peace based on freedom. Yet we must ask the questions, Why, when, and how?

I am in favor of any system of international organization that will keep enduring peace with freedom. If we can do it by world government, let us do it that way; if through the United Nations, we should do it through the United Nations. I do not care what the system is, as long as it works. Yet there are a few questions that arise.

Divergent Views

In the present state of affairs we most regrettably have a divergence of view and policy and aim as between the Communist-dominated portion of the world and those nations of the West which are free and independent and democratic, and believe in individual liberty. I wonder how world government can compose those differences within a more close framework than we have in the United Nations, which was designed to be a center for harmonizing the efforts of national states to achieve world peace.

When the United States, with the backing of ten other nations, prepared and submitted a proposal for international control of atomic energy with the idea of condign punishment for any nation that violated that agreement, our efforts regrettably came to nought; the Soviet Union has consistently blocked agreement on a plan approved by an overwhelming majority of U.N. members. Now, on the basis of that experience, can we feel that we can all pull together in one new world-government organization?

Representation

Another question is, What shall be the basis of representation in world government? As a student at Geneva many years ago, when every state had its

sovereign vote and therefore, in effect, a veto on the proceedings of the League of Nations, and again in my work at San Francisco and since, I learned how difficult it is to reconcile the views of sovereign states, or, to use what to me is a fairly meaningless phrase in the United Nations Charter, states of "sovereign equality."

Should we have representation in the world government by counting noses, and therefore should the four hundred million Chinese and the two hundred million Russians outweigh the one hundred and forty million Americans? Or should it be done by counting the national states, so that the vote of the small states, such as Haiti and Luxembourg, would equal that of the immense millions of India? Or should the representation be based, as some of our World Federalist friends say, on the number of tons of steel a nation can produce, or the number of yards of textiles its looms can weave? Under this standard we might exclude representation of a higher philosophical and ethical value.

LACK OF AGREEMENT

Even more burning is the question raised by the Governor of Connecticut in his article in *Harper's*—the question of how the world government is to apply preponderant force over national states. Because of the "rule of unanimity," to which Dr. Vilfan has referred,[1] the United Nations has been prevented from acquiring even the modest striking forces designed, not to prevent wars between superstates—because they could not—but to prevent small wars which may spread into world-wide conflagrations.

But the question which seems to me to have no answer is, If we have regrettably been unable thus far to get complete compliance with the lesser obligations of the United Nations, how can we expect to secure compliance with the greater obligations of world government? If that question were answered, then I should say, indeed, world government is at hand.

UNFULFILLED HOPES OF UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is certainly not what we thought four years ago, at San Francisco, that it was going to be. At that time it represented the highest—or perhaps the lowest—common denominator of agreement on certain fundamental principles of decent conduct which could be reached by sovereign states. That was the high-water mark at San Francisco. I think we have receded from it; but the Charter contains such seeds of growth that we can regain that high-water mark, and indeed far surpass it.

At the recent celebration on the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, my mind went back to the signing of the United Nations Charter. It was ironic, perhaps, that some of the people signing the Atlantic Treaty had also signed the Charter. But I think there is no incompatibility between those two acts. The Charter was based on certain assumptions which do not hold true today.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AT SAN FRANCISCO

One of these assumptions was the rule of unanimity of the big powers. According to Dr. Vilfan's reasoning, that can still be achieved by the simple

[1] This reference is to an address delivered before the American Academy by Dr. Joza Vilfan, Permanent Representative of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations. In planning this volume it was expected that the address by Dr. Vilfan would be included, but at the last moment he found it impossible to check the manuscript for publication. This and other references by Mr. McClintock to Dr. Vilfan's article should be read with this in mind.—EDITOR'S NOTE.

device of agreement on the part of everyone with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Another point was not even an assumption; it was a solemn pledge entered into by the great powers, which stated that the right of veto would be used sparingly and on the most solemn occasions. Yet Dr. Vilfan tells us that the thirtieth veto has been cast by the U.S.S.R., and it was, apparently, a relatively frivolous veto. According to his somewhat involute logic, the United States has been an instigator of the Soviet vetoes. If we would just agree at all times with the U.S.S.R., of course there would be no Soviet vetoes.

In 1947, when Greece was threatened by infiltration from the north and we set out to get effective action in the Security Council of the United Nations, two Soviet vetoes were cast; and our representative said that we would not stand idly by and see the purpose of the great United Nations Charter stultified by flagrant misuse of the veto power. To meet that situation we proposed the Little Assembly, in order, as Dr. Vilfan says, to get things done by use of the majority rule. He did not add that the Soviet Union boycotts the Little Assembly, and that neither Russia nor Yugoslavia has participated as a member.

Later, Dr. Vilfan says that the United Nations is the first international organization to achieve its processes by majority vote. I find a certain discrepancy between his objections to the Little Assembly, which also reaches its decisions by majority vote, and his praise of the United Nations for the same thing.

The third basic assumption at San Francisco was that security forces would be established under the Security Council under Article 43. Now, the representatives of the five great powers sat month after month in New York trying to work out the first principles of organization of those forces which would preserve peace. It was almost eighteen months before the Soviet representative even produced something on paper that said what his Government might be willing to consider, and it was that very lack of ability that made it impossible for the Security Council to have any striking force.

GROUPINGS FOR SELF-DEFENSE

I have shown that the basic assumptions at San Francisco have not been fulfilled, and I leave it to my readers to judge why they have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, we do not despair. By the experience of these four years, we have learned how to accomplish certain results. What we are trying to do is to keep the United Nations as a going concern which will keep the peace; and we want a United Nations which will keep an enduring peace based on freedom, and not mere absence of conditions where people are at each other's throats.

The Charter itself showed the way to do this. If we lacked big-power unanimity, we nevertheless had the means whereby through regional groupings for self-defense, in full compliance with the Charter, we could enable those nations which wanted to live according to the Charter to carry out their ideals.

A hint of this was given even before the United Nations was born. At the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (the so-called Chapultepec Conference), held in Mexico, D. F. in March 1945, it was affirmed that a threat against any of the American fraternity of states would be regarded as a threat against all. Then the fraternity of American states met in Rio de Janeiro in September 1947 and signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

The European nations, which had

also felt the stultifying effect of the situation in the United Nations, were quick to take that hint. Under the impetus of that great statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Western European Union was formed and the Brussels Pact, which also embodied the principle of the Act of Chapultepec, was signed in March 1948.

As I said at the outset, we in the Department of State are responsive to the will of our people, but must base foreign policy on what we think it is proper that we should do. So it was extremely important that in June 1948 the Senate, by a vote of 64 in favor and only 4 against, pointed out that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provided for collective self-defense. The State Department reacted to that resolution passed by such a conclusive vote, and the answer is the North Atlantic Pact.

SIGNIFICANCE OF REGIONAL GROUPINGS

I envision within the framework of the United Nations Charter, and carrying out the ideal of the Charter, a growing pattern of overlapping circles of mutual interest in keeping the peace on a regional basis, which will eventually blend into the grand harmony of some form of world order superior to national sovereignty. Thus, the inter-American system is already overlapped by the Atlantic Pact community, and the Atlantic powers overlap the Mediterranean area with the application of the Atlantic Pact to Italy and the Algerian departments of France. In time these circles may spread to cover the Near East, possibly a regional arrangement for southeastern Asia, with India as the center of gravity, and eventually the Far East.

Now, this is not an aggressive attempt. Action is not to be taken under Article 51 unless a member of the United Nations is attacked by overt, armed force. People complain that the North Atlantic Treaty is a military alliance. Of course it is; but more important, it is an effort to put on paper the facts of international life as they have come to be over the past four years. The Atlantic Pact is also of fundamental significance in its emphasis on international economic and social co-operation. We find in the Benelux union that three countries can do without customs barriers. They have a Customs Union. We see that France and Italy are on the point of reaching a similar arrangement. And we see, as Mrs. Myrdal has so excellently explained,[2] the infinite ramifications of the specialized agencies of the United Nations providing access to beneficent forces which will help us to eradicate those economic and social ills which are so often the causes of war.

I took my little boys to the circus recently, and as I saw the daring young man on the flying trapeze, I thought of some of our antics in the Security Council, and of how happy the young man must be to have a safety net below him. I think the North Atlantic Treaty and the other regional arrangements which I have described may also be a safety net until we reach the point where, by using the United Nations seriously and courageously, we can really make it the center for harmonizing the actions of states to preserve peace with freedom.

CONCLUSION

I agree wholeheartedly with Dr. Vilfan in his concluding remarks. I take him sincerely at his word that he wants to work in the United Nations to prevent war, and that it must be a center for harmonizing the seemingly rival aspirations and policies of the various governments.

We need a great deal of patience, a

[2] See Alva Myrdal in this volume.

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great deal of luck—because luck is one of the famous inconstants among the constant factors of diplomacy. If we can write such treaties as we have been discussing, in all honesty and candor, carrying out the principles and purposes of the United Nations, I, for one, am optimistic as to the future. If we could only get governments and peoples to abide by even the first two articles of the United Nations Charter, we should either have world government—or we should have a world government that we should not have to worry about.

I, in common with my colleagues, have not only to look at all the proposals of world government with sympathy and understanding judgment, but also to hold them against the light to see if they will really work and if they will carry out the basic policy of the American people, which is enduring peace with freedom.

At the age of sixteen I walked through a terrible valley outside Verdun and saw the place where in six months 600,000 men had been killed; and I saw the trench at Douaumont with the bayonets still sticking up above the earth where an entire French company had been buried alive. For that reason I entered the Foreign Service, thinking that thus I might have a chance to do something in a small personal way to combat the terrible threat of war. In seventeen years of service I have seen one revolution, and one massacre in which, by the will of one man, 5,000 people were killed in a week, and have been through two wars.

I have also been to San Francisco and have seen in the eyes of right-minded people the conviction that with good will, endeavor, and honest purpose, we can achieve our goal. I think that conviction is justified by the fact that in this gathering of the American Academy of Political and Social Science there have been people from Sweden and Yugoslavia and the United States speaking on the same platform—with widely different emphases, I admit—on the same subject. That of itself is a cause for encouragement. So I trust that we or our children shall yet see what the poet predicted, "The Parliament of Man and the Federation of the World."

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Regional Dynamics in World Affairs

By Randle Elliott

IF THE study of international affairs has brought to me any particularly outstanding conclusions, they are, first, that we can progress most rapidly in international government by taking advantage of the administrative machinery that is already available to us, and making the most of it. We must build the more ideal world of tomorrow upon realities of today. Secondly, any international government, to succeed, must be based on real community sentiment. Common peace-enforcement responsibilities, especially, should be accepted in the first instance by nations sharing the same will for community in many different fields of international activity. For no international police force can be fully effective as an agency for the application of sanctions unless the area within which it is expected to operate is coextensive with the existence of a genuine feeling of community among the participating nations.

This is the fundamental—although naturally not the only—idea behind the North Atlantic Pact. Community sentiment expands only slowly, and there is still not enough evidence to suggest that it has attained global proportions. Under present conditions, it simply is not realistic to assume that the ideal of "One World" has become universally rooted deep enough to ensure that nations everywhere will be willing to accept the sacrifices necessary to stop a determined violation of the peace in any part of the globe. Canada, for example, could scarcely be expected to go to war, at the drop of a hat, to preserve the independence of Afghanistan. Nor could Norway be counted on to send troops against the aggressor in a Central or South American conflict. But both countries would be ready to help arrest the outbreak or the spread of hostilities between two countries on their own doorstep. For when war strikes close to home, each nation more clearly sees its own safety endangered.

Process of Community Expansion

The process of community expansion, nevertheless, has continued steadily from the beginning of recorded time. Through the creation of new associations formed to unify and direct community activities, this steady expansion has provided a dynamic source of energy for the direction of both national and international affairs. The earliest signs of growing community appeared in the social relationships of ordinary individuals. Many of these are still apparent, and form the basis of larger, more far-reaching, communities. First came family groups; then associations of families, as in a parish community. Out of these grew municipal governments; later on, provincial or state governments; and ultimately national governments.

Even now, the existence and effectiveness of the nation-state is possible only because it represents the ambit of a community composed of its citizens. It is merely an association formed to serve the national community, to maintain order among the lesser associations. Whenever the state ceases to represent a real community spirit, its sanction reverts to the lesser associations, and revolution results. The equivalent of revolution in the international realm is war, or strife between the great state associations. States can

be kept orderly through a greater association only when it represents a genuine community broader than those supporting the states themselves. If we want to have our international relations conducted uniformly in accordance with respect for law, it is essential that we discover the outer reaches of community spirit, and then clearly define the primary peace-enforcement responsibilities of an international government for that area. Since international community of interest in many important matters is less than world-wide, regional arrangements are increasingly being used as practical devices to stimulate international co-operation in certain parts of the world.

GROWTH OF REGIONAL COMMUNITIES

The growth of regional communities, cutting across national frontiers, has been a slow but encouraging development on the road toward eventual world government. After all, Rome was not built in a day; and it has required sixty years of determined effort to build up the idea of Western Hemisphere solidarity. During these years since 1889, a joint inter-American approach to many vital international problems—such as highway development, control of communicable diseases, and migration of workers—has led to the rise of a new center of power in this region.

As we study the changes in international economic and social relationships, it seems possible to trace the rise of certain dynamic cultures which have greatly influenced the course of world history. In the Western Hemisphere, I believe, we have a magnetic field of culture, a new fulcrum of world power, which has grown up within the past few decades. It has resulted from a type of revolutionary energy created by the fusion of the predominantly French and Hispanic cultures of Latin America with the Anglo-Saxon culture of the United States. Working almost like a chemical reaction, fusion of the inter-American community has generated a wealth of new energy in the conduct of international affairs in this hemisphere.

Similar, though smaller, dynamic centers of social, economic, and political power have evolved through years of close co-operation among other groups of countries, such as the Scandinavian states, the Benelux countries, and the Arab League in the Middle East. The British Empire constitutes still another association of nations for common purposes, although it is a special type of interest group built around non-geographic ties. The Soviet Union, too, forms a dynamic regional unit which obviously must be reckoned with in world affairs. Experience of the past thirty years shows that the driving community spirit in groups like these could be and should be turned to constructive purposes in international government.

WORLD ORGANIZATION PREMATURE

Today, for the second time in our generation, mankind is engaged in a great postwar quest for some kind of international world community. Eventually it must come. In some limited technical matters, universal communities of interest already exist, and have provided sound foundations for workable, world-wide associations (such as the Universal Postal Union) which are doing a good and necessary job in their own functional fields. But in the vital matters of national security and political independence, this advanced global stage of community development is just now starting to take place. If we try at one fell swoop to establish a world-wide agency for the compulsory, universal application of sanctions and enforcement of peace, we shall overreach the bounds of real community and

cause the new world peace organization to collapse of its own weight.

This type of overambition, in my opinion, was a major defect of the great League of Nations experiment. During the past ten years we have heard a great deal of disparagement of the League of Nations and its attempts toward world government. Much of this disparagement, of course, is justified. After all, the League did fail in its primary responsibility of preventing another world war. But we still have much to learn from that experiment, and I think it is in order for us now to draw from the League's experience some pertinent lessons that are equally applicable under the United Nations. For again today, as in 1920, hope for peace and security has been entrusted to the mechanistic devices of a world-wide international organization.

One of the vital problems in instituting any form of international government is to strike a balance between the innate idealism of statesmen and the realities of the situation at hand. The statesman is prone to peer into the future to set up, before its time, the system that might evolve in the course of normal experience if only free evolution were permitted. The philosophers of international organization, with remarkably few exceptions, have always looked toward a universal basis for any peace system that might be established; and in 1919 the founders of the League of Nations were strongly influenced by the same ideal of one peace for the entire world.

REGIONALISM IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Even before the final text of the League Covenant had been initialed, however, a negative form of regionalism emerged among groups of delegations to the Peace Conference at Versailles. They voiced the unwillingness of their peoples to accept binding commitments to aid victims of attack in distant parts of the world, where they had little or nothing at stake. This attitude, first expressed by the Scandinavian delegates in March 1919, gained ground rapidly after the League set up shop in Geneva a year later. Canada, supported by many of the non-European countries, led a three-year campaign to have the territorial-guarantee clause of the Covenant deleted or debilitated. These views were finally reconciled in the League resolution that each member state was free to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant had been committed. Although it was not fully realized at the time, that doctrine spelled the effective end of the League's attempt to achieve universal security.

As an alternative to the weakened general guarantees of the League Covenant, various experimental security plans—incorporating regional features—were developed at Geneva in the mid-1920's. They included Lord Robert Cecil's resolutions of 1922, Lieutenant Colonel Réquin's 1922 plan for regional aid pacts, the 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the Geneva Protocol of 1924. But all of these schemes failed to achieve endorsement by the League Assembly, chiefly because of strong opposition by Great Britain, whose world-wide empire impelled it to hold out for world-wide territorial guarantees. As a result, various groups of states gradually banded together and undertook, among themselves, to build up regional machinery for mutual assistance in case an aggressor violated the peace of their respective areas. Thus the Little Entente, the Locarno system, the Balkan Entente, and the Baltic bloc came into existence. The object of all these schemes was to make the receipt of military aid more certain, for a victim of aggression, by making peace-enforcement responsibilities coin-

cide more nearly with the bounds of genuine international community.

BASES OF UNITY

The outer limits within which community sentiment is decisive naturally vary for different purposes. For cultural relations there may be one community, for economic matters another, and for political affairs still another. The whole interrelationship of living forces combines to create the truest community in the small, intense form familiar to all of us—the family, the congregation of a church, the members of a local lodge. This is the community with a predominantly territorial content. As communal bounds reach out, fewer and fewer of these forces remain common to all members or parts of the society, and unity is effected on the basis of similar interests rather than common interests. In the case of great associations like the nation-state, powerful opposition to existing regimes continually arises because mere likeness of interest cannot be transformed into perfect community of interest. Under these circumstances, the small, intensive community retains the full force of its original compactness, and the larger one is simply superimposed.

Clearly, there is no fundamental antagonism between the different types of community. Each fulfills its own useful purpose, and all can benefit from a harmonious integration of small communities and interest groups within a larger association created to serve the whole society. In fact, associations of communities may in time extend themselves on a federal pattern until eventually the entire world becomes a true family of nations. Such a world family, properly organized, would voluntarily submit to a single recognized community law, yet would preserve the social and legal controls of smaller communities whose development precedes in the historical process. Community expansion along these lines is already on the march throughout the world. But since the control of society by mores diminishes as the limits of community extend, a crying need today is to expand international legal controls and thus synchronize them with the broadened bases of communities.

CONTROLS FOR INTEREST GROUPS

These new legal controls in the international field often might follow the lines of interest groups. More and more reliance would then be placed on laws and treaty regulations like those governing postal relations, radio communications, lighting of ships, harbor regulations, commercial air transport, sanitation standards, poison gas restrictions, and numerous other functional fields in which peoples the world over may have common interests.

The extension of controls for interest communities, however, often tends to involve relatively innocuous activities, and leave controversial problems unregulated. Naturally there are some exceptions, which do grapple with the tough problems and take the rough edges off potential sources of serious international friction. A notable achievement of interest-community regulation was the Five-Power Treaty of February 1922, for the limitation of naval armaments among the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

But more often, when controversial topics are the subject of a successful international convention, they are worked out within regional limits.

FUSED BY COMMON PROBLEMS

One of the most promising lines of progression toward the enforcement of international law is through regional controls within those geographical areas where intercommunity—social, cultural, economic, and political—has permeated

the basic necessities of life and rendered inseparable the conditions of coexistence. As the recognition of common problems and the growth of common characteristics make it possible to identify the members of incipient communities, new associational controls must be set up to regulate the new regional groups.

The rapid development of associational forms for regional international government in the Western Hemisphere since World War II is a logical sequel to the wartime impetus given to intercommunity among all the American republics. Soon after September 1939, when the Allied blockade cut American nations off from their traditional ties to the European Continent, the Western Hemisphere peoples realized that they were all in the same boat. They turned increasingly to one another to fill gaps left by Europe's withdrawal from their pattern of life. Inter-American bonds were greatly strengthened through unprecedented activity in inter-American exchanges of students and teachers, literature, language instruction, folklore, health and sanitation data, raw materials, manufactures, defense plans, and technical military information. An acute sense of interdependence and mutual understanding flourished throughout the twenty-one American republics.

Then, in March 1945, the Mexico City Conference capitalized on this wartime growth of community sentiment. For the first time, it assigned political functions to a central agency—formed from the old nonpolitical Pan American Union—for all the Latin American countries and the United States. It also called for a regional treaty of mutual military assistance among these same American states. Within three years, the Rio de Janeiro Pact and the Bogotá Conference had established, in the Western Hemisphere, the first regional security structure under the United Nations Charter.

In much the same way, a second important regional association was set up —for western Europe—by the Brussels Pact of March 1948. And now the new North Atlantic Pact reflects the growing sense of community among maritime nations that share the same hazards of war in this part of the Western world.

DELIMITATION OF THE REGION

The chief problem in setting up international regional machinery is the practical one of delimiting specific regions. In most cases it requires exhaustive study of the social, economic, and political factors involved, and intimate acquaintance with each region concerned. Geography and history do not often combine readily to spur the development of a genuine international community association like the inter-American system, or even like the Western European Union created by the Brussels Pact.

Considerations or political and military expediency, as well as historical community ties, determined the composition of the North Atlantic alliance of April 1949. Unquestionably the common cause of military and economic co-operation during World War II—with many resultant and effective working agencies like the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Middle East Supply Center—did much to promote a genuine feeling of community among the Western Allies. But now by including Italy, which did not share in those Allied efforts during the war and does not border on the Atlantic, the new North Atlantic Pact seems to have overextended itself as a community instrument. Our bonds of real community with Italy are hardly strong enough at this stage to justify bringing Italy into the pact, however desirable the inclu-

sion may have been on strategic grounds.

The North Atlantic security area becomes frankly experimental as a regional device, too, by including Norway and Denmark but not Sweden. We know from testimonies of Danish and Norwegian statesmen that they preferred a Scandinavian defense arrangement which would have bound together those nations that historically have been united for many purposes in a genuine community. But Sweden was unwilling to come in on that deal with Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. Under these conditions, I believe we should have had a much sounder regional structure if at the outset none of the Scandinavian states had been included in the North Atlantic Pact, but if they could all have been brought in later as a subregional group. In this way the new regional security area might have been extended group by group, and its responsibilities defined not only in the military field but in every possible field of human activity.

A Deterrent to Aggression

For all its emphasis on expediency, however, the North Atlantic Pact—like the Rio Pact of 1947 and the Brussels Pact of 1948—is no accidental device to get around the Soviet-American rift that has shattered the initial hope and confidence with which the United Nations was launched. The postwar resort to regional formulas of international government is a natural extension of trends which had already become clear a few years before the outbreak of World War II. In 1936 the League of Nations began a careful two-year study, based on international developments between the two world wars, to find out how the League might be strengthened following its failure to stop Japanese aggression in the Far East, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, and Nazi Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 prevented carrying out the recommendations of that distinguished "Committee of Twenty-eight," but its conclusions can give us an invaluable guide for putting teeth into the United Nations today. The Committee discovered that regional security pacts offer a good chance to deter an aggressor by ensuring that the punishment for any act of aggression will be automatic and immediate.

Regional groups of states, because of their limited geographical extent, are better able than the world society to foresee, in detail, all the tactical possibilities of attack within their own jurisdictions, and to take precautionary steps. They can more readily specify in advance the types and qualities of aid—both military and economic—required from each party to the agreement in case of aggression. Hence regional sanctions, being quicker than universally applied measures, can more surely deprive an aggressor of the strategic advantage of surprise action, and can best cushion the attack for the victim until the more cumbersome universal machinery can become operative. Thus one of the major contributions of regionalism, at the present time, might be to ensure the effective application of military sanctions against an aggressor, according to clear definitions agreed upon in advance.

Aggression Defined

One of the great stumbling blocks to the enforcement of international law has been the problem of getting the lawabiding nations to reach agreement as to which country is the lawbreaker when hostilities occur. Until they agree, no co-operative sanctions against the aggressor are possible. The London conventions of July 1933 and the pact of the Balkan Entente in 1934, however, showed that it is not difficult to de-

fine aggression in specific terms prior to any overt act—so that when the actual attack comes, sanctions can be applied automatically by countries in the vicinity of the conflict. According to the London treaties of 1933, a state would be adjudged the aggressor in a conflict whenever it is the first to commit any of five acts: to declare war; to invade another country with armed forces, even without a declaration of war; to attack (by land, sea, or air) the territory, naval vessels, or aircraft of another country; to blockade foreign coasts or ports; or to permit armed bands to operate from its territory against another country.

Such criteria of what constitutes aggression—if written into the statutes of the machinery contemplated under the Rio de Janeiro, Brussels, and North Atlantic Pacts—would further strengthen the regional groups.

WORLD-WIDE MACHINERY NECESSARY

There is no question of weakening the United Nations, for regional peace-enforcement devices can never supplant the continuing need for world-wide organization. Any would-be aggressor in a given area, whether or not a party to a regional pact, could readily calculate in advance the likely weight of the regional military forces that might be brought against him in case he should attack a neighbor. He would surely reckon on this opposition before beginning his conquest, and would not attempt the venture unless confident he could overwhelm the policing forces. Therefore the military function of regional sanctions is primarily in the nature of a delaying action, to slow down the aggressor until the universal sanctions can come into play.

Universal machinery is also needed to reinforce military police action with economic sanctions, which, by their nature, must be world-wide in order to be effective. After all, if only one nation in the world is willing to supply arms and ammunition to an international aggressor, the whole force of economic sanctions will be seriously weakened. But the initial regional measures are still necessary in order to spark the universal machinery into action before it is too late.

FOR SUCCESS OF REGIONAL BLOCS

It must constantly be remembered that the resort to regionalism will not automatically provide an easy solution for the problems of international government. The League of Nations experience, time and again, revealed certain needs which must be met if regional blocs of states are to strengthen the general arrangements for world peace and security. These lessons should be re-learned now, as we assume new regional commitments under the North Atlantic Pact.

First, the effective use of regional formulas requires continuous and persevering efforts—to resolve the seeds of conflict whenever possible in advance of an open flare-up, and to cope with any sudden violation of the peace. Periodic consultation alone is not enough. The consultation-and-conference method proved to be the undoing of two earlier regional systems which in their time were viewed with considerable hope: the Washington Treaties of 1922 and the Locarno Pact of 1925.

This means, secondly, that a permanent body of negotiators should be built up for each functioning regional group, and that time-honored bilateral diplomacy must give way to a new type of collective diplomacy. The United States Government has necessarily assumed leadership in negotiating the North Atlantic Pact, in order to get the job done. But now, as soon as possible, co-operative procedures of collective diplomacy should be established, so that all the North Atlantic nations will have at their

joint disposal the machinery required for the continuing examination of their common problems.

Finally, each regional association should also be provided with a permanent civil service, composed of technical experts and administrators, to stimulate multiple contacts among all states included in the region. These contacts will help solidify the regional community, not only by fostering cooperation in the field of peace and security, but also by promoting mutual interests in cultural, social, economic, technical, and administrative matters. The causes of international friction can best be removed through such a common approach along a broad front embracing all fields of human activity.

REGIONALISM WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS

In these ways the three important regional groups formed since World War II could be strengthened to serve as arms of the United Nations. All of them, appropriately, have been tied to the United Nations under Articles 47 to 54 of the Charter, although the initiative in forming each of the groups was taken by the countries themselves.

Profiting now from the interwar experience of the League of Nations, the U.N. would be well advised not to wait passively for countries in each region to undertake the formation of political blocs entirely on their own accord. Rather, under provisions of its Charter, it should officially encourage the establishment of new regional associations for the still amorphous communities of nations in southeast Asia, the Middle East, and eastern Europe. All these constructive, co-operative associations should be harmonized within the framework of the United Nations, and all should accord the Security Council full authority of examination and review. They should be encouraged, not as stopgap measures or as a retreat from universalism, but as the deliberate, positive creation of new, permanent international agencies with a purpose.

Along this path of purposeful planning, the amorphous regions now forming could be crystallized. With adequate safeguards for peaceful change, in time they could be redefined or merged to conform with the growing sense of community, which must eventually embrace the whole world if universal peace and security is to become a reality.

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An Asian Views World Government

By B R. SEN *

THE ideas of renunciation of war as an instrument to settle human affairs, and of a world government to enforce a world law, are, I need hardly say, not new concepts. They are, in fact, as old as human history. One of the greatest monarchs of all times, whose dominions extended over a big slice of the then known world, declared in certain instruments that still exist that he would no longer seek conquest by war but by religion. Emperor Asoka, in the fourth century B.C., was no mere religious fanatic. Right aspiration, right effort, and right livelihood were the principles that he adopted for the conduct of his life as well as the lives of his people. He founded hospitals and public gardens, appointed officers for the supervision of charitable works, created a ministry for the care of the aborigines and subject races, and provided for the education of women. He was the first monarch to attempt to educate his people into a common view of the proper ends and ways of life. He sent missionaries throughout the known world to spread the noble teaching of Buddha. In those early days of human civilization when the common man had not yet emerged, Emperor Asoka showed the way to as good a world order as has probably ever been conceived by man.

BEGINNINGS OF "ONE WORLD"

About the same period of history we see the first stirrings of human imagination for "one world" in King Philip of Macedon, who aimed, if Isocrates is to be believed, at a world state of all known peoples by the unification of the Western world with the Persian Empire. Alexander, specially trained by Philip to carry out his ideas, did bring the whole known world from the Adriatic to the Indus under one rule, and the concept of a world organization and a world law did assume, in his time, a practicable and assimilable shape. But his sudden and early death gave it a setback from which it took a long time to recover.

The idea revived with the growing authority of the Romans under the Caesars. Rome conquered most of the then civilized world in Europe and Africa, and in Asia came as far as the borders of India. Subject lands were ruled from Rome as member provinces, and were permitted to retain local autonomy, especially in religious and cultural matters. Roman law was established throughout the Empire. The concept of universal law and order did not die with the breakup of the Roman Empire. It persisted through the medieval ideas of the Holy Roman Empire and of the Roman Church. It was only with the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire and of the Roman Church that the idea appeared to fade away. Thereafter it was left to individual kings and adventurers to carry on the idea of the possible unity of the races under a "Caesar King of Kings." As a historian amusingly remarks, the First World War mowed down no fewer than four Caesars—in Germany, Austria, Russia, and Bulgaria—leaving only two behind. The extinction of the Turkish sultanate in 1924 put an end to the Kaiser-i-Roum, while the British mon-

* I wish to make it clear that this article represents my own personal views, and not, directly or indirectly, the views of my Government.

arch voluntarily abdicated his title of Kaisar-i-Hind when transferring sovereignty to India a year and a half ago.

MODERN CONCEPTS OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

The tortuous history of the kings and monarchs of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is of no concern to us in the present context. I shall not, therefore, dwell upon the attempts made to preserve peace through the balance of power, the Holy Alliance, the Concert of Europe, and the like. The idea of a world government in the modern garb of a League of Nations makes its first appearance at the end of the last century, when in 1898 the young Czar Nicholas II of Russia invited the other great powers to a conference of states "seeking to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over the elements of trouble and discord." The Hague Conferences which followed did not develop the consciousness of a world commonweal overriding national sovereignties; abolition of war was still regarded as a chimera; the general intelligence of the world was still shut out from these international deliberations.

The end of the First World War saw the birth of the League of Nations. The rest is recent history. The League of Nations did not prevent another and bigger Armageddon within the lifetime of the same generation. Out of the ashes of the Second World War arose the United Nations, with the same objectives as the League of Nations, and practically the same machinery. Now we have the United World Federalists urging the United States to take immediate steps to transform the United Nations into a World *Federal* Government with authority to enact, interpret, and enforce world law adequate to assure peace.

It will be seen that between the idea of world government as it first arose in the Macedonian days and then developed through the Middle Ages, and the present-day conception of world government and world law, there is one fundamental difference: the existence of national sovereign states is now assumed as the basis of any organization for world government. What is aimed at is not one physical empire under one sovereign, but a world government composed of representatives of all sovereign states, with such limited powers vested in it by the member governments as are necessary to prevent armed conflict and to assure peace.

The policy and program adopted by the United World Federalists are only a step in advance of the basic ideas of the League of Nations and the United Nations: the world government is to be not merely a *confederation* of sovereign states as it is today, but a *federation,* with definite legislative, executive, and judicial powers surrendered to it by the sovereign states, and exercising jurisdiction, not through the sovereign states, but directly.

Why is it that the fruition of the idea of world government has so far avoided the grasp of man? Why is it that the League of Nations, so nobly conceived and hailed by the people of many lands as "the first installment of the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth," so miserably failed? Why is it that the United Nations today is unable to prevent wars? To answer these questions, we must first address ourselves to certain theories about the place of war in the affairs of men.

EQUIVALENTS OF WAR

William James expresses the view of some who hold that war cannot be abolished until man has found some substitute which will promote those "conceptions of order and discipline,

the tradition of service and devotion, of physical fitness, unstinted exertion, and universal responsibility" which are characteristic of the higher forms of militarism. In these days of totalitarian war, which involves every sector of human activity and every class of the civil population, would anybody take the responsibility of saying that a proper release for certain of the subjective impulses of man must still be found through war? On our side of the world, a frail little man dressed in the loincloth of the poorest and humblest of India—described contemptuously as "the Naked Fakir" by one acclaimed as a world leader today—preached nonviolence as an effective substitute for war. I would ask my listeners to study, if they have not already done so, Mahatma Gandhi's doctrine of nonviolence. Several western thinkers have found in nonviolence a more effective means of release than war for all the subjective impulses mentioned by William James, and even a weapon of strategy which is a match for all that has been claimed for war by such masters as von Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Foch.

Again, it is said that it is not enough to propose an equivalent for the military virtues. War is one of the ways by which great human decisions are made. Abolition of war depends primarily upon inventing and organizing other ways of deciding those issues which have hitherto been decided by war. Walter Lippmann says:

> The projects for maintaining peace which mankind has thus far achieved will show that they provide no pacific method of altering the status quo. The whole theory of arbitration and the judicial settlement of disputes rests upon the determination of existing rights, and in principle at least, rules out the revision of rights. The European system of alliances, the Locarno Treaties, and the Covenant of the League itself, are inspired by the conviction that the maintenance of peace is synonymous with the maintenance of the status quo.

But in a world where human aspirations and human relations do not stand still, a policy of the status quo can never be satisfactory. Machinery for international co-operation must therefore be found which will adequately provide for the revision rather than the maintenance of the status quo where the circumstances make the revision desirable and necessary. Walter Lippmann recognizes that the Covenant of the League of Nations did provide for this principle in Articles 11 and 19. I feel that Walter Lippmann does establish an essential principle. The failure of the League of Nations need not discourage us. The recognition of this principle by the United Nations would help to solve many a dispute which is arising today, especially in areas controlled by the metropolitan powers.

FACTORS OF FAILURE

I will now deal with the questions I formulated a short while ago, namely, Why did the League of Nations fail, and why is the United Nations not showing any greater success than the League of Nations in assuring peace and preventing wars? Among the problems of mankind on which the eminent men gathered from many countries of the world addressed the Mid-Century Convocation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Cambridge recently, the problem of world government was one which found prominent mention. In expressing the point of view of an Asian, I think I can do no better than to base myself on the material furnished by some of these addresses. Mr. Churchill made four points bearing on the question of prevention of war:

1. That the civilization on which science bestowed its novel gifts at the beginning of this century was "immature."

2. That one of the serious mistakes made by the framers of the Versailles Treaty was the adoption of the principle of self-determination, which was not the remedy for Europe, for the remedy lay rather in larger groupings.

3. That had the League been resolutely sustained and used, it would have saved us all.

4. That the impulses toward a trial of strength in Europe by war were stronger at that time than the impulses toward amicable adjustment of disputes. The attitude of the United States was a major contributing factor toward settlement of the issues by war.

On the same theme, Mr. Harold Stassen made the following observation:

> Unless in all major component parts there is the concept of a higher justice, of natural rights of man, with the self-restraint and self-discipline that come with it it is difficult to see how a world structure for administration over all men can be successfully maintained. This means that we had better develop the lesser agencies and commissions and courts and arbitration systems in the Atlantic community and in the broader community of those who move in our philosophic stream, and make an effort to develop a similar concept in other parts of the world.

APPROACHES TO SUCCESS

In dealing with the world-wide relations of men, which must decide the destiny of man over the next half-century, Mr. Harold Stassen advocates a philosophical approach. He notes three major streams of philosophic thought among the nations as to the nature of man and the way he should live, influencing the nations' governmental, economic, and social systems: the concept of the liberty of man, belonging to western civilization; the concept of the subservient and atheistic man—of materialism and force—in countries like Russia and her satellites, Spain, Argentina, Portugal, and northern China; and the concept of indifference to men, springing from the earliest Eastern religions and of key significance in all of Asia.

With some of the points made by Mr. Churchill, I, as an Asian, am in complete agreement. Mr. Churchill did not develop his point about civilization's being too immature to make proper use of the facilities placed in its hands by science. He would probably not disagree with the exposition of this thought made by Professor Zimmern a few years ago:

> The world in which George III came to the throne and George Washington grew up was in its externals closer to the world of Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Julius Caesar, and Charlemagne, than to the world of George VI and Franklin Roosevelt. . . . [One reason for] the failure of men's minds to keep up with the change brought about in external conditions by the industrial revolution is . . . simply ordinary human conservatism. It took the historians a hundred years to see clearly what was happening before their eyes and to formulate it in the term of "Industrial Revolution." Is it surprising that there is a time-lag between the movement of events set in motion by science and the movement of men's minds? . . . Today science has injected into the external world the dynamism of a torrent, whilst most men, in their own thinking, keep to the tempo of the glacier. The result is the maladjustment that we see around us—old-fashioned ideas, programs, watchwords, and alas! even battle-cries being applied to conditions for which they no longer have any relevance, territories conquered for their booty in an age of abundance, territories barricaded against the world's commerce in an age of interdependence.

The explanation why the League was not resolutely maintained and used must also be found in the failure of men's minds to keep up with external change. Several centuries of controversy had preceded the Reformation. A hundred years of discussion had preceded the French Revolution. For the idea of the

League of Nations there was no such preparation. Even in his own country, President Wilson's idea was rejected as too revolutionary. The essential need of political education to sustain such an idea as that of international co-operation is recognized by Mr. Stassen in the statement I have just quoted.

On one point, however, I, as an Asian, must join issue with Mr. Churchill. "Self-determination of peoples," Mr. Churchill said, "was not the remedy for Europe, but larger groupings." Are we being asked to agree that after the Great War, in consistency with the principles on which the war had been fought, the peoples of Austria and Hungary, of Poland and of the old Ottoman Empire, could have been denied the right of self-determination? Did Mr. Churchill really mean to suggest that in the place of the old Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires there should have been larger empires with other boundaries without giving autonomy to the different races which composed them and had been fighting for self-determination?

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY

With Mr. Stassen's main thesis that a world structure of administration can be successfully maintained only on the foundation of wide popular support of the concept of a higher justice and of the natural rights of man, I am in entire agreement, as I have already said. But as to the philosophy which he advocates, I do not feel equally sure. Does he mean (assuming for the moment that his exposition of the different philosophies of the world is correct) that the people who have evolved the philosophy attributed to them remain, as a people—subject to certain modifying influences—forever its adherent? If not—if the divine spark in man must forever keep the human mind on the move—he must admit that the infinite variety in man cannot all be fitted into the three sizes of strait jacket designed by him, and the argument he bases on this idea must lose some of its force and meaning. As to the substance of his philosophy, may I be permitted to doubt the correctness of his analysis, at least insofar as it relates to the Asian peoples? Is a more democratic religion or a more democratic way of life to be found in any philosophy than Islam provides? Is not the fundamental teaching of Buddha, namely, nirvana—extinction of personal aims—in the closest harmony with modern ideas? May I take the liberty of quoting the following lines from H. G. Wells's *Outline of History:*

> The teaching of history, as we are unfolding it in this book, is strictly in accordance with this teaching of Buddha. There is, as we are seeing, no social order, no security, no peace or happiness, no righteous leadership or kingship, unless men lose themselves in something greater than themselves. The study of biological progress again reveals exactly the same process—the merger of the narrow globe of the individual experience in a wider being. . . . To forget oneself in greater interests is to escape from a prison.

ASIAN ASPIRATIONS

I now come to the main part of my theme. As an Asian, I am an intense and passionate believer in peace; not because I am a follower of that school of philosophy described by Mr. Stassen as having mystical concern for the hereafter, but because I want Asia to catch up with all the material advancement that has taken place in the West. I recall that culturally and otherwise Asia was not behind Europe till very recent times. Even in warfare, which is now the specialty of the West, the two great battles (as Mr. Churchill reminded his Massachusetts audience, though for quite a different moral) fought not many centuries ago in Poland and near Vienna completely shattered the armed

power of Europe; and but for the intervention of Providence, Europe today might be the colonial empire of the Eastern potentates rather than the other way about. Asians, however, do not regret the course that history has taken. The mechanical revolution has brought much that is of value to the world, and Asia wants to take the best that is in it for the billions of her people. For that, Asia needs peace. For that—and this is my personal belief—no Asian country would hesitate to cede such of its sovereign powers as are required to make a world federation effective.

But peace is not merely absence of war; it is something more positive. It is the assurance of conditions in which man everywhere can attain his full intellectual and moral stature. For that, Asia needs the material assistance of the West. One of the claims made by the West is that by the achievements of science it has substituted machine power for hand power; and eliminated drudgery from human life—a process begun by the domestication of animals, the invention of the wheel, the watermill, the windmill, and other contrivances, but carried immeasurably farther in recent generations. Asia wants to participate in this heritage. In doing so she believes that, like peace, prosperity is indivisible. As President Truman in his Inaugural Address said, "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease, their economic life is primitive and stagnant, their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas." The importance of the well-being and development of backward peoples was recognized in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The United Nations Charter, in Article 55, refers more fully to this problem, and places it in perspective in the scheme of maintenance of international security. The article will bear quotation:

> With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
>
> *a*) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
> *b*) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
> *c*) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

We hope that the powers conferred on the World Federal Government for the treatment of this problem will be equal to those proposed by the United World Federalists for the control of the armed activities of nations.

I have already referred to political education as the sustaining force in any concept of world government. If that sustaining force is to be effective, it must come from all peoples of the world. The people of backward countries today must therefore be helped to come forward and receive that political education. This is possible only if their energies are released from the mere drudgeries of life and they have at least the sustaining minimum of food and clothing and the education needed to enable them to understand the broader affairs of mankind.

UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT NECESSARY

There is another point that, as an Asian, I should like to emphasize. I subscribe to the view put forward by the UWF that in these days of the increasing range and destructiveness of

new weapons fashioned by science, and the increasing mobility of people due to aeronautic improvements, an international machinery for peace which lacks the active support of one half of the world, and that half inhabited by peoples of another ideology, can be of little consequence. Such an arrangement would merely amount to a regional pact, which, however necessary in certain circumstances, can never be a substitute for a scheme such as has been the dream of mankind all through history. There must be a general settlement with the Soviet Union, or there will be not one but two world governments, and mutual fear and suspicion will absorb the energies and resources of both, in preparation for a third world war. Such a situation cannot be satisfactory to either, in spite of the reassuring—shall I say—*prophecy,* for it was hardly an argument, of Mr. Harold Stassen that civilization will survive even the devastation and destruction of an atomic war. A general settlement, however, is not possible in the present atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and recrimination. There must be more patience and will to understand on both sides. One wonders whether an approach on a basis such as that contemplated by President Truman just before his election, rather than one on the basis of the "Thirteen Men in the Kremlin" so picturesquely phrased by Mr. Churchill, would not be a way out of the present impasse.

Finally, as an Asian, I must declare that while I fasten my faith on the principles of the United Nations Charter, I believe that our progress in the matter will be conditioned not so much by the *form* of the organization as by the *spirit* which infuses its working. To the creation of that spirit, therefore, we, all peoples all over the world, whatever mold of philosophy we may be held to be cast in, should now bend our energies—like Ulysses, "strong in will, to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

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Middle East—Balance of Power Versus World Government

By Jamil M. Baroody

A WORLD government today is farther away from realization than the Kingdom of God on earth. At first sight, an international organization like the United Nations might be considered as a steppingstone to a world government. A little analysis, however, will reveal that such an international body, which is not very dissimilar to the League of Nations, is in great measure an instrument for maintaining the system of balance of power among the big nations whose policies ultimately shape the destiny of the world. International congresses and organizations have frequently followed in the wake of major conflicts with the object of determining by agreement the rights of participating states, thereby curbing national ambitions which might threaten peace. In the year 1815 the Congress of Vienna may be considered the child of the Napoleonic Wars. A little over a hundred years later, the conference at Versailles, evolving into the League of Nations, is another case when a great war gave birth to an international body for keeping the world out of war. And, finally, it may be well observed that had there been no Second World War the United Nations would not have come into being, introducing, as it has done, many improvements that were not within the scope of the previous international organizations.

No one can deny today that the big powers which largely control the United Nations are using this organization to solve their major problems. Bilateral and multilateral pacts and treaties, regional blocs and coalitions, overt and tacit agreements, are being formed apart from the United Nations, with a great deal of lip service to its Charter. How can we talk of world government and ways and means of its realization when the big powers still find it expedient to resort to the old system of balance of power instead of resolving their problems within the United Nations? It is therefore utopian to talk of an immediate commonwealth of nations whose inhabitants live in ideal conditions. Failure to recognize defects in human nature may easily lead us into discussing inapplicable political theories instead of facing the hard facts of the present critical world situation.

Internal Difficulties

As is well known, the functions of any government are the making and applying of laws and the settling of disputes within the state, on one hand, and dealing with other governments or groups of people outside the national boundaries, on the other hand. In discharging these functions, governments still have, at one time or another, to use physical force to compel obedience of any recalcitrant elements within the state and to repel aggressors from without. Rightly or wrongly, governments often daub the recalcitrant elements as traitors, who, with external aggressors, are called enemies of the people.

Except in the nonexistent anarchical form of government, dispensing with all official control, it can be safely said that individual freedom is subject in varying degrees to the state's statutory and legal restrictions. It is ideologies that

set the balance between individual freedom and government restrictions and ultimately determine the diverse economic systems, such as capitalism and communism, with a wide gamut of modified forms between the two extremes.

Every ideology within the state has champions and dissenters who are vociferous or inarticulate, depending on the extent to which a government allows freedom of speech without jeopardizing its grip on the people. The exponents of conflicting ideologies inside every politically conscious country are becoming more intransigent and seem to favor coercion when the method of persuasion fails. Once compromise is ruled out, there is always the danger that internal conflicts end in strikes and riots, and they may at times assume the proportion of civil war.

Unless order inside a state is achieved by mutual agreement among the various factions constituting the nation's body politic, it would be futile to discuss ways and means of founding a world government.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Among the greatest deterrents of international understanding is the resurgence of nationalism masquerading under the guise of various ideologies. These ideologies should not be considered as mere figments created by the imaginative mind, but as political processes determined to a large extent by complex economic and social forces; today, with the economic forces in the ascendancy.

Invariably we find the big powers extolling their gigantic efforts for raising the standard of living within their respective countries. The masses are indoctrinated with the idea that an increase in the output of consumer goods and outward signs of progress are indicative of the superiority of a particular ideology. What each big power willfully omits or unwittingly fails to mention is the complex economic and sociopolitical background which gave rise to and nurtured that particular ideology. In further efforts to raise the standard of living for satisfying the masses, the big powers fan the flames of nationalism and engage in a race for extending their economic frontiers outside their own territorial limits.

We shall later look into the different means by which these economic frontiers are extended and what bearing they have on maintaining or tipping the balance of power. However, it should be mentioned that whenever competition between the big powers is unrestricted, it releases fears which are often partially allayed by encouraging a chauvinistic national spirit and a false sense of superiority among the people.

And when international competition becomes so keen that one great power imagines her rights as being encroached upon by another big power, the worst fears flare up. Armaments are built in the name of national security, or, as is often said, for self-defense or to repel the enemy from without; but in fact armaments are built to consolidate major economic gains with designs for further economic expansion outside the state in order to keep those gains.

POPULATION PRESSURE

The industrial revolution and the significant strides made in the field of medicine and public health within the last century have prolonged man's life expectancy and caused the world's population to multiply in geometrical progression, regardless of whether or not the land yielded enough to warrant such unchecked increase.

In ancient times and until a recent period, when a surplus or indigent population threatened the economic and political security of virile communities or

nations, the situation was usually relieved by the conquest of foreign lands. Pillage was condoned, and the spoils of war considered legitimate. History furnishes us with the dramatic proclamations of many leaders who were honest enough not to conceal the underlying causes that drove them to choose war for surmounting internal economic difficulties.

Before the end of the eleventh century the famous proclamation of Urban II galvanized the European community. Diverted from their internal economic ills, they unleashed their forces on the inhabitants of western Asia. The words of Urban II are worth quoting:

> Let none of your possessions detain you, nor solicitude for your family affairs, since the land which you inhabit is too narrow for your large population, nor does it abound with wealth; it furnishes scarcely food for its cultivators. Hence, it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war and frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let, therefore, hatred depart from among you and let quarrels and wars cease. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre, wrest the land from the wicked race and subject it to yourself.

The history of the Crusades which inflicted so much suffering on both East and West is too familiar to bear repetition in this paper.

Exactly seven centuries later, when, owing to one of the bloodiest revolutions in history, the economic life of the French people was disrupted, a European military genius, none other than Napoleon, addressed thirty thousand starving soldiers in the following terms:

> You are badly fed and all but naked and I am about to lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. Before you are great cities and rich provinces; there we shall find honor, glory and riches.

Napoleon roused his troops with the words "honor and glory," and, having fired their imagination, he promised them riches. The subjugated Italian people paid the price, but subsequently the armies that fed on the vanquished were decimated, and Napoleon's downfall, like his rise to power, was meteoric.

MODERN EXPANSION

During the nineteenth century the scramble for colonies and mass emigration to the Western Hemisphere somewhat relieved the pressure of population in Europe. Under the guise of bringing western civilization to Asia and Africa, the big powers partitioned what territories they could lay their hands on in both these continents and elsewhere. And it seems only yesterday that both Hitler and Mussolini clamored for "living space" and a "place in the sun" for their excessive populations.

Within thirty years the two greatest wars in history were fought in the name of freedom and liberty, whereas the struggle was basically for raising or at least maintaining the standard of living at somebody else's expense.

But it is growing more difficult every year to achieve a more or less decent standard of living on a universal scale —I repeat "universal scale"—disregarding spotty and short-lived prosperity in certain regions. The reason for this difficulty cannot be better explained than by quoting from a speech of Dr. Norris E. Dodds, Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, delivered last fall before the United Nations General Assembly in Paris. Said Dr. Dodds:

> Tomorrow morning there will be 55,000 more persons for breakfast than there were in the world this morning, and the day after tomorrow 55,000 more, and so on daily—twenty to twenty-five million more people annually. But we are not producing 55,000 more cups of milk a day for the new children, nor 55,000 more loaves of bread, nor 55,000 more bowls of rice.

In spite of these revealing facts, no serious measures have as yet been taken, whether by national legislation or international conventions, to deal with the ecological disequilibrium which is at the root of most petty and major wars. Instead, we find the big powers waging unabashed propaganda for winning the masses to what they call their own way of life or particular ideology, and at the same time welcoming rather than decrying a national increase in population.

Consequently, the big powers engage in an armament race and adopt a jingoistic foreign policy toward their rivals in a vain attempt to appease national fears invariably evoked by economic stringency or a depreciating standard of living. The people gradually develop a war psychosis, and their leaders, unable to extricate themselves from the vicious circle of talking peace and preparing for war, often become desperate and lose all diplomatic decorum. No wonder that international assembly halls have become arenas for the interchange of calumnious accusations while world peace stands begging at the door.

STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Turning to the Middle East, we find that it is being made to play a great role in the system of balance of power. Since the dawn of history, geography has endowed that region with a strategic position second to none, for it has always been a bridge and crossway between continents. An aggregate population of about seventy million Moslems seething with political and social unrest inhabits that area, the world's richest in oil and possessing abundant but slightly developed natural resources. The big powers know that any one power that can solely control the Middle East might eventually establish it as a base for the control of the whole Asiatic Continent from the western side. With the exception of the United States, the highly industrialized and overpopulated countries are all clustered in Europe, which, geographically speaking, is a projection of Asia. Trade between the two continents has been transacted mainly through three focal points, all of them situated in what until the First World War was the Ottoman Empire.

1. Constantinople, now Istanbul, was a link between Europe and distant regions, extending beyond the Oxus of central Asia.

2. Syria, which has the furthermost easterly coastline in the eastern Mediterranean Basin, was for many centuries another link between the Orient and the West. From Aleppo and Damascus, both ancient inland cities, stretched the caravan routes which reached the confines of China.

3. The Red Sea, approached overland from Alexandria and later from Port Said, through the Suez Canal carried the bulk of trade between Europe and India, as well as Malaya, the Archipelago, and other regions of the Far East.

Of the three trade routes, the one passing through the Red Sea has been the most important, because it is cheapest, safest, and, above all, it serves the most densely populated countries in southeastern Asia.

The Syrian overland route is considered the cheapest and fastest to the Persian Gulf and the Asiatic hinterland to the north. Istanbul's chief importance today lies in its strategic relation to the Black Sea. It therefore becomes obvious that the power which can control western Asia and Egypt will hold the key to the most important gateway to the Asiatic Continent from the European side.

THE OIL SUPPLY

Modern industry cannot flourish without oil, nor can the wheels of

mechanized warfare efficiently turn without it, unless in the future atomic energy can be harnessed and utilized at a cheaper cost. So, besides figuring high on the list of strategic materials, oil may be used as a political weapon for winning over industrialized countries suffering from fuel shortages.

It is a well-known fact that the world's center of gravity in oil production is rapidly shifting from the Western Hemisphere to the Middle East. A barrel of Middle East oil is being produced at less than half its cost in the United States. Anglo-American companies own and indirectly control over 90 per cent of the world's proved reserves outside the Soviet Union.

When, in addition to all the foregoing facts, we are told that the United States proved oil reserves are being depleted at about 10 per cent a year and that in five years the daily world consumption will soar to thirteen million barrels, it becomes quite plain why both the United States and Great Britain consider the Middle East essential for maintaining the balance of power pending some kind of understanding with the Soviet Union.

EAST-WEST POWER POLITICS

The western powers fear that access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles and to the Persian Gulf across Iran, or Persia as it used to be known, is still a predominant factor in Russia's Middle East policy. Russia, on the other hand, has often declared that the West should not hold a supreme economic monopoly and geopolitical mastery over the whole Middle East.

The western powers retort that it was Russia that shut them off from central Europe and the Balkans, and on this ground the Anglo-American hands-off policy in the Middle East is justified. All this is power politics at its worst, indeed, with little regard to the welfare and aspirations of the people caught between the titanic blocs with conflicting ideologies.

It may be asked how it is that both the western powers and the Soviet Union, undeniably at loggerheads with each other, concurred in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, in the face of strong Arab opposition.

The answer is that this was done with entirely different motives on the two sides. Barred from Mediterranean sea and air bases, and having failed to win over the pro-western Arab governments to her side, Russia thought of gaining a foothold in the Middle East through the swelling ranks of Zionist upholders of Communism in Palestine. Furthermore, Russia calculated that a Jewish-Arab war would sooner or later accelerate an Arab social upheaval which would eventually overthrow what she considers the reactionary ruling classes, and thus make it easier for the establishment of a new regime. Russia's policy of supporting Kurdish and Armenian self-determination inside Turkey, Iran, and Iraq is designed to counteract the military aid extended by the United States to Turkey and Iran and that of Britain to Iraq.

THE ARAB SITUATION

The western powers, on the other hand, while feigning friendship to the Arab world, have harbored fears that should the Arabs succeed once and for all in torpedoing Zionist plans for a Jewish state in Palestine, the Arab League would become a potent force that might deliberately or unintentionally threaten western economic interests in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. When, after the Second World War, the Arabs realized that they were not ripe for a geopolitical union, they began to direct their efforts toward Arab unity. The result was the Arab League, an organization officially cre-

ated by the Arab states, with headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. From the outset, one of its main tasks has been to fight Zionist expansion and make sure that Palestine would remain predominantly Arab. Eventually, the League broadened the basis of its activities. By presenting a collective foreign policy toward the outside world and promoting closer cultural and economic ties among its member states, it has laid the cornerstone of Arab solidarity. What irked the western powers, especially France, was that the League began to extend its influence beyond the frontiers of the Arab East by advocating a common Arab citizenship, not only for nationals of the Arab states but also for all Arabs living in North Africa.

Repercussions in Tunis and Algeria alarmed the French, and the British felt uneasy when the Soviet Union at one time offered herself for the trusteeship over Tripolitania. If the Soviet Union championed Arab hegemony once she gained a foothold in North Africa, the western powers might be easily outmaneuvered in their Middle East policy. The Anglo-American policy would only have incited Arab national risings in North Africa had the Communists won the elections in France. The far-reaching plans of the Arab League would have come handy. But the Communists lost the elections in France, and the government coming into power made it clear to Britain and the United States that French participation in any western bloc was contingent on, inter alia, the nonabetment of the Anglo-Americans in any activity designed to foment Arab unrest in French North Africa.

The extraterritorial nationality scheme of the League had to be subverted, and subverted it was; not, however, only for France's sake, but lest the Arabs might become a unified force, difficult for the western powers to control. Furthermore, there would always be the danger that the Soviet Union might vie for Arab favor should the masses be roused.

Capitalizing on Zionist military preparedness, the western powers were not slack in supporting the creation of a Jewish state, thereby driving a wedge in the side of the Arab East. Should the Zionists flirt with Russia or seek further expansion in the Holy Land, it is most likely that the western powers would delegate to Britain the task of providing the necessary curbs, among which would be a warning to the Jews that Anglo-Arab military pacts and treaties, extant and in the making, would be invoked.

BALANCE OF POWER STILL IN USE

Thus, such developments in the Middle East, as well as similar developments in other parts of the world, give full evidence of the fact that the balance of power which evolved into a system in the sixteenth century is still considered by the great powers the most practical method for bridling dangerous rivalries among them in the international field.

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The Middle East and the Prospect for World Government

By Kermit Roosevelt

I AM afraid I come as a bearer of cold water, with only this excuse, that cold water may be invigorating, and that a cold shower in the morning, while uncomfortable, is said to be a good way of starting the day.

I can agree on a good many points with Mr. Eichelberger.[1] I can agree, for instance, on what he described as his aim in world government—a government which does not interfere too much. I do not want a world government of a pervasive type, which interferes in or must act upon the daily lives of citizens all over the world. We should recognize, however, that a noninterfering government is the hardest kind to bring about and make effective, and that it must rest on a clearly recognized community of interests of all kinds. Where I would differ with Mr. Eichelberger is on the progress we are making toward that goal.

Another point on which I heartily agree with him is his warning against unrealistic optimism. What we need is to see the facts clearly, without bias of preconceptions, either good or bad. When I visited the Soviet Union some fifteen years ago, I came back with a strong conviction that anyone who entered that country with strong notions of what he was going to see would see exactly what he expected to see. Similarly, I think it is possible to enter the world of the United Nations or the world of world federalism and come out with exactly the same ideas one had when one went in, strengthened by what one has seen. It is dangerous and misleading to judge the United Nations solely by what one sees or hears at Lake Success.

Mr. Eichelberger presented a rosy view, which he has apparently obtained at Lake Success, of the prospect for peace and the progress now being made through the United Nations toward a world community in which we all believe. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the Middle East, not that of Lake Success, I come back with a different picture indeed.

"As Others See Us"

If we, as Americans, are to plan realistically about world government, we must do two things. First, we must develop an accurate understanding of the way our country and ourselves appear to people in other parts of the world. It is easy to say that the United States of America is the strongest country in the world, and that therefore public opinion in America is the strongest force in the world. That is true in a sense, but it is dangerous to assume that therefore American public opinion is, in effect, world public opinion. If American public opinion is to be the strongest force in the world, it must be based on a clear understanding of how the rest of the world looks on American public opinion.

The second step we must take is to appraise realistically the attitude in the rest of the world toward our present effort in the direction of world government—the United Nations.

Both of these processes will be profoundly discouraging to those who be-

[1] See Clark M. Eichelberger, in this volume.

lieve and hope that world government is an imminent possibility, or that the United Nations is a solidly healthy organization. Yet both of these steps must be taken if world government is to precede, rather than follow upon, world catastrophe.

Probably in no other part of the world do the United States and the United Nations stand in greater disrepute and condemnation than in the Middle East. In other words, the two elements in world society which we consider the most important forces for world government are at a very low ebb indeed, in an important part of the world.

Just a few years ago people in the Middle East looked upon the United States as a pillar of strength for good—the only great power whose motives were not purely selfish. And they looked to the United Nations as their great hope for peace and independence. Now, the feeling is growing and spreading rapidly that the United Nations, under the present leadership of the United States, has assisted exactly what the Middle East is most anxious to avoid, namely, a form of foreign intervention—Zionism—which has drawn its strength from outside the Middle East, from Europe and from America. Large numbers of people in the Middle East consider that the United States and the United Nations are bringing not peace but a sword to the Middle East by assisting this foreign element to establish itself strongly there.

IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

If the Arab countries, which are admittedly politically, economically, and militarily weak, were the only elements in the world scene that had that feeling, it would still, in my opinion, be a pretty serious situation; for world peace and world government will not be soundly based if they are built on the cowing of the weak by the strong. But this is not a matter which affects simply the Arabs. The Middle East is part of what appears to be a newly developing bloc of countries stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to Singapore. Next to the split between the Soviet Union and western democracy, this tentative formation of a grand alliance is the most significant political development in the world today. It is based upon certain things that these peoples feel that they have in common.

POINTS IN COMMON

One thing is tinted skin. The countries of the Middle East and the Orient are not color-conscious except as they have been made so by the realization that the white races regard them as different and inferior. This feeling gives this bloc of countries something in common—something in common against the white races, against the West.

Another thing they have in common is religion. Many of the people in this area are, of course, Moslems, but most of those who are not Moslems have at least this in common with the Moslems, that they are not Christians. They know—it has been impressed upon them over the last couple of centuries—that Christians regard them as different and as inferior. This gives them another grievance to agree upon. Again, it is against the white races.

They have also, in common, a feeling that they have been subjected to foreign exploitation. All these countries from the Atlantic coast of Africa to central Asia have been, to a greater or less extent, under foreign domination within the near past. Some still are. To the other grievances which unite them, they add exploitation and/or political domination by white Christians. "Down with foreign imperialism!" is the cry which rings from French North Africa through Indonesia, Indo-China, and so

on. The fact that the Russians join loudly in this chorus does not escape attention.

Another feeling these countries have in common is a sense of technological inadequacy. Combined with the feeling that the West has been rooking them is a realization that if they are to hold their own, there is much they have to learn from the West. This is, in their mind, chiefly technological. They are not impressed by our ethics as they have seen them exemplified in a couple of world wars. They are not impressed by our philosophy. They are impressed by our technology. Their idea is, Give us the machines and the knowledge of their use, and we will be as good as or better than the West. Westerners who are not wholly proud of what the Occident has accomplished with its material skills are still not confident that the simple transmission of those skills to the Orient is going to solve anything important.

Finally, this bloc of countries have in common this: They are coming to regard the United Nations more and more as a creature of the West—a new cloak for old devices; and as I have pointed out, the elements which I have mentioned, uniting this bloc, all include resentment against the West. The Russians of course produced this interpretation of the United Nations from the very moment of its creation, and they have spread it throughout the Orient. They have also spread it in central and eastern Europe. It is probably fair to say that at first no one took the argument very seriously. But as time has gone on, the United Nations has developed more and more into a debating ground between the Soviet Union and the West. Increasing evidence has supported the Soviet argument that the United Nations is set up in such a way as to give the West domination of it. The result is that Communist propaganda against the U.N. has begun to be believed in many parts of the world.

It may be difficult for us to understand why the Orient should feel as it does. What reason, many would ask, is there for regarding the United States and the United Nations as in any sense imperialistic?

That brings me to the point I made earlier, that it is very important for us to see from time to time how we and our foreign policy look to others. Let us try to remove ourselves in our imagination from the American scene and look at ourselves from the outside.

THE PALESTINE CONFLICT

So far as the Middle East is concerned, the important point on which to concentrate is Palestine. Many Americans view our Palestine policy, and the U.N. resolution recommending the partition of Palestine, as liberal, humanitarian, entirely admirable and unselfish steps to aid a stricken people. Seen wholly in the light of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, and of the priceless contributions of the Jews to western civilization, that is easy to understand. A section of barren land on the Mediterranean is small recompense to a people that has suffered so much—and given so much.

Looked at from the Middle East, unhappily, the picture takes on a different cast. The Arabs see now only what we have failed to see adequately, if at all. They see a people coming from another continent, backed by arms—British or Czech, American or Russian, it matters not—and taking over rule of a land inhabited by others. Where we see refugees from Europe, they see three quarters of a million Arab refugees who have fled their homes because room was wanted for housing European refugees.

They fear. And fear is the most outstanding characteristic, right now, of the Middle East as of other parts of the

world. They fear future expansion, backed from the outside, of the state of Israel. If the Arabs could be assured that Israel would not expand at their expense, I think there would be a fairly widespread movement among many of the Arab peoples to accept the status quo as far as that is concerned. But they do not believe that. They fear, and they have good reason to fear, that this little state is going to expand. It has proved itself a military match for the Arabs in their present condition, and many of its citizens have already expressed a determination to expand. (Incidentally, anyone who states that United Nations policy on Palestine has been recognized as a success cannot be talking about the Middle East, because the United Nations policy on Palestine is one of the few things on which all elements in the Middle East agree. The Israelites do not believe it has been successful, any more than the Arabs do.)

There is another fear with regard to Israel. Even hoping, as moderate Arabs have to hope, that the world will support them in restraining an aggressive move toward expansion, there is fear of economic colonization. The Arab states are in process of building their own economies, their own industries, and Israel is far more technically advanced than they are, and also able to count on vast sums of outside capital which are not available to them. They fear very much that American and British and other pressure will force upon the Arabs a situation of economic vassalage which to them would be very nearly as serious a fate as a political or military vassalage. That is not the kind of world that they understood the United States or the United Nations to be trying to advance.

A Gloomy Picture

That is the picture of the Palestine conflict as seen from the Middle East, and it is very different from our picture here.

But it is not enough for us to say that our picture is different. The fact that some of us cannot see it their way is not going to make all the inhabitants of the Middle East see it our way. We must face the fact that, so far as the people of the Middle East are concerned, the United States and the United Nations appear to have been backing, in the Palestine controversy, a racist, imperialist venture which is bound to promote hatred, violence, and confusion and to make more difficult than ever the tasks of peace and unification in work toward a common goal.

That is a gloomy picture. I told you I was going to be gloomy. I may seem to have dwelt unduly upon reaction to one particular action of the United Nations; yet if we are to think and talk of the Middle East we *must* think and talk of that action or that reaction, because that counts. The other actions of the U.N. have not affected the people in that area in any particular fashion. We are deceiving ourselves unjustifiably if we feel that declarations in the United Nations about human rights are going to carry any weight in the Middle East as compared with a resolution such as that of November 29, 1947, which the Arabs know brought struggle to them and which they regard as fundamentally antidemocratic and imperialistic.

Progressive Elements Discredited

I have dwelt upon much that has been done to create attitudes toward the United Nations and the United States—attitudes which profoundly affect the prospects for obtaining any support for world government in the Middle East. But it is not only attitudes toward outsiders that have been created by what has happened. In a sense even more serious are the attitudes created in the

minds of people living in the area toward those elements in the Middle Eastern countries who were western-minded, progressively minded, who really wished to work toward closer understanding with the West, in the hope that that would lead them or show them the way to improve the social and economic conditions in their own countries.

The effect of this whole Palestine controversy has been to discredit those elements in the Arab countries and to give ammunition to the most reactionary antiforeign and fanatically Moslem groups. The one element there which has been gaining in strength over the last three generations, the one element there which could be expected to work with right- or like-minded peoples in other parts of the world for a gradual approach to a sound world government —that element has been, for the time being at least, put out of the picture. That is another serious effect, and is another condition on which we must count in our present estimate.

QUESTION OF PUBLIC OPINION

I said earlier that it is easy enough to observe the United States of America as the most powerful nation in the world and to think that American public opinion is therefore the most powerful public opinion in the world; and I also warned that that leads us to wrong assumptions. I dislike to refer to Palestine continually, but let us consider the Palestine partition plan. It was said that it was approved by world opinion, on the basis that the United Nations approved it by more than a two-thirds majority of those nations voting.

The assumption that that necessarily represented an expression of world opinion is dangerous and false. Even if you assume that all the peoples represented by the national delegates who voted for the partition firmly supported the idea of partition, and that the delegates voting against it represented their peoples' view, and that the countries not represented could not be counted in the picture at all—even then the situation would work out about like this:

The countries voting for the partition of Palestine represented somewhat over a quarter of the population of the world. The countries voting against partition represented something under a quarter of the population of the world. Those abstaining (and I do not think anyone who was at Lake Success at the time would wish to argue that anyone abstained because he really wanted the partition) represented somewhat more than a quarter of the world's population. Those not represented at all included the remainder of the population.

This is a situation where public opinion in the Western world was more or less united upon a policy which was being applied in a portion of the world where public opinion was united against the policy.

QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION

That represents a fundamental problem in the approach to any form of world government. How is representation to be worked out? Is it to be on a head-by-head basis? Is a national representative's vote to count according to the population represented by that individual? Or is there to be, as many western scholars have suggested, a weighted representation—a representation based on population plus a number of other elements, such as degree of literacy, industrial advancement, and so on?

There are a number of elements which affect a nation's strength, apart from the size of its population. Are these elements to be counted decisively in determining the allocation of votes in a world parliament? Obviously, the countries of the West would be interested in having such a weighted repre-

sentation. Equally obviously, the countries of the East, including the Middle East, would not want such a form of representation.

I think this Palestine issue has brought home to Middle Easterners, anyhow, the dangers inherent in such a setup. They found themselves in a situation where a vote of tiny Guatemala, on a subject which did not concern Guatemala in any fashion, counted equally with the vote of Egypt or India, although those countries were more directly associated with the particular question, had strong views on it, and population-wise were hardly on a comparable basis with Guatemala.

That is just one of a number of issues which are going to create mistrust, particularly until we have achieved a recognized community of interests and ideals, which I believe is essential before we can even consider a world government. Today we are a long, long way from this achievement.

REGIONAL FEDERATION FIRST

I do not like to close on a gloomy note. I should like to sound an optimistic note as far as world government is concerned, but I should not be honest if I did. The Middle East has been unable to develop any strong regional federation, and I am inclined to believe that is a necessary step before proceeding to a broader federation. If the group of peoples in a part of the world cannot agree among themselves upon a community of interests, any agreement that they think they have reached with peoples much farther away is going to be worthless.

If I have to dredge up a note of hope on which to conclude, I might put it this way: The Middle East is a region of minorities that have been fighting among themselves for centuries or millenniums. It is also a part of the world which is backward in many of its social, economic, and political institutions. When the Middle East, with or without assistance from the outside, begins to make progress in solving its local interrelations and in building a regional federation which is healthy and sound and respected, then I think it will be safe to be very, very optimistic indeed about the prospect for world government in the rest of the world.

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The Near East and World Government

By Aubrey S. Eban

IT IS difficult to speak of Israel's first year of independent national life in a proper mood of academic detachment, for this is essentially one of the romantic episodes of contemporary history. It possesses every element of drama—the swift transition from dire peril to stability; a conflict against overwhelming material odds; a constant recourse to the spiritual and moral impulses which are decisive in all issues of human conflict.

But one year ago this was a lost cause, apparently engulfed in an intricate pattern of hostile circumstances. Today its foundations are firmly established.

We are newcomers in practical statecraft, but we are veterans in our connection with universal traditions. We cannot forget that the doctrine of international co-operation, the conception of universal brotherhood, entered the records of western civilization as the direct inheritance of Israel's prophetic writings; that it was the basic documents of Hebrew literature that bequeathed to the world the longing for an age when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." Here, then, is a spiritual lineage which connects Israel with the conception of world government envisioned at San Francisco.

I have said that what appeared last year to be a brave but futile gesture has prospered upon the international scene. Within one year this state has stood firm against overwhelming attack. It has driven back the offensive into the territory from which it was launched. It has sustained the crushing burdens of total mobilization. It has met a fierce challenge upon the international scene. It has won through to universal recognition. It has established the machinery and institutions of democratic administration amid the turmoil of war. It has carried out the ingathering of exiles, the battered remnants of once prosperous communities, the victims of Nazi holocaust left behind by the most monstrous episode of organized inhumanity in the annals of man.

No wonder that the feelings arising around this event have had a high quality of sentiment and drama. I would assure all representatives of the press of my undying affection, coupled with the thought, which I hope they will not resent, that this process has had too much journalistic attention and has so far been subjected to too little scrutiny in the spirit of political and social investigation.

Political and Social Significance of Israel

Yet nobody can doubt that the creation of this new unit of independent political and cultural life must have its message for the social scientist and the political thinker. What is the social and cultural nature of this unit? What are its internal relations? What are its prospects of integration into its immediate environment? What does it portend for the continent of Asia upon whose western extremity it lives? What is to be envisaged in its relations with the great powers? What are its responsibilities to the organized international community? What is the significance of this process in the quest for world brotherhood?

Each of these questions, by the very act of enumeration, reveals the possibility of new vistas in the illustration, by this tiny example, of larger political and social rules. Israel presents the picture of a new parliamentary democracy in an area where the institutions of democracy have flourished but where its spirit has remained little understood.

BACKWARDNESS OF THE NEAR EAST

The Near East has advanced by spectacular strides toward full sovereign independence, while its social, economic, and cultural standards have remained rooted in past centuries. As far as the Near East is concerned, the industrial revolution might never have occurred. The new inventions and discoveries of science which revolutionized the amenities of modern life have passed by that area unheeded. As far as the Near East is concerned, the French Revolution might never have happened; for the doctrine of individual equality, of personal welfare as the goal of governmental responsibility, has not yet taken root. The growth of parliamentarianism in its external forms should not be allowed for one moment to obscure the inherent weakness of democratic roots in that part of the world.

The news of recent days brings us a striking illustration of this fact to the immediate north of Israel, where a characteristic governmental upheaval has taken place. Israel is a new creation and therefore should be an unstable one. The French have a saying that it is only the provisional that ever endures. The only government in the Near East that has not undergone drastic changes in the last ten months is the provisional government of Israel.

It is clear that the basic conditions for a functioning democracy are not the external forms and procedures of parliamentarianism, but a literate electorate and social conditions resting upon a conception of equality, without that chronic disparity between unimaginable wealth and inconceivable squalor and degradation. Therefore the world is entitled to watch with a certain breathless attention to see how the Jewish historic experience and social tradition are to be expressed in free political and social institutions on a level of equality with all other nations in the human family.

JURISDICTION OF U.N.

It is clear, however, that the significance of Israel's rise as a subject of political investigation does not lie alone in the development of its own institutions. Here was an act of the international community; the incentive to Israel's independence was provided by the United Nations itself. The conception of sovereign equality prevents the United Nations from acting in the capacity of a world government where a sovereign state is concerned. The Charter maintains and advocates the doctrine of sovereign equality. It upholds the right of each state to be free from international interference in its domestic jurisdiction.

There are, however, areas of the world in which the United Nations can act as a world government. I refer to those territories which do not constitute sovereign states, but which are the subjects of international concern either through having been mandated territories under the League of Nations or through falling at this time within the trusteeship system of the United Nations. In respect to those territories there are no sovereign susceptibilities and claims to separate them from the direct attention of the international community. In the case of Palestine, the United Nations, for a brief period of history, was able to act as a sover-

eign agent and to decree what should come to pass. The United Nations now acts in a similar capacity toward the colonial territories formerly under Italian rule.

APPLICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In the case of Palestine the United Nations was called upon to apply the principle of self-determination to a heterogeneous society which did not hold the ends of life in common—a country which consisted of two communities, sharply differentiated in every aspect of their political, social, and cultural life—from which the system of tutelage was being withdrawn and which now had to be fitted and integrated into an independent pattern of government.

The United Nations discovered the obvious elementary fact that in such cases mathematics is of no use. The doctrine of majority rule cannot solve the question of self-determination in societies compounded of more than one element; for in such a case the mathematical criterion would involve the subordination of one people to another, merely for the trivial circumstance that it was smaller in numbers.

In this case the subordination of Jewish life to the will of the Arab majority could have been justified only on mathematical grounds. It would have resulted in the entire denial of self-determination to one of those elements purely because it was numerically inferior. It would have suppressed dynamic and elemental forces. The application of majority rule by armed force might have produced peace, but it would have been the peace of a quiescent volcano.

And thus, at an early stage of its investigation, the United Nations was called upon to examine whether the objective conditions of the Arab-Jewish relationship did not require a separate application of the doctrine of self-determination to each of those two communities. As we know, it came to a positive decision. It judged that the Jewish community was qualified for sovereign independence on two grounds. An examination of the grounds which justified this act of separation or secession is useful in any consideration of the relationship between nationalism and universalism.

MATURITY

The first of those two grounds was maturity. As the Arab nations emerged one by one out of regimes of protectorate and tutelage to full sovereign independence, it became an intolerable paradox that the Jewish community alone, not less advanced in its cultural or social standards, should be denied the prerogatives of independence, should not be allowed to take its destiny into its own hands and carve out its future in the image of its own spirit and tradition. There existed a disharmony between the dependent status of the Jewish community and the widespread trend of emancipation throughout the Arabic-speaking world. By recommending Jewish statehood the United Nations abolished this paradox and created a status of equality between the political responsibilities and obligations of the Jews and those of the surrounding Arab world.

DISTINCTIVENESS

The second criterion was that of distinctiveness. The Jewish community presented a spectacle of complete separation. It was objectively distinct from its environment in every aspect of its life—so distinct that it could express itself only within its own frontiers of authority and in the scope of its own self-determination.

In the society of Israel at its earliest stage we already perceive a distinctive feature in the harmonious coexistence of free enterprise with the most advanced forms of social co-operation. The social order of Israel is a symbiosis of these two doctrines of life which are habitually regarded as contradictory and irreconcilable. This coexistence of free enterprise and social co-operation within Israeli society is precisely reflected upon the international scene in the capacity of the new state to elicit and maintain friendship both in the Eastern and in the Western worlds.

The Moslem world, through the creation of Pakistan, is committed to the view that religious distinctiveness is in itself sufficient to justify, or even to require, the establishment of separate statehood. I do not wish to commit myself, still less my Government, for or against any such view. But those who hold it are in no position to deny that where there is distinctiveness not only of religion but also of language, of historical origin, of social standards, of conceptions of democratic and economic organizations, of standards of life—where the distinction affects every activity of the individual and the community, the case for a separate expression of self-determination becomes irresistible.

The Declaration of Independence of the United States quite properly exhorts all peoples who secede from a previous political unit in order to establish a system of their own to declare the causes of their separation. I think the political scientist must admit that there are no criteria whereby peoples justify a separate national existence that are not found to exist in the relationship between Arab and Jewish societies in Palestine. How futile it must have appeared, how unpractical, to force this distinctive, mature, and conscious community into the strait jacket of a political, social, and cultural system which was not akin to it in any respect!

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE WITH ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Addressing the General Assembly in 1948, the representative of the Netherlands illustrated the doctrine of separate self-determination by reference to his own part of the world. He pointed to the time when the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were united under one state, and showed that the differences between even those three communities were sufficiently great to make a common allegiance impossible, and the area eventually developed a formula for combining political independence with economic and regional co-operation. He went on to point out that the differences dividing Arabs from Jews were in every respect wider and deeper than those which divided the peoples of that area of western Europe, and that therefore a forced unity in political allegiance could not be envisaged.

We find the same doctrine at work in the Arab world itself. There are two countries to the north of Israel—Syria and Lebanon—whose citizens are scarcely distinguishable from each other by any characteristic of language or dialect or historic memory or tradition. Yet such differences as do exist between them are considered by both to be sufficiently significant to require each to safeguard its separate sovereignty as a prior condition of its co-operation with the rest of the Arab world.

In Latin America, in the Benelux union, in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the twentieth century may be said to have found its classic doctrine for the solution of the national problem—separate political independence combined with close economic and social co-operation.

DECISION JUSTIFIED BY RESULTS

By every comparison with history and with contemporary life, we are therefore entitled to conclude that in its historic Palestine resolution the United Nations made a correct application of the doctrine of self-determination to the particular circumstances of the region involved.

Underlying that international judgment was another hope which we are now able to judge in the light of results. We have consistently upheld a certain doctrine of Arab-Jewish relations which is that the first condition of partnership and co-operation between the two peoples is equal political status. Jewish statehood side by side with Arab statehood establishes the objective conditions of Arab-Jewish co-operation.

Recent events have given striking confirmation of the validity of that doctrine. As long as Arabs and Jews were not equally emancipated in the full enjoyment of sovereign rights, they never even succeeded in making formal contact for the adjustment of conflicting interests. But no sooner did a Jewish state exist side by side with Arab states, with all the appearances of permanence, than it found itself around the table with Arab governments treating problems as an equal among equals.

NATIONALISM UNDERLIES INTERNATIONALISM

From the success of this experiment we deduce a theory which perhaps may have significance in a wider context—the theory of diversity as a condition of regional co-operation. The Near East, in our eyes, presents a pattern of cultural and economic diversity, and not of monotony. We aspire to the harmony of a mosaic. We look not to the forced unity of different peoples of which the smaller are to be subjected to the dominant culture; but to the co-operation of equal units, each independent within the scope of its own sovereignty and co-operating with others for the rehabilitation of the region as a whole. Here again we may invoke the successful experience of other areas of regional co-operation, in which the maintenance of the individual independence of each unit is a basic principle.

The nineteenth century had a different conception. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Napoleonic experiment, later Hitler's attempt to unite Europe—all these rested on the conception of false unity, submerging the independence of the smaller national units and creating a vast inchoate unity in the image of the dominant culture.

This stands in complete antithesis to the modern doctrine of political independence combined with regional co-operation—a doctrine which has successful illustrations in many parts of the globe. Just as the full expression of individual civic rights is a condition of national loyalty, so the full expression of a people's national sentiment is a necessary prelude to its successful integration into the universal community. Just as the individual is the only recognizable unit of national life, so the independent state is the only recognizable unit of international life. Thus internationalism and nationalism stand in no antithesis; they are indeed complementary to each other. Those of us who have not forgotten our Latin might properly reflect that internationalism means a relationship *between* nations, and therefore requires the full existence of the national unit as an essential element in any wider confederation.

We believe that the conception of diversity has great meaning for the Near East. The renaissance of culture in that part of the world in medieval

times arose through the interplay of different cultures and the production of something different from each of them. There can be no renaissance of culture anywhere that does not arise from such an effervescence produced from the interplay of more than one element.

For that reason we see something negative in the conception of an Arab League which rests on racial and cultural exclusiveness, and we see something positive and constructive in the idea of a Near Eastern League which embraces, on the principle of regional co-operation, all the peoples of that area in the full diversity of their languages, cultures, and political institutions.

ISRAEL IN HER ENVIRONMENT

One might ask whether this conception of the harmonious integration of Israel into an environment alien to it is not a utopian idea in the light of recent acrimonies and conflicts. If there are Near Eastern experts who doubt that possibility, they are worthy successors of other experts who doubted the possibility of the development of Palestine, doubted the possibility of Jewish resistance, doubted the possibility of direct Arab-Jewish negotiations.

To confound the predictions of experts is perhaps the most satisfying experience of the human mind, and of that particular satisfaction the peoples of the Near East have recently had an abundant share. Nothing in the past eventful year has been more splendid or impressive than that a few months after the climax of war we should see upon the horizon the unmistakable omens of peace. Although the recent armistice negotiations conducted under United Nations mediation at Rhodes and elsewhere were confined to discussions on a military level, we do not doubt for a single moment that they have instituted a fruitful procedure for direct contact between Israel and the neighboring states for the adjustment of conflicting interests.

More important than the actual substantial results of those conferences, and more impressive to us, was the evidence that we received of the steady encroachment upon the Arab mind of the doctrine of Arab-Jewish co-operation as an imminent and practical possibility. In no other part of the world does the conception of political independence combined with regional co-operation offer such a convincing reply to the challenge of the environment. The Near East presents a spectacle of degradation and squalor unparalleled in any other part of the world in which political independence has been achieved. Extreme poverty, endemic disease, short expectation of life, infantile mortality, ravage the life of the common man in every part of the Nile and the fertile Crescent. The squalor of the present insults the grandeur of the past. This disparity between constitutional advancement and social backwardness must be reduced if the Near East is to be saved from revolutionary upheaval and external exploitation.

The Near East does not need, for the good of its peoples, the kind of flamboyant crusades to which a defeated and discredited leadership has condemned it in recent years. It needs scientific agriculture. It needs industry based on human skills. It needs the introduction of modern technology. It needs the emulation of modern examples in social co-operation. It needs the application of new capital resources to local projects of health and development.

These things, which every student of the Near East must conclude to be the basic necessities for the revival of that area, are surely the features most characteristic of Israel's achievement. We

therefore do not tolerate for a single moment the sterile contention that Israel's example or exertions are alien to the genuine interests of the Near Eastern peoples. It may be said that an objective harmony is of little use unless it is subjectively felt; but even here, the bulwarks of prejudice and exclusiveness are crumbling before us in ruins.

This process of the integration of Israel into the life of Asia has already begun with the recognition conferred upon it from both sides in Asia—from China in the East and from Turkey in the West. And in conversations with leaders of both countries, as well as from a study of public opinion in India itself, we are impressed by a growing consciousness in Asia that a new and dynamic force has arisen which instead of disrupting its life and aspirations, as many feared, may instead be regarded as a potent reinforcement to the continent's most important constructive aspirations.

NOT A GROUND OF CONTENTION

When I speak of regional co-operation I have in mind not a strategic but a social conception. The manner in which Israel has managed to exist as a bridge between the two contending powers is an asset to be cherished and most zealously preserved. The friends of the Near East cannot regard the area as a potential base for the use of one group of powers against another group of powers. It must be regarded solely as an arena for social and economic rehabilitation.

I imply no criticism of other small nations differently placed in the strategic pattern when I suggest that Israel's interests, and perhaps the interests of the other states in the continent, require a strict detachment from the international struggle and an attempt to keep the area neutralized from strategic influences for the sake of its own rehabilitation. It was for that reason that we found so many responsive echoes in Pandit Nehru's recent pronouncement on this very theme. The objective political conditions of the entire Middle and Near East require some such intermediate position. There is not a single part of that continent for which the preservation of world peace is not a vital interest as well as a doctrine in full conformity with all the ideals which have grown up in the continent of Asia.

SYNTHESIS OF EASTERN AND WESTERN CULTURES

I have said enough to indicate why we believe that the doctrine of inveterate conflict between Israel and its environment is a superficial doctrine. It rests upon no kind of objective analysis. The Near East is bent upon achieving a synthesis between eastern and western forms, of adapting eastern life to the best standards of western progress.

Israel starts off with western culture, which it must strive to fit into an eastern environment. I insist that there is an objective historic affinity in this process, a profound harmony far deeper than the transient political divisions which now hold international attention. For this reason, the United Nations' judgment on this question must be regarded as a successful application of international processes to one of the most tormented issues of international conflict. The United Nations here showed itself capable of judgment and decision. Later it showed itself capable in the exercise of invaluable qualities of conciliation and mediation with which to dispel the clash and shock of this revolutionary experiment.

IS WORLD GOVERNMENT DESIRABLE?

How far does this illustration from Israel's experience have value in the

general context of a discussion on world government? I should like to present one drastic question: Does the world really aspire to world government? In more concrete terms: What is the conception of world government to which human sentiment aspires? Do we and should we aspire to a world consisting of a single political unit?

I recoil from such a prospect with undisguised horror. The world organized as a single political unit would surely be as anomalous and as unattractive as the world existing on one physical plane, completely flat, with no mountains or hills, with no climatic differences. Surely the variety of language and culture and spirit and ethics and way of life, dividing groups of men from one another, is just as much an integral part of the pattern of this world as its division into mountains and valleys, into land and sea.

Not merely would I suggest that the conception of a uniform world is an impossible conception; I would ask you most seriously to consider whether it is even a desirable conception. Is not this infinite variety of human culture and experience the most significant aspect in the organization and life of the world?

UNITY VERSUS CO-OPERATION

Therefore I think that we must differentiate most clearly between two quite different conceptions—that of unity and that of co-operation. Not merely are these not the same thing; they stand in the most direct antithesis. Co-operation accepts the existence of independent units of life and thought and government, but aspires to harmonize the activity of those units in a general stream of universal peace. Unity would abolish those horizons. A unified form of government would deny to the human spirit the right to express its differences in one of the most vital forms of that expression, namely, the organization of society. The organization of society is just as much a part of cultural distinctiveness as is the language or the historic memory of the people itself.

For that reason I would indicate a strong theoretical and practical preference for the conceptions of the Charter of the United Nations as against the opposing conceptions of federalism. These are not kindred conceptions, but alien one from the other; for the Charter rests on a frank recognition of sovereign equality, of the existence of separate and distinctive units which have a perfect right to their distinctiveness but which are yet compelled by overriding duty to subordinate their distinctive expressions of life to the supreme arbitrament of international peace.

The minds of those who long for peace should be guided by the conception of co-operation and should turn aside both practically and ideologically from the impossible conception of unity. Let us think no more in terms of ramshackle confederations in which peoples surrender their separate capacity for organizing their national life, and let us think rather in terms of harmonizing differences that we acknowledge as they are. Any other doctrine applied to the Near East would have made impossible the epic Palestinian solution which has made such an irresistible appeal to the sentiment and chivalry of liberal mankind.

The doctrine of regional co-operation might serve as a bridge between the ideas of separate sovereignty and the aspirations of universalism. If the United Nations has failed to achieve the aspirations of its founders, it is not because the ideological foundations of the Charter are false. And we cannot evade the necessity of harmonizing the distinctive units which make up the international community by recourse to

any possible utopianism of a single and undivided world.

THE UNANSWERED QUESTION

This leaves us, in conclusion, with the main question: Can we reconcile diversity with peace? Can systems of life and thought be different and yet live together in harmony? The rise of Israel has little to offer in this connection, because it rested upon a circumstance that was entirely unique, namely, that the two conflicting ideological camps managed in this single, exceptional instance to combine upon a single line of thought and action. Can they carry that synthesis and that harmony over into other affairs which affect their own vital interests more closely? That is the crucial and unanswered question. Israel can bring to its answer very little in the way of material sustenance. We can, however, insist upon that vision which we bequeathed to the world—the vision of the day when peace shall cover the earth as waters cover the seas.

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Why the International Trade Organization?

By Clair Wilcox

THE Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization does two things. It lays down a detailed code of rules to govern trade relationships, and it sets up another specialized agency of the United Nations to serve as an instrument of continuous international accommodation.

Analysis of Commitments

The substantive commitments contained in the Charter may be divided into two groups. In the first group are those that relate to issues of national commercial policy that have previously been covered in international agreements. In the second are those that mark the first attempt to deal with some of the major problems now affecting world trade.

The first group contains commitments relating to tariffs, preferences, discriminatory internal taxes and regulations, methods of customs administration, import and export quota systems, and other devices for restricting trade. These commitments limit the freedom of nations to employ measures other than tariffs for the protection of domestic industries, and they require the members of the ITO to enter into negotiations directed toward the substantial reduction of tariffs and the elimination of preferences.

Such negotiations, concluded among twenty-three nations at Geneva in 1947, resulted in the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Further negotiations, now under way at Annecy in France, will bring thirteen other nations within the scope of that agreement. The General Agreement, already covering more than half of the world's trade, reduces many duties, binds others against increase, binds the free entry of still other goods, eliminates a long list of preferences, and reduces the margin of many other preferences. These concessions are safeguarded by the inclusion, in the trade agreement, of provisions paralleling those commitments of the Charter that check resort to other methods of restricting trade.

These commitments are necessarily a product of compromise. They are accompanied, in both documents, by exceptions and by provisions through which further exceptions may be obtained. These provisions are to be administered, upon its establishment, by the ITO. Most of the criticism of the Charter has been directed toward the exceptions to the commitments that fall in this group. It is important to remember that these exceptions are also contained in the General Agreement. As far as this criticism is concerned, adoption of the Charter will not change the structure of international obligations which already exists.

The commitments in the second group are peculiar to the Charter and will not be undertaken unless the Charter is approved. They have to do with the relationship between domestic employment policies and international trade policy, with the economic development of backward areas and the treatment of international investments, with the prevention of restrictive business practices of monopolies and cartels, and with the control of export subsidies, state trading operations, and international commodity agreements. These commitments mark the first general agreement on policy in any of these fields.

Considered together, these commitments constitute the most comprehensive undertaking in the history of international economic relations, and represent the widest area of agreement ever obtained with respect to national commercial policies. Admittedly, they are not as strong as could be wished. But they afford a good beginning, and with the development of the International Trade Organization they should grow in strength and in authority.

AGENCY OF ADMINISTRATION

More important, potentially, than the structure of commitments in the Charter is the agency which it sets up to administer their terms. The ITO will serve as a medium of continuous consultation on national policies that affect world trade. Instead of taking unilateral action without regard to the damage it may do to others, a nation belonging to the organization will enter into discussions with its other members so that it may act in a manner that is consistent with their mutual advantage. Instead of resorting to retaliation against a member that has taken action harmful to its interests, a nation will bring the case before the organization. If it cannot effect an amicable settlement of the dispute, the organization, acting through its Executive Board or its Conference of Member States, and with the advice, if it is requested, of the International Court of Justice, will make a decision. If it decides that a complaint is well founded, it may then release the complaining member from stated obligations toward the member who is found to be at fault.

This procedure affords a sanction through which the provisions of the Charter can be enforced, and, more important than this, it prevents resort to economic warfare by establishing an orderly judicial process; and it holds the promise of creating, through an accumulation of decisions, a recognized body of international law. It may thus be possible to develop a code of conduct that will govern the practices of state trading enterprises and international cartels. The ITO will serve as a continuous forum through which such practices can be called into question, criticized, defended, and modified. In the absence of the organization, no such medium would exist.

The ITO will take its place beside the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, among the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The establishment of such an organization has been contemplated since the very beginning of the planning for postwar reconstruction and recovery. Action to reduce barriers to trade was pledged by the Atlantic Charter in 1941 and by the lend-lease agreements in 1942. It was envisaged by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. It is required, under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, by the agreements entered into between the United States and each of the countries participating in the European Recovery Program. The ITO is an integral part of the larger pattern of economic reconstruction; as long as it is lacking, the pattern will be incomplete.

THE FUND AND THE BANK

The future of the International Monetary Fund is dependent upon the establishment and operation of the ITO. It is the purpose of the fund, by contributing to the stabilization of currencies, to bring about the eventual elimination of exchange controls. But there would be little point in abolishing national regulation of the use of moneys if unrestricted freedom to license imports were re-

tained, for anything that a nation was forbidden to do by regulating its exchanges it could accomplish with equal certainty by imposing a quota system on its trade. Unless quantitative restrictions as well as exchange controls are brought under international supervision, the purpose of the fund can be circumvented with the greatest of ease. Unless the fund is supported by the ITO, its possible contribution to the restoration of a freer trading system will be insignificant.

A nation that is short of foreign moneys with which to pay for imports may be able to obtain them, for a time, by selling its own money to the fund. It is the purpose of such a loan to tide the nation over until it can balance its accounts by selling more abroad. But exports cannot be increased unless markets are opened, and markets will not be opened unless nations reduce their barriers to trade. If imports are to be increasingly restricted, the fund cannot go on lending very long. If trade is not accorded greater freedom, the effort to stabilize currencies will eventually break down.

The future of the bank, like that of the fund, is bound up with the prospects of the ITO. The bank is designed to make and to guarantee long-term loans for reconstruction and development. It was not set up to give money away. Borrowers are expected to pay interest and to retire their debts. But they will not meet these payments unless they can acquire exchange by making sales abroad, and their ability to do so will depend upon the character of the regulations that govern international trade. If trade is to be tightly restricted, the funds provided through the bank will turn out to be not loans, but gifts.

ERP AND UN

So, too, with the European Recovery Program. Since the war, the trade of Europe has been conducted through a network of short-term agreements between pairs of governments, under which each party undertakes to license the exportation to the other of certain quantities of certain goods, and both parties undertake to minimize transfers of currencies by making payments through clearing accounts in their respective central banks. It is required, moreover, that purchases and sales in each of these arrangements shall balance. And this means, in effect, that a large part of the world's trade has been thrown back from the civilized economy of money to the primitivism of barter. As the nations of Europe get back on their feet, as goods once more become available in adequate supply, the need for these practices will disappear. In conformity with the pledge contained in the aid agreements, they should then move toward freer trade.

The pledge, however, is a general one. It can come to have meaning only as it is spelled out explicitly in commitments that will have binding force. This is what is accomplished by the obligations that have been written into the Charter. When the recovery program has been completed, the aid agreements will expire. Reliance for the subsequent fulfillment of their promise must be placed upon the Charter and the ITO. Without them, there would be nothing to take over where the recovery program leaves off. Without them, the program might well become a mere handout, and the Economic Cooperation Administration another agency for the distribution of relief.

The International Trade Organization is an indispensable part of the United Nations. To reject it would be to jeopardize every effort that has been made to organize the world for peace. Nations cannot expect to establish order through agencies of political co-operation if anarchy is to be the rule in eco-

nomic affairs. The world tried that once, and it didn't work.

Repeated efforts were made through the League of Nations during the twenty years between the two world wars to check the headlong movement toward restrictionism and discrimination in world trade. One by one these efforts ended in failure. And for this failure the United States must bear a large share of the responsibility. We refused to join the League. On the eve of a conference that was called to reduce the world's tariffs, we raised our own tariff to the highest level in history. Three years later, when the nations met to agree upon the stabilization of currencies, we condemned the project to failure by refusing to co-operate.

Our record since the Second World War affords a heartening contrast. We have taken the lead in the creation of the United Nations and the establishment of its specialized agencies for international co-operation. We have contributed heavily to relief, resettlement, and rehabilitation. We have made grants and loans for reconstruction, unprecedented in magnitude and in the generosity of their terms. We have taken action to promote the development of backward areas, to stabilize currencies, and to reduce barriers to trade. Now we are presented, in the Charter of the ITO, with a final test of our determination to carry through.

CRITICISMS

The Charter has come under fire from the left, from the right, and from the center. According to the Communists, it is an attempt by imperialist American monopoly capitalism to enslave the economies of weaker states. According to the isolationists, it will require the United States to surrender its sovereignty to a superstate, involve it in global economic planning, and commit it to international socialism. In the eyes of many people who belong to neither of these groups, the provisions of the Charter are weaker than they should be, and its exceptions are open to abuse. The first of these criticisms is obvious nonsense; the second is demonstrably false; the third, it must be admitted, contains a considerable measure of truth.

The conditions that would permit an early and unqualified restoration of multilateralism and nondiscrimination simply do not exist in the world today. The trade of nations is out of balance; many countries must now restrict imports if they are to avoid financial disaster. In some countries all economic activity has been collectivized; in others the economy is subjected to detailed controls; in neither case is economic planning to be easily reconciled with greater freedom of trade. In underdeveloped countries, all over the world, there is a compelling desire for rapid industrialization, and a belief that industrialization is to be promoted by restricting trade. Everywhere there is a sense of economic and political insecurity and a hesitation to assume the risks that a freer trading system would entail. These are unhappy facts, but they are stubborn facts. If nations are to reach agreement, these facts are not to be ignored.

Since the Charter compromises conflicting interests, it is less than perfect from the point of view of the United States. But perfection, in international agreements, is to be neither expected nor attained. Invariably, nations have to settle on something that falls short of utopia.

In the companion article by Mr. Killheffer there are a number of instances of misunderstanding or misinterpretation on which brief comments should be made:

1. It is said that acceptance of the Charter would, in effect, write the Re-

ciprocal Trade Agreements Act into the Constitution of the United States. This is not the case. The only obligation contained in the Charter is the obligation to negotiate. The procedure to be adopted by any country in carrying out this obligation is for it alone to choose. The Charter does not require the particular procedures embodied in the Trade Agreements Act.

2. One obscure item, among several thousands covered in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is cited to suggest that that agreement reduced tariffs in the United States and raised tariffs abroad. The citation is implausible on the face of it, but I am not familiar with the facts of the case. I do know, however, that concessions were obtained, at Geneva, from twenty-two countries, affecting two-thirds of their imports from us; that one-third of these concessions involved reductions in duties; that three-fifths of these reductions were over 25 per cent, and that one-third of them were over 35 per cent.

3. It is said that one provision in this agreement would have limited the amount of synthetic rubber that could be consumed in the United States. There is not now, and there never has been, any agreement that would have operated to reduce the amount of synthetic rubber consumed—or produced—in this country.

4. It is said that preferences are excepted from the general rule requiring most-favored-nation treatment. This is true only of preferences existing before the Havana Conference, and such preferences are subject to reduction or elimination through further negotiations.

5. It is contended that the commitments contained in the Charter are ambiguous. The only phrase cited in support of this contention is as clear as crystal. And it is taken, not from a paragraph that sets forth a definite commitment, but from one that merely involves a recognition of a general principle.

6. It is said that the United Kingdom opposed inclusion in the Charter of a provision that gives to the International Monetary Fund the power to determine whether or not a country is in balance-of-payments difficulty and is therefore permitted to impose quotas on imports. The truth is that the opposition came, not from the United Kingdom, but from Australia and New Zealand. More important is the fact that these countries finally agreed to the provision and that it is now in the Charter. The provision is highly significant, since the heavily weighted vote of the United States in the fund will give it a predominant influence in making the determination. This fact was well understood by all the countries at Havana, who voted, unanimously, for the provision.

7. It is said that the United Kingdom sought to introduce procedures that would have delayed proceedings against international cartels. It is not said that this move was defeated and that the proposals made by the United Kingdom are not included in the Charter. Mr. Killheffer objects when a difference between the United States and another country is settled by a compromise. He also objects when the United States has been completely successful in obtaining acceptance of its position without a compromise.

8. It is said that a provision confining commodity agreements to primary commodities has been dropped. This is not the case. The paragraph that is cited clearly confines such agreements to commodities that satisfy carefully prescribed conditions existing only in the case of primary commodities.

9. It is implied that the ITO would have power to order governments to shift resources from one product to an-

other or to shift production from one area to another. This is incorrect. The provisions that are quoted merely make sure that commodity agreements will not be used to prevent such shifts from taking place.

10. It is said that the governments of countries joining the ITO will be obligated to provide capital and know-how for the development of backward areas. The fact is that the obligation contained in the Charter is, first, to impose no unreasonable impediment to the exportation of capital and know-how by private enterprise, and second, to co-operate with the United Nations and its specialized agencies in their work of promoting economic development.

Finally, a statement is attributed to the delegate from Australia suggesting that his country intends to discriminate even if it assumes an obligation not to do so. The statement made by the delegate apparently was misunderstood. What I heard him say, in discussing a particular proposal made by the United States, was that Australia never had discriminated, did not intend to discriminate, but would not accept this particular obligation not to do so. I have complete confidence that the Commonwealth of Australia will scrupulously observe any obligation that it undertakes.

EXCEPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

These are matters of detail. More important are Mr. Killheffer's charges that the Charter is one-sided, being filled with escapes for everyone but the United States, and that it is designed to bring about global economic planning. What are the facts?

Of the exceptions contained in the Charter, six are really important. Of these, three were included at the insistence of the United States, and three to meet the needs of countries in balance-of-payments difficulties and countries in the process of economic development. The American exceptions relate to the suspension of tariff cuts when increased imports threaten to injure domestic producers, to the imposition of quotas on agricultural imports and the subsidization of agricultural exports, and to measures adopted in the interest of national security. The other exceptions relate to the imposition of quotas by countries faced with an imminent threat of a serious loss of monetary reserves, to the use of quotas and preferences found to be necessary to promote the development of new industries, and to the creation of customs unions. The American exceptions become effective without any sort of finding or approval by any international agency. The other exceptions do not come into operation until numerous conditions have been fulfilled, criteria satisfied, and permissions obtained. They are contingent upon the assumption of additional obligations and are limited in scope and in duration. Paul Baran of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, writing recently in the *New York Times,* agrees with Mr. Killheffer that the Charter is one-sided, but he argues that it makes inadequate concessions to the interests of other countries and is loaded too heavily in favor of the United States.

QUESTION OF STATE SOCIALISM AND WORLD PLANNING

Mr. Killheffer says that the doctrines of state socialism have been written into the Charter and that the document contemplates the creation of a planned world economy. Unfortunately, no proof is offered in support of the first assertion. It would be interesting to see the passages in which the doctrines of state socialism are said to be set forth. Does the Charter contemplate global planning? It most certainly does not. Three of its provisions are

cited, however, in support of this assertion. Each of them may be examined in turn.

Reference is made, first, to an article that prevents the use of export subsidies to obtain an increased share of the world market. Under this article, decisions on the amount of exports that may be subsidized are made (1) by the country granting the subsidy, (2) if another country objects, by consultation, or (3) if they cannot agree, by the ITO, according to certain principles, only one of which is quoted. Mr. Killheffer asks, "If this is not international planned economy, what is it?" The answer is easy: It is an effort to check the use of export subsidies.

It is said, second, that the commodity-agreement chapter of the Charter promotes the creation of innumerable intergovernmental cartels. The fact, however, is that without the Charter there will be no agreement in existence to check the formation of commodity agreements or to protect consumers against such agreements as may be made. Under the Charter, on the other hand, governments will be strictly limited as to the fields in which, and the circumstances under which, commodity agreements can be formed, the character of such agreements, and their duration. The probability is that under the rules of the Charter there will be fewer commodity agreements—not more.

It is further stated that the ITO, in connection with an agreement on cotton, could deny the United States the right to produce that crop; and this amazing statement is followed by the assertion that "this is definitely a planned and managed economy." The statement, of course, is false. There is nothing whatever in the Charter that would obligate the United States ever to enter into any agreement with respect to any commodity. And if the United States were unwilling to enter into an agreement, it is unlikely that one could be concluded.

Finally, it is said that a nation's pledge to promote the development of its own resources is statism, and that agencies of the United Nations, when they advise backward countries concerning the development of their resources, are following the procedures of a managed economy. There seems to be no reason, however, to suppose that private enterprise, given a favorable climate in which to operate, must necessarily be impotent, or that socialism is the only way in which the development of backward areas can be achieved. Nor is it reasonable to argue that the agencies of the United Nations can make no contribution to the process of economic development unless the know-how that belongs to private industry is seized and given away. Even more vital are such matters as aids to transportation and communications; the conservation of the soil and the improvement of methods of cultivation; public health work, sanitation, and the control of epidemics; and the establishment of institutions for research and technical training.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is possible merely to state two remaining points of difference. Mr. Killheffer defends the use of quota systems, says that tariff bargaining is wrong in principle, and argues that American tariffs should not be reduced as long as other forms of restriction are used abroad. I am opposed to quota systems, I believe in the principle of the Trade Agreements Act, and I am convinced that the overwhelming imbalance of trade that exists in the world today cannot be corrected unless American tariffs are low. Mr. Killheffer suggests that the Charter should be rejected and negotiations reopened by the United States. It seems to me fantastic to suppose that such a proposal would be wel-

comed with enthusiasm by the fifty-four nations that, at our invitation, have already spent eighteen months negotiating the present document. In my judgment, the choice lies between this Charter and no Charter at all. Faced with this choice, Mr. Killheffer prefers a world in which there is no set of agreed rules to govern international trade relationships and no instrument for the settlement of economic differences. I prefer the Charter of Havana.

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ITO—Illusion or Reality?

By Elvin H. Killheffer

In questioning the reality of the International Trade Organization, it is necessary to compare what is in the Havana Charter with what it was said it should and would contain and with what have been, and I hope still are, sound United States principles.

Assuming that most of my readers have some familiarity with the Havana Charter, it will suffice to say that it is made up of nine chapters which deal, in the order named, with Purposes and Objectives, Employment and Economic Activity, Economic Development and Reconstruction, Commercial Policy, Restrictive Business Practices, Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements, The International Trade Organization, Settlement of Differences, and General Provisions. In addition, there are annexes, interpretative notes, and resolutions.

The Proposed Purposes

The Department of State proposals of 1945 declared that there was an opportunity "to establish the kind of world we want to live in." It said also that "the fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each other for wealth and power or work together for security and mutual advantage." Well, of course, we all want to work together rather than at cross purposes. That does not mean, however, that men or countries will ever cease their struggle for wealth and power. That, in fact, is the very essence of competitive enterprise, and it is not incompatible with co-operation unless we carry the latter to the point of managed economy. As to what the purposes were to be, the proposals said:

What is needed is a broad and yet detailed agreement, among many nations, dealing at one time with many different sorts of governmental restrictions upon trade, reducing all of them at once on a balanced and equitable basis, and stating rules and principles within which the restrictions permitted to remain should be administered.

Rules are suggested to limit quotas and embargoes to carefully defined cases and to avoid discrimination in their application. Provision is made for the substantial reduction of tariffs and the elimination of tariff preferences.

I think it is correct to say that advocates of the Havana Charter assert that it accomplishes all this.

Question of Agreement

Taking these in order—is there broad and detailed agreement? We have a document and it includes a lot of detail, but unfortunately the Charter is a record of disagreement. Nor does the fact that the reasons are compelling alter the fact of disagreement. Whatever the reasons, the other nations could not sign the final act at Havana unless and until the requisite exceptions and escapes were incorporated, so that their nonperformance was accepted and condoned. Dr. Wilcox[1] would divert attention from this fact by pointing out that three out of six main escape clauses were introduced at the request of the United States. That does not alter the fact as I have stated it. In addition to escape clauses so called, there are numerous exceptions which also allow escape from or avoidance of the principles and rules.

Agreement "in principle" is not

[1] See Clair Wilcox in this volume.

enough, especially as it is often expressed as though it were synonymous with "agreement in theory." The proposals from which I have already quoted say that "the proof of any principle is in its application." I agree with that statement.

Examples of nonagreement

In implementation of the most-favored-nation principle, the Charter lays down the rule that all customs duties and charges, the method of their levying and any other formalities in connection with the import or export of commodities granted by one member shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for all other member countries (Art. 16–1).

As to many countries, both the principle and the rule are still only an objective. But the article is also an obligation. Obviously there was no genuine agreement to abide by the rule immediately and unconditionally. Preferences are at once excepted from the rule (Art. 16–2–3).

The lack of agreement is further emphasized by the provisions covering quantitative restrictions (quotas). Here an excellent principle is stated. It is very clear. "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges . . . shall be instituted or maintained by any Member . . ." (Art. 20–1).

It then requires several pages to detail the disagreement and make provision for nonperformance of the obligation. Admittedly, quotas are necessary when a nation cannot pay for its imports. So instead of agreement with the rule against them, we have agreement with exceptions permitting continuance. Termination depends on achievement of a better balance in international payments. British spokesmen have already warned of inability to achieve this by 1952.

There is much ambiguity in the Charter, often reflecting lack of any real agreement. Sometimes the language itself is ambiguous, but more often the meaning is so. An apt illustration is the definition of value to be used in calculating customs duties; here the language is clear, whereas the meaning is not:

> Actual value should be the price at which, at a time and place determined by the legislation of the country of importation, and in the ordinary course of trade, such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale under fully competitive conditions . . . (Art. 35–3(b)).

The words "at a time and place determined by the legislation of the country of importation" are susceptible of several meanings, even with each country acting in complete good faith. Legislation in one country may call for value at time and place of exportation. That is what we in the United States call foreign value. Another country may decide upon value at time and place of importation, thus making it some form of domestic value. Certainly this is not agreement.

TRADE RESTRICTIONS

Is there reduction of all restrictions at once on a balanced and equitable basis? Obviously there is not. The concept was very optimistic.

How about the principles and rules? Many good principles and rules are in the Charter. If my count is accurate, there are approximately fifty definite commitments and almost as many escapes and exceptions. If any escapes or exceptions necessary to continuance of existing restrictive practices are not in the Charter, the oversight is doubtless regarded as very serious by some of the delegations.

QUOTAS AND TARIFFS

In the effort to limit quotas, the United States delegates stood almost alone. In fact, they had to overcome the active opposition of the United Kingdom as to the important provision calling for decisions by the International Monetary Fund as to balance-of-payments difficulties. Insistence, by the same delegation, on all possible freedom in the use of quotas as well as preferences was, in my opinion, an important contributing factor leading to the new provisions making these devices permissible when the announced purpose is economic development. Some limit is put on the use of quotas through the provisions calling for discussion, reports, reviews, and the determinations by the International Monetary Fund. How effective they will prove to be is a matter depending greatly on the amount of willing effort made by the nations now using the devices. Termination of the practice can be long delayed.

Obsessed with the ideals of free trade and the necessity of removing tariffs in order to achieve it, the United States negotiators, in order to make any show of consistency, must oppose the use of quotas. Tariffs can be paid and goods then move. Quotas limit and then stop the movement of goods. But examined in the light of reason, certain serious questions arise as to United States attitude toward both tariffs and quotas. Tariffs are the least restrictive of the regulatory devices used in connection with imports and exports. Even if the fact were not admitted, proof is afforded by the actions of other countries. They find that tariffs only regulate or equalize certain differences, but do not restrict or altogether stop trade. That is why they use quotas and other devices.

In the United States, has any competent body ever made a genuine study to determine if and where tariffs are needed, why they are needed, and to what extent? Yet without this basic determination, the United States proceeds with the elimination of tariffs as though they were all bad and unnecessary.

But what about quotas? Are they as bad as painted? Usually when a man refrains from purchasing an automobile because he has not the money to pay for it, we say he is an honest, prudent man. That opinion holds even though his character and reputation might easily warrant the extension of credit. Yet when a nation restricts its purchases to necessities, we condemn it, even though there is no real basis for extending credit, and little hope of collecting if credit were given.

There is a logical reason for the use of quotas, just as there is for tariffs, and there can be and probably are unreasonable uses of both. But it is impossible to get rid of quotas in the foreseeable future, and it is unwise to continue reduction of the less restrictive tariffs in the mistaken belief that they are the real barriers to trade.

DISCRIMINATION

Is discrimination avoided? It is not. An Australian delegate went out of his way to make that fact abundantly clear, much to the delight of listening delegates. He frankly said that his government was willing to "give due regard" to the principle, but intended to practice discrimination nevertheless. There was no misunderstanding of what was said. I wrote down his words as he uttered them. Moreover, experienced United States foreign traders can testify to the existing discriminatory practices by Australia.

TARIFF REDUCTION

There is no question that the Charter provides for the substantial reduction

of tariffs (Art. 17). But there is a question as to the genuineness of the agreement reached. In fact, at Havana it looked for a time as though there might be pretty complete disagreement. It is generally recognized that tariffs are not the real barriers to world trade, propaganda in the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. What is less well appreciated is that the more restrictive devices employed by other nations do not replace tariffs, but are in addition to them. Agreement with United States theory as to the great value of tariff reduction is much less general than is supposed. Indeed, many nations depend on customs tariff as an important source of revenue. Obviously, agreement among foreign nations is almost unanimous as to the desirability of continuing the reduction of United States tariffs.

What the Charter now provides is that in the negotiations a member shall be free not to grant concessions on particular products, and in the granting of a concession may reduce a duty, bind it at an existing level, or undertake not to increase it beyond a level that it will specify. (Art. 17–2(a).)

The last part of this provision has already been utilized. An actual instance will be enlightening. In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations at Geneva, Benelux asked for and received a reduction of 50 per cent in United States duty on certain film. In "reciprocating" it raised its own rate on the same commodity to levels prohibitive of United States exports. This is not the sort of reduction other countries expect or receive from the United States.

Dr. Wilcox regards what I have said as being implausible on its face, even though he admits unfamiliarity with the facts. I will agree that such a provision should be impossible. The facts, however, are just as I have stated them. Obviously, I was not at this point discussing concessions *in general.* I stated an exact provision of the Charter which I consider improper, and in order to illustrate how it would work in practice, I gave an instance in which it already has been so applied. It is therefore not a question of interpretation or of opinion, but of simple fact.

There is a basic incompatibility throughout the Charter. Its professed purpose is the removal of restrictions. But wherever governments have intervened to manage the economy, it is necessary to impose restrictions in order to make the plans work.

ELIMINATION OF PREFERENCES

Is there provision for elimination of preferences? Yes, there is such a provision (Art. 17–1). But actual elimination of preferences may be long deferred, as the rule concerning concessions is the one just referred to. There is one definite gain, however, in that no margin of preference shall be increased (Art. 17–2(c)(iv)). On the other hand, there is a provision for creating new preferences when the purpose is economic development or reconstruction (Art. 15).

Differences of interpretation and the presence or absence of agreement are well illustrated when we discuss preferences. The imminent elimination of preferences was for a time widely publicized in this country. Since GATT it has been said that preferences affecting a large part of the trade of the United States were substantially reduced, and on a long list of products eliminated. The British regard the matter differently. I quote from *The Economist* (London, November 22, 1947):

> Though some reductions have been made in imperial preference, the "citadel" is still substantially intact; 70% of imperial preferential rates are completely untouched and only 5% of them eliminated.

GATT did provide for elimination of some preferences applying to colonial areas. These were given in exchange for a limit in the amount of synthetic rubber consumed under regulation in the United States. However, the British withdrew them, claiming a misunderstanding of what had been agreed. It is difficult to understand the statement by Dr. Wilcox to the effect that no such agreement was ever made. It is all spelled out in the GATT agreement, Schedule XIX United Kingdom 83/84.

Any criticisms or objections that I or others will make, or even many interpretations of what the articles of the Charter mean, will undoubtedly be disputed vehemently. Yet these disagreements can arise despite complete intellectual honesty on both sides. It is not illogical, then, to anticipate equal or greater disagreement between Member countries whenever an attempt at enforcement is made or when ITO makes unwelcome decisions or interpretations.

Settlement of Differences

The provisions for settlement of differences (Chapter VIII) seem pertinent, therefore, at this point. The Charter articles provide orderly procedure. First, consultation between members or submission to arbitration (Art. 93). If the issue is not satisfactorily settled, it may be referred to the Executive Board (Art. 94). At a member's request, the board decision or report can be sent to the Conference for review (Art. 95). Finally, at the request of a member, ITO may submit the matter to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on legal questions (Art. 96). This means that questions of fact are concluded by the Conference.

The procedure is excellent, except for this reference to the Court. It is often difficult to segregate questions of fact or law. Moreover, the members may not agree as to facts or on the statement of them by ITO. As only states may be parties in cases before the Court, there should be provision that in cases where members, after exhausting the procedure of the Charter, still cannot agree on questions of fact, they shall be permitted to appeal to the Court on both questions of law and questions of fact. To fill just such a need would seem to be the reason why nations have adhered to the Statute of the Court.

Presently two provisions interfere with such a solution. First is the obligation of members not to have recourse to any procedure other than that envisaged in the Charter (Art. 92–1). Second is the reservation by the United States when it adhered to the Court, excluding from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes arising under a multilateral treaty unless (*a*) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (*b*) the United States specially agrees to jurisdiction.

Apparently the United States Government is unwilling to modify these reservations. From this I infer that the Government is as apprehensive about entrusting certain decisions to the Court as I am about entrusting them to ITO.

Specific Criticisms

That the Charter is long and complex is to be expected, for the subject matter is similarly complex. Lack of genuine agreement cannot be overemphasized. It will be the source of many and perhaps serious disputes.

Statism—managed economy

Involved in statism is the difference between freedom and slavery. This country was founded upon and dedicated to the doctrine of freedom of the individual and the doctrine that the state should be the servant of the people, and not the reverse. That far I

think we will all agree. Now there are folks who denounce those of us who see the opposite doctrines of statism in the Charter, so the matter warrants a little examination.

First, what do we know about the practices and the attitudes of states and many people, regardless of the Charter? Beginning with our own Government, we see under its auspices and control operation of planned economy in Germany and Japan. Accelerated steps toward a socialized economy have been advocated publicly and an enabling act introduced into the Congress (H. R. 2756). Benefits of supported prices to many groups blind them to the inevitable controls to follow. Abroad, we see operation of state socialism in Britain—and we see the consequences. Most of the countries of Europe and many elsewhere have completely or partially controlled economies. Planned economy was openly advocated by many countries whose delegates participated at Havana.

This is the climate in which the Charter was written and should be viewed. It is most illogical to suppose that the doctrines of state socialism would not, under these circumstances, be written into the Charter. Does anyone suppose that the British and the Australians did not play an important part in writing the document?

Within the last several weeks a new wheat agreement has been written. The bait which will doubtless persuade United States agriculture to go along is the assurance, more apparent than real, of an export market for a certain quantity at a price. But this managed arrangement will inevitably necessitate government control of production to make it work, whenever overproduction occurs.

In the chapter on Economic Development and Reconstruction, there is provision that ITO shall make surveys of potentialities and give advice concerning plans and financing of economic developments (Art. 10); further, that members (governments) shall co-operate in providing the facilities, the capital, and the "know how" (Art. 11). The co-operation would presumably be through ITO. Are we really so naïve as to believe that these procedures are not those of managed economy, or that the commission set up for the purpose will not regard the provisions a mandate for such?

In case of disagreement over the share of the world market obtained on subsidized commodities, ITO will determine what is an equitable share (Art. 28–3). In doing so, it is to consider among other things

> the desirability of facilitating the gradual expansion of production for export in those areas able to satisfy world market requirements of the commodity concerned in the most effective and economic manner, and therefore of limiting any subsidies or other measures which make that expansion difficult (Art. 28–4(e)).

Administration will require a staff. Decisions must be made as to which is the "most effective and economic manner." Perhaps the decision might hold that cotton would be so produced in India or Brazil. If this is not international planned economy, what is it?

The member subsidizing a primary commodity obligates itself to negotiate an intergovernmental cartel, as provided in Chapter VI (Art. 27–2). And in Chapter VI we find provision for a whole series of such intergovernmental commodity agreements originally limited to primary commodities in burdensome surplus. That limitation has been removed (Art. 56–3). Among the objectives of such agreements is this:

> to provide, during the period which may be necessary, a framework for the consideration and development of measures which

have as their purpose economic adjustments designed to promote the expansion of consumption or a shift of resources and manpower out of over-expanded industries into new and productive occupations, including as far as possible in appropriate cases, the development of secondary industries based upon domestic production of primary commodities (Art. 57(b)).

Here we have government agreements which contemplate measures involving shifts of resources and manpower, and deciding which productions are over-expanded. They might involve such commodities as cotton, wheat, lard, tobacco, or potatoes. In making such an agreement, provision is to be made so that there shall be increasing opportunities to supply markets from sources from which such requirements can be supplied in the most effective and economic manner (Art. 63(c)).

It is said that the commodity agreement is the framework or transitory measure affording time for the members to study the problem and arrange to take individual remedial action, hence there is no central planning or managing. That argument is not convincing. Members will study the problem as an ITO group. Assume that a cartel is created. The Charter provides for a Commodity Council (Art. 64–1), on which the interested members have representation (Art. 64–2). The decisions taken by this council are obviously international, and not national. Consuming countries shall also have a voice in the decisions on matters of substance. Their vote shall be equal to that of the producers who want to export the commodity (Art. 63(b)).

The decisions on the vital matters to which I have referred are certainly matters of substance. If, then, it were decided that cotton is produced most economically by India or Brazil or China, and that United States manpower should be shifted to something else, the United States might find itself a magnificent minority of one. And the decision would not be made by the United States. It would be made by this international ITO.

This is definitely a planned and managed economy. If you still doubt it, look at some of the other objectives, such as developing natural resources and the expansion of production of primary commodities (Art. 57–(d)(e)). These are not functions of government, national or international, in a private-enterprise economy.

Decisions and interpretations by ITO

Another criticism is the wide area of decision and interpretation inevitably to be made by the organization. Some decisions are specifically delegated, including releases from or waivers of obligations. The far greater number will be necessitated by ambiguity in the language of the Charter. It has been said in effect that much of this was intentional—that the Charter is only a framework within which the substance will be developed through establishment of precedents and the growth of a body of cases. If this is the case, who will develop this substance? Obviously, it will be the ITO, in which the United States has one vote. It is fantastic to expect the United States to sign such a blank check.

If ITO, through its decisions, is to create a body of new international law, it will in effect have legislative powers. That very definitely is an invasion of sovereignty. Moreover, it will mean acceptance of administrative law in the international sphere; more government of men—less government under law.

The obligations are terribly one-sided now because of the exceptions and escapes for other countries; and if new matters of substance can be introduced through the procedure of interpretation,

the Charter should be rejected forthwith. Unfortunately, just such procedure was followed at the recent meeting of the Interim Commission in Geneva. By means of interpretation, the concept of monetary compensation was introduced (ICITO/EC.2/SR.11). The Charter provides that where the interests of a member are prejudiced, only retaliatory measures for their redress should be resorted to, such as withdrawal of concessions. While the Australian delegate pointed out that the Charter was being amended substantively through interpretation, the United States delegate agreed with the interpretation. You can guess the probable target for monetary damages, with Czechoslovakia even now charging the United States with discrimination.

The most important escape is naturally because of balance-of-payment difficulties. Carefully as the provisions in the Charter have been drawn, it is still possible that these escapes will be prolonged more or less deliberately through other policies. It is significant to note a specific provision of the Charter to the effect that a member shall not be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in its policy would render the restrictions unnecessary (Art. 21–4(b)(i)).

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

The chapter begins with a sound statement of the gains to be had from an economically sound development of resources. Incidentally, reconstruction was added at Havana. My personal feeling is that, despite all the special exceptions already in the Charter for their benefit, the war-devastated countries thought the strong drive for economic development might result in a new gravy train, and they wanted to be aboard.

Several obligations are objectionable; here is one: "Members shall within their respective territories take action designed progressively to develop, and where necessary to reconstruct, industrial and other economic resources . . ." (Art. 9). I can hear someone say "designed to develop" is not an obligation to do it. That argument is not impressive, for members are governments, and they here obligate themselves to take action. The language and the intent are those of statism rather than private enterprise.

The facilities for economic development and reconstruction are listed as capital funds, materials, modern equipment and technology, and technical and managerial skills. Then there is this obligation: "Members shall co-operate . . . in providing or arranging for the provision of such facilities within the limits of their power . . ." (Art. 11–1 (a)). This is hardly a trivial obligation. What is the limit of the power of government? The facilities described are in the United States privately owned and operated—the very essence of private enterprise.

Recently we have heard of a bold new plan. In essence it seems a combination of the contents of this article of the Charter and of the Economic Cooperation Administration. It is present United States policy to aid in the rehabilitation of Europe. That policy has wide support among our people for both emotional and practical reasons. It is "something else again" for the Government to assume an indefinite and continuing obligation of this kind.

I think there is a general desire to be as helpful as possible in the development of other countries, but the important point is that the facilities can be available through direct dealings and agreements between the people who have them and those who want them. Intervention of government does not

add to the facilities. It does superimpose political direction and control.

The Charter recognizes the important part played by foreign investment in the economic development of resources. It does not provide either the inducement or the protection to make such investment attractive. It fails even to call for just compensation and prompt payment when investments are expropriated. The subject is introduced thus: "The Members recognize that international investment, both public and private, can be of great value in promoting . . ." (Art. 12–1(a)). The words "public and private" are significant. With investment as with facilities, the possibility of obtaining capital through government on less exacting terms almost precludes satisfactory private agreements.

Commercial Policy

The commercial-policy provisions of the Charter are an extension of the Trade Agreements Act. This act embodied a temporary delegation by Congress of its constitutional responsibility for tariffs. Ratification of the Havana Charter would by indirection amend the United States Constitution by making permanent the transfer of this power so long as the United States retained membership in ITO. Our Government would be obligated to negotiate for the substantial reduction of tariffs on the request of any member or members of ITO (Art. 17–1).

Dr. Wilcox says this statement is absolutely untrue. But the matter is not one of opinion or veracity, but of fact. The facts are as I have stated them. If he objects to the word "amend," I am perfectly willing to substitute the word "nullify." That word perhaps better describes what would happen. Congress could not recover its constitutional authority except by withdrawing the United States from ITO after giving the required notice.

I should like to discuss very briefly what I believe to be a basic fallacy carried into the Charter from the trade Agreements program. It is the double assumption, first, that increasing world trade, as trade, will bring prosperity, and second, that indiscriminate removal of tariffs and other restrictions will bring it about. Please do not misunderstand me, for having spent most of my life in production and trade, much of the latter in foreign fields, I should and do have a full appreciation of the value and place of trade. My point is that overstressing the relative importance of trade tends to obscure the greater importance of production. If there were more production, the need for excessive exports from the United States would decrease, and the balance-of-payments difficulties would be lessened. A second point is the apparent assumption that there is no economic purpose for tariffs. Unless there is such an assumption, how can we bargain them away like so much surplus goods? If there is justification for any protection, published tariffs are the fairest and least restrictive of the various devices employed.

Tariff bargaining is wrong in principle. It must assume that all tariffs are either too high or not needed at all. If the assumption is correct, then the remedy is wrong. If they are not needed, they should be removed. If too high, they should be reduced. But the need or the lack of it should be accurately determined by a competent body of experts. It should not be subjected to political horsetrading, national or international.

Restrictive Business Practices

Restrictive business practices, commonly known as monopolies and cartels, are dealt with in Chapter V of the ITO

Charter. In essence, the chapter embodies the antimonopoly ideas of the United States. To put it mildly, there was no great enthusiasm for this. Wheras a subcommittee wanted to expedite recourse to the regular procedures for settlement of differences in case of alleged injury, the United Kingdom was adamant in its insistence on retention of all the procedures of Chapter V before resort to the settlement-of-differences procedures. This was done even though the subcommittee chairman pointed out that it would permit delay of a number of years. Two immediate objections to the chapter are:

1. The chapter immediately following, which provides for intergovernmental cartels, called Inter-Governmental Commodity Agreements. It is difficult to see how a device condemned in private hands, where it can be regulated, becomes desirable and proper in the hands of government or an international bureaucracy.

2. The exception from the requirements of the Commercial Policy chapter to permit measures necessary to enforcement of monopolies operated under state trading (Art. 45–1(a)(v)). In each instance the objection is basically the same. Monopolies either are or are not undesirable. If agreement on that question is impossible, why put it in the Charter? If there is agreement, then keep Chapter V and eliminate Chapter VI. Wherever there are abuses, treat them all alike.

Obviously, what I have said is not an exhaustive treatment of the Charter. I shall go on to a few conclusions.

THE CHOICE

If the only choice before the United States is between the Charter as written or none at all, I would take none. I say that regretfully, because I would like to see a good Charter adopted. If the time and conditions are such as to make that impossible, then certainly I would rather have no Charter than a bad one. If the United States flatly rejected it, the Charter would hardly survive. But that need not be the choice. The United States could make an alternative proposal in which it could indicate just what it would agree to.

Dr. Wilcox alludes to other, more important potentialities of ITO; and he includes the fact that ITO can serve as a medium for continuous consultation on national policies affecting world trade. With that I wholeheartedly agree. That should be the foundation on which future agreed rules should be based.

Some advocates say the United States should ratify the Charter, bad as it is, and then improve it by amendment, or if it does not work out to our liking, withdraw at the permitted time. It is unrealistic to expect to alter a contract in your favor after you have signed it. Withdrawal is a last resort, and will not lightly be resorted to. It sounds easy, but may not be feasible. In any case, it is a poor substitute for a sound Charter in the first place. If the power and influence of the United States are not sufficient to procure changes now, what reason have we to suppose that our influence will be greater when the unusual aid programs come to an end? At Havana the principal objective was to get the Geneva draft approved with as little change as possible. But the Geneva draft already contained much of what we are now criticizing.

The Charter is intended to minimize restrictions to trade and promote multilateralism. But this is largely a monetary rather than a trade problem. All trade is bilateral. If there are stable and properly valued currencies, there is multilateral settlement for the many bilateral trades.

But where are the properly valued

currencies? Much was said of what the Monetary Fund would do, but as yet even the pound sterling is not properly valued. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was to finance reconstruction of war-torn countries and development of world economic resources. The United States seems to have taken this over with the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the ITO asserts that economic development and reconstruction is one of its prime purposes.

The record of actual performance holds no encouragement for the further proliferation of international organizations.

Consultation and co-operation are most desirable. We should not forget, however, that it will require long and patient consultation and much persuasion and education before there will be a satisfying degree of co-operation.

ATTITUDE OF INDUSTRY

United States industry has long recognized that an international organization providing a forum for discussion and having initially only consultative and advisory functions would be a constructive move. It has been thought that such procedure would provide the sure foundation upon which a more comprehensive organization could eventually be built. Indeed, it has always been feared by those with long experience in international trade that unless there was willingness to make a disappointingly long effort at consultation, persuasion, and even education, we might build an organization for dissension instead of the reverse.

This awareness of the constructive possibilities is what accounts for a number of suggestions at different times by several of the larger associations in the United States, that there be such an organization created. Why, then, is there so much opposition to the Havana Charter?

Proponents of the Havana Charter are still talking in the attractive generalities of the prospectus. But the Charter is the contract which either does or does not implement those high hopes. And I say that a careful study of the document shows that it does not do so.

Certainly I am not alone in my appraisal of the Charter. It has been studied by many of the principal organizations of business and industry in the United States. They are in substantial agreement in their call for its rejection. These organizations are not given to flippant judgments. Indeed, several of the largest and most important of them wanted very much to go along, but found it impossible to do so after long and careful study.

The organizations referred to are: the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Resolution April 1948; [2] the National Foreign Trade Council, Resolution January 1949; the American Tariff League, Resolution October 1948; the New York Board of Trade, Resolution September 1948; the National Association of Manufacturers, Resolution

[2] As a matter of fact, the following steps were taken by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States: (1) An adverse report by a subcommittee of the Foreign Service Committee. (2) Foreign Service Committee recommended to the Board of Directors that a special committee representing all departments of the chamber be created to study the matter. (3) Directors appointed such a committee with Mr. Harper Sibley, a former president of the chamber, as chairman. After an all-day meeting, which was well attended, this committee made a report to the directors calling for the rejection of the Charter. (4) Board of Directors approved this report and referred it to Policy Committee. (5) Policy Committee wrote a resolution calling for rejection of the Charter, for submission to the annual meeting of the chamber. (6) Annual meeting of the chamber unanimously voted for the resolution.

March 1949; Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, Resolution February 1949; a special committee of the American Bar Association, see November 1948 issue of *Business Lawyer*. And among nonbusiness organizations, the Daughters of the American Revolution recently voted a resolution against the Charter after considerable debate.

Elvin H. Killheffer, West Chester, Pennsylvania, has recently retired from E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc., after nearly thirty years of service. He is a chemist and has held executive positions with many organizations, and was until recently chairman of the American Tariff League. He was a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment at Havana in 1948.

Peace by Pieces—The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

By Lyman C. White

IT IS only within our own lifetime that widespread and serious consideration has been given to the problem of how to create better international relations. During this time great efforts have been made to understand what causes war, and many proposals for the elimination of these causes have been advanced and strongly supported. These efforts have unfortunately contained a large element of error, since they have been based on a negative approach—they have nearly always been concentrated on the causes of war.

It seems to me that we are too preoccupied by war—our fear and our hatred of it keep us from realizing the true nature of peace and the means we must use to build it. Both our conscious and our unconscious attitudes are too often based on the fallacious idea that peace is the absence of war, and that what is needed is to abolish or control the causes of war. This idea does not contain the dynamic power necessary for success. It places us in a psychologically weak position—the position of those who are "against" rather than "for," who appeal to fear rather than to courage, and who exhort us to hate evil rather than to do good.

It is not the vision of the horrors of war to which we must appeal. We know that men are courageous and that they will fight even under the most terrible circumstances if they think it necessary. Even the fear of hell itself has never kept men from sinning. These things being so, how futile it is for us to attempt to frighten men into peace! We should not go on talking about the "causes of war." It is high time for us to begin to consider the "causes of peace." Peace is real and solid and full of life, activity, and achievement. Peace includes the day-by-day work of dealing with the problems of human life, which have all become international.

Common Interests and Peace

Our appeal must be to man's desire to achieve—to the vision of men who are at peace with themselves and each other because they have found great common causes to which they can give their devotion; to the vision of a world where every man, woman, and child will be provided with all that he needs for the fullest possible development of his individual personality.

One way by which such peace can be achieved is through the promotion of the common interests of humanity, by organized international action. This method is already far advanced, for there are more than a thousand international organizations now in operation which are dealing with almost every conceivable subject of interest to mankind.

With rare exceptions, these organizations have all come into being during the past hundred years. This great movement has, indeed, developed so rapidly during recent decades that it is probably safe to say that the amount of organized international activity today is fully a hundred times greater than it was in 1910 and ten times greater now than in 1930.

There are now in operation about

a hundred intergovernmental organizations—that is, organizations to which governments belong, such as the United Nations.

However, I want to discuss the role in world affairs of the nine hundred or more international nongovernmental organizations. These bodies are composed of private or unofficial groups in different countries which have formed a joint organization to promote some common interest. A large proportion of the people of the world are connected with one or more of these organizations, for they include in their membership nearly all the large churches, trade unions, businessmen's associations, co-operative societies, farmers' groups, and women's organizations, as well as numerous professional, scientific, humanitarian, and social reform organizations. They deal with almost every possible subject from theology to the Olympic Games, from child welfare to astronomy, from cancer to the problems of labor, from aviation to women's rights.

The world owes much to those people of different nationalities who had the intelligence and vision to realize that they had interests in common, and who had the energy, the devotion, and the boldness to bring together the national organizations which they represented to form these international nongovernmental bodies. It is in these and in the intergovernmental organizations that world unity is daily being prepared. In certain instances one can say that it has even been fully achieved in the particular activities concerned. The Salvation Army and other international religious orders, for example, regulate the lives of their members in great detail. Organizations in the field of sport have achieved a remarkable degree of world unity for the limited area of life under their control, since they lay down and enforce the rules for international competition.

SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS

I would like to give a few examples of the work of the international nongovernmental organizations. The International Chamber of Commerce, composed of the leading associations of businessmen in the world, carries on many activities, of which I will describe only one. It has set up an international court for the settlement of legal disputes between businessmen of different countries. This court has handled over a thousand cases, at a cost of only 1.2 per cent of the amounts involved. In every case except one the decisions of this court have been carried out. In most cases the court has been able to settle the disputes by conciliation rather than by actual trial. This method of dealing with international disputes not only costs much less than taking a case to a national court, but it also avoids the bad feeling which would otherwise be developed.

The International Astronomical Union —to go into a very different field—coordinates the work of many observatories scattered throughout the world; this makes it possible to conduct scientific observations which could not be made within the borders of any one country.

The League of Red Cross Societies, through its international secretariat, its conferences, its publications, and the visits of its experts, has stimulated and aided its national member societies to establish and develop the peacetime services of the Red Cross. These services include such important activities as first-aid and home-nursing classes, health lectures, child welfare centers, training courses for nurses, antimalarial and antituberculosis dispensaries and sanatoria.

The organizations of a religious character have made converts, established national member societies, and strength-

ened the faith of believers; and have concerned themselves with many political, social, and humanitarian problems.

INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Many international treaties are based on the work of international nongovernmental organizations or have been influenced by them. I can give only a few examples. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 constituted the first important action of governments in the modern peace movement. An effort was made to limit armaments; declarations or conventions on the laws and customs of war were adopted; and the International Court of Arbitration was established. Czar Nicholas II acknowledged that the idea of calling the first of these conferences was suggested to him by the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The union was also largely responsible for the convocation of the second Hague Peace Conference. The influence of another nongovernmental organization in this connection is indicated by Elihu Root's statement before the American Society of International Law: "I think it is not generally understood that the first conference at The Hague would have been a complete failure if it had not been for the accomplished work of the *Institut de droit International.*"

Manley O. Hudson, writing some years ago in the *American Journal of International Law*, made the following statement regarding the International Maritime Committee:

> This is not an official body, but its work forms the basis of the deliberations of diplomatic conferences held at Brussels from time to time for the adoption of international legislation relating to the maritime law of peace. . . . Their recent labors have produced four important conventions; relating to the limitations of ship owners' liability, bills of lading, maritime liens and mortgages, and immunities of state-owned ships.

The formulation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson was undoubtedly influenced by the resolutions of the 1915 Congress of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Francis Delaisi stated in his *The Contradictions of the Modern World* that "the Dawes Plan was really the work of the International Chamber of Commerce." He also said, "In brief, what thirty-two diplomatic conferences with the help of countless meetings of ambassadors and interviews between heads of governments were unable to achieve, has been done by a private business organization." There is considerable evidence that the chamber also had a great deal to do with the announcement of the Hoover moratorium of 1931 on the payment of war debts.

International nongovernmental organizations have done a great deal to improve relations between countries. It was in 1936 that President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia told the Inter-Allied Federation of Ex-Service Men, "Your peace work is incomparably more effective than that of the diplomats." King Alexander of Yugoslavia said at about the same time that the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches was largely responsible for the cessation of bad feeling between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the resulting Pact of Friendship between the two nations.

The effect of the famous international boycott proclaimed against Hungary in 1920 by the International Federation of Trade Unions and the result of its action in organizing the refusal of workers to transport munitions to Poland during the war with Russia in the same year are well known.

Many of these organizations have

played a great part in the establishment of intergovernmental organizations. An example of this is the International Association for Labor Legislation, which existed before the First World War and originated the ideas which were later put into the first international treaty on labor, the Franco-Italian treaty of 1904. It also prepared the way for the first international labor conventions of 1905, 1906, and 1913; and its work contributed greatly to the establishment of the International Labor Organization, which is now one of the most important specialized agencies of the United Nations.

INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL LIFE

A very significant contribution to national life all over the world has been made by international business, trade union, religious, and other organizations, which have been influential in the creation of many hundreds of national organizations and have aided them in their work, encouraged them to take up new activities, and stimulated them into more vigorous action.

To give only one example, the formation of the League of Red Cross Societies in 1919 and the consequent broadening of the program of the Red Cross to include the relief of suffering in peace as well as in war led to a more general acceptance of the Red Cross idea throughout the world, especially in South America. Owing to this as well as to direct encouragement, the number of national Red Cross Societies has increased by more than thirty since 1919.

It is perhaps surprising to learn that international nongovernmental organizations have actually contributed to the creation of nations themselves, as in the case of both Italy and Germany.

In our own day we find an even better example. The independent state of Israel would surely never have been established in Palestine without the long-continued efforts of the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the World Jewish Congress, and many other Jewish organizations.

VARIOUS ADVANTAGES

International nongovernmental organizations have carried on, independent of governmental action and with their own resources, activities of an extremely varied nature, of value to their members or to society at large. The exchange of knowledge, promoted or facilitated by these associations, in itself constitutes a powerful instrument for man's advancement.

International nongovernmental organizations frequently reach agreements which regulate the relations among their national member groups or substitute for the different national methods or customs a standard international terminology, custom, or method. The International Chamber of Commerce has promoted the use of uniform bills of lading. The International Organization for Standardization promotes the acceptance of common standards through 69 special committees dealing with everything from screw threads to banking. The Boy Scout and Girl Scout movements have spread common customs and ideals among the young people of many lands. These are but a few examples.

These associations build up the organization of interests on a world basis, and through them individuals become accustomed to thinking in terms of the world and can more readily accept and support the idea of co-operation among governments.

It may now be interesting to summarize the inherent characteristics of international nongovernmental organizations.

These organizations have the freedom to pioneer; they may criticize both governments and intergovernmental organi-

zations, proposing action and demanding changes of policy; they are also relatively free from political considerations in working out and publishing scientific or other conclusions. In addition, they are able to meet needs which relatively few persons recognize, and which could not be met by official action for lack of public support or even because of public opposition. They can bring together in friendly discussion individuals from unfriendly nations and thus pave the way for international conciliation. They can represent in international affairs the interests of particular groups of all kinds—that is, functional or minority interests—as well as the interests of the dominant groups. It is possible for them to work in a direct fashion either on or with individuals, and finally to represent in a more direct fashion than governments can the views of the various parts of organized public opinion.

POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

A few words on the future of international nongovernmental organizations may be appropriate at this point.

If we assume the continued existence of our civilization, we may also assume that international nongovernmental organizations will continue to develop; for they arise out of that civilization and meet needs created by it. To enlarge upon this idea, let us say that the industrial revolution and the advance of science have destroyed the isolation of peoples and have provided the means by which they can work together in dealing with common interests. One aspect of this has been increasing specialization in knowledge and the resulting dependence of scientists and scholars on the thought of those of other lands. Scientists clearly realize that cutting off the international exchange of information greatly reduces the progress of both the physical and the social sciences. This exchange of information is often most effectively carried on through international nongovernmental organizations. When social workers, chemists, or other specialists of different nations come together in conferences, they find the meetings stimulating and helpful; they are also greatly helped by the publications of these organizations, which bring to their attention the latest developments in many countries.

Another aspect of our civilization is democracy, and the future of international nongovernmental organization is intimately connected with democracy. It is an expression of democracy when groups from various nations work together in solving their common problems; this is particularly true when they try to influence intergovernmental organizations. They are then acting as national groups act within a democratic state. Thus the influence and the future of international nongovernmental organization is connected with the growth of democratic attitudes within states and also within intergovernmental organizations.

RELATIONSHIP WITH UN

I now come to a further development of the process of co-operation between nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations which grew up in the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This is the consultative relationship with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

The United Nations is based upon common interests and the understanding that organized means are necessary for their promotion. Of particular importance are its economic and social aims, which, as expressed in Article 55 of the Charter, are:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

The organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for carrying out these aims is the Economic and Social Council, composed of eighteen members of the United Nations.

The importance of the contributions to be made by nongovernmental organizations to the Council's work is recognized by the inclusion of Article 71, which reads as follows:

> The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

CONSULTATIVE STATUS

In accordance with this article, the Council adopted, on June 21, 1946, a report setting forth the purposes of consultation and the criteria of eligibility for consultative status.

The purposes are to secure expert information or advice, and to enable organizations which represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.

The main criteria of eligibility are concern with matters covered by the Council, and authentic representation of a substantial proportion of the organized persons in the field of interest of the organization.

The Council has so far conferred consultative status on eighty-three organizations, which are divided into three categories. Category (a), in which there are nine organizations,[1] is defined as "organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council, and are closely linked with the economic or social life of the areas which they represent." Category (b), in which there are seventy organizations, is defined as "organizations which have a special competence but are concerned specifically with only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council." Category (c), in which there are four organizations, is defined as "organizations which are primarily concerned with the development of public opinion and with the dissemination of information."

Some general facts about the organizations granted consultative status are:

1. They include in their membership nearly all the important trade unions, business and employers' organizations, co-operative societies, and farmers' organizations of the world. Leading associations of journalists, teachers, architects, women, and youth are also included.

2. Organizations representing a large part of the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Greek Orthodox faiths and peoples are included.

3. At least fifteen of the consultative organizations have over five million members, one alone representing 360,000,000 people.

4. The membership of other consultative organizations, although small, is

[1] The World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Co-operative Alliance, the American Federation of Labor, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Organization of Employers, and the World Federation of United Nations Associations.

composed of persons having a very special competence. These include, among others, members of national congresses or parliaments, leading statisticians, fiscal experts, international law and penal law experts, social welfare workers, authorities on housing and town planning, and child welfare leaders.

5. The number of persons who directly participate in the international activities of these organizations is immense. One employs in its international secretariat some seven hundred persons. Recently, thirty-five thousand people from forty-two countries attended an international meeting called by one of the consultative organizations.

CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Authorized representatives of consultative organizations, who are called "consultants," are given official recognition at the meetings of the Council and its commissions, such as the Commission on Human Rights or the Economic and Employment Commission. They are free to move about in the Council area or in the delegates' lounge, and to engage in private discussions with government representatives.

Organizations in category (a) may submit written statements expressing their views on any economic or social matter, and these communications are reproduced in full and distributed throughout the world as official documents. The organizations in the other two categories may also submit written statements, but these are issued in a summarized form.

When the consultants attend a commission, they may ask to speak. Thus they have frequently been able to present the views of their organizations at the very time when the matter in question arose. It is obvious that this opportunity is significant.

When a commission reports to the Council, the consultative organizations may express their views on the report, or on other matters before the Council, through the Council's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. This Committee is at the present time composed of the President of the Council and the representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Such consultation is arranged if the Council so desires or the organization so requests. It is furthermore provided that the consultants should be able to participate fully in any consultations of this kind, so that the Committee may report to the Council on the basis of a full exchange of views. It is even provided that the Committee may recommend that the Council receive the consultants of organizations in category (a) for the purpose of hearing their views. The Committee has in fact done so, and the representatives of a number of organizations have thus appeared before plenary sessions of the Economic and Social Council.

Organizations in category (a) may submit items for the provisional agenda of the Council, and may defend these items before the Agenda Committee. If these items are accepted by the Council, their consultants may speak thereon to the Council or to a Committee of the Whole of the Council, depending on which is dealing with the matter.

Organizations in category (a) have also been granted the right to place items on the provisional agenda of the commissions.

During the eighth session of the Economic and Social Council which finished its work in March 1949, nine statements were made by the representatives of nongovernmental organizations in the Council, two speeches in Committees of the Whole, two in the Agenda Committee, and five to the Council's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations—a

total of eighteen personal appearances dealing with such matters as forced labor, trade union rights, and equal pay for equal work for men and women workers. These subjects and several others came before the Council on the initiative of the organizations in category (a).

Through these consultative arrangements a strong link has been created between the United Nations and organized public opinion, which thus has an opportunity to contribute to the creation of a better life for all the peoples of the world.

In addition to the consultative arrangements with the Economic and Social Council, nongovernmental organizations may submit written communications on matters before the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Trusteeship Council. These communications may be seen by any interested member of these organs of the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council frequently examines petitions from nongovernmental organizations in trust territories which allege that the administering authority is not fulfilling its obligations.

THE "OUTGOING" ASPECT

The foregoing may be considered as the "incoming" aspects of the relations of the United Nations with nongovernmental organizations. There is also the "outgoing" aspect, which is the informational work of the Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat. The Department assists 250 international and over 1,050 national nongovernmental organizations to promote, all over the world, understanding of the aims and achievements of the United Nations. These organizations are supplied with documents, and their accredited observers, such as press and radio representatives, are given special facilities to enable them to learn what is going on. The Department has called several important conferences of international nongovernmental organizations at Lake Success and Geneva to stimulate their informational activities by the interchange of ideas and projects, to develop their relations with the Department, and to improve the services rendered to them.

The specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization, and other intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States, each determine their own relationships with nongovernmental organizations. I cannot attempt to describe these relationships at this time. They are, however, extensive and of remarkable importance.

RESULTS

What are the results of the work of nongovernmental organizations with the United Nations? In the first place, these organizations have carried on a tremendous educational program to inform their members of the principles and activities of the United Nations and thus to develop the popular support which is so necessary for its success. In the second place, they have contributed numerous ideas and much information, which is highly valued by the members of the Secretariat who are working on international transport and communications, the removal of barriers to international trade, the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, problems of migration, and many other matters. Particularly noteworthy are the contributions of the organizations to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, which without their support could hardly have come into being.

The economic and social documents of the United Nations contain an aston-

ishing number of references to nongovernmental organizations. Further evidence will be available when the report on the contributions which the consultative organizations have made to the work of the Economic and Social Council is ready next November. Another publication which will throw light on the value of these organizations will be the Handbook of Consultative Non-Governmental Organizations which is now in course of preparation. This handbook will contain a careful description of consultative organizations, including such points as history, membership, structure, activities, and publications.

TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the study of international relations we have thus far restricted ourselves largely to the study of relations between governments. Students of international affairs have traditionally been "officially" minded, that is, largely concerned with the relations between states or governments, their struggle for power, and their conflicts. The expression "the international mind" has, in fact, meant the "official international mind." The development of the "nongovernmental international mind," which leads one to think of the relations among groups of people of different nationalities and how they may promote their common interests, has been neglected. We need to develop both the official and the non-official international mind. In this connection an interesting parallel can be drawn between the study of government and the study of international affairs. Some decades ago, the political scientists were concerned with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government and their powers and duties. They *thought* that they were studying government. As time went on, it became evident to them that careful consideration of political parties is necessary for the understanding of government. Later still, they realized the great influence exerted by what the political scientists call "pressure groups," i.e. chambers of commerce, trade unions, churches, farmers' organizations, and other like bodies which exercise a tremendous influence on the course of legislation. We all understand now that no government, no political party, nor indeed the life of any country where such groups operate, can be understood without careful study of their activities and influence.

In the study of international relations, however, we have so far restricted ourselves largely to the study of relations between governments. Surely the time has come for the students and teachers of international affairs to realize that international nongovernmental organization is a great unexplored continent in the world of international affairs and that expeditions should be sent in search of the great riches to be found there. For it is there that one finds the most positive and constructive elements working for world unity. Most of the areas in the world of international relations may be called dark continents. At least exploration of them does not encourage great optimism about the future of mankind. The continent to which I draw your attention is, however, a bright and cheerful one where men and women of all races and with every kind of interest have somehow come together to work in common for things which they believe in. I should like to make the following concrete suggestions:

1. Teachers can help their students to become conscious of the fact that when they join any organization not of a strictly local character, either as students or later in life, they probably belong to a world organization which groups together people of many coun-

tries; and that they can, by working through these organizations, contribute greatly to better international relations and the progress of humanity.

In almost every community such organizations as the Red Cross, the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Chamber of Commerce, trade unions, the local co-operative society, and churches may be found. These organizations are the channels through which every citizen can enter and affect the main stream of international life.

2. Students should be informed that no matter what lifework they may choose, there is an international nongovernmental organization already working in that field which they can help and from which they can gain a great deal.

3. Young people who are interested in a career within the field of international relations should be aware that the nongovernmental organizations, as well as the intergovernmental organizations, offer great opportunities for the highly qualified.

4. A great deal of effort is being given to the promotion of the teaching of the principles and activities of the United Nations in our schools. This teaching, I am afraid, usually fails to inform the students of the relations between the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations and how through these organizations the individual can contribute to the success of the United Nations.

5. International-relations clubs, study conferences, and model General Assemblies or, better yet, model Economic and Social Councils should not neglect the role of the nongovernmental organizations.

6. Many students visit Europe during the summer months. Could they not be put in touch with international organizations dealing with subjects of interest to them, in order either to attend their conferences or to visit their headquarters?

7. Graduate students writing masters' theses or doctors' dissertations on any subject in the field of international relations should be expected to take into consideration the influence of international nongovernmental organizations whenever that is appropriate. Graduate students should also become aware of the fact that there are many suitable subjects for theses or dissertations within the field of international nongovernmental organization.

8. The writers of textbooks on international relations should endeavor to cover adequately the activities and achievements of the international nongovernmental organizations.

9. Some consideration is already being given to international nongovernmental organizations by a few universities in their courses for graduate students. These examples should be more widely followed, and increasing attention should be given this subject. Perhaps some of the leading universities might pioneer by offering special courses in this field.

If these things were done, I think we might gradually build up appreciation of, and greater support for, the international nongovernmental organizations and thus help them in their efforts for human progress and the achievement of peace.

CONCLUSION

We have lived through some bitterly discouraging years, yet we may be proud and look forward with hope when we realize that in a few short years the machinery for dealing with almost every conceivable international common need on both the governmental and the nongovernmental level has been created. By looking for these common needs and devoting ourselves to their promotion,

we shall not only accomplish many useful services for the world and ourselves, but we shall also gain world unity and lasting peace.

The process is like that which occurs within nations by the creation and development of national organizations of every kind, each drawing its power from individuals or organizations scattered throughout the country. The importance of the interests organized on a sectional basis becomes almost insignificant compared with the importance of the interests organized on a national basis. Until this process is well developed, war is possible, even within territories under one government. We would not have had a civil war in the United States if the railroads had run north and south as well as east and west, if trade between the North and the South had been better developed, and if the process of the organization of interests on a national basis rather than a sectional basis had been farther advanced.

This is the process of peace by pieces on which we must rely to unify the world. In the words of David Mitrany in his *A Working Peace System,* we need to "overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated." Mitrany's principles are, in fact, being carried out through such functional services as those of the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and other specialized agencies of the United Nations. Mitrany, however, confines his proposals to intergovernmental action. The need to "overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies" is perhaps just as important on the nongovernmental level, and may very likely be a necessary foundation for the type of intergovernmental action for which Mitrany argues.

One of the great topics of our day is "World Government: Pro and Con." I shall not express my views on this matter, but only point out that if a world government is ever established, it will be largely through the efforts of those international nongovernmental organizations which are now working toward that end with such great energy and enthusiasm; and that no matter what form of international co-operation we support, it is the international nongovernmental organizations that are bringing about the underlying community of organized interests without which no form of international co-operation can succeed.

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World Action Against Social Ills

By Alva Myrdal

IS THERE any world action against social ills which could be anything more than mere words?

The Wartime Vision

During the war, we had high hopes. We hoped that after the slaughter it would be possible really to create One World—one world in peace, one world for practical brotherhood between men and between nations. The postwar planning—as we called it then, and as we picture it in our present pessimistic postscriptum—meant a tremendous advance in international thinking. The books written and published then held out to the world a challenge which it now seems trying its best to forget. While the United Nations organization was being created, that hope was still before us. Thus the purpose given to the United Nations, besides maintaining peace, was to try to achieve

> international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.[1]

This was the firm resolution at that time.

The course of events has been different. Peace has not yet been arrived at. The high contracting powers have not agreed to establish the peace; consequently, the United Nations cannot be expected to maintain it. The many peoples of the world have not yet become welded into one body of mankind, ready to go forward with the joint constructive tasks which I have just indicated. It is no use to pretend that we can easily achieve anything like one-worldness in social affairs.

But the social ills of the world still exist, demanding our attention and our action.

When during the war all these plans for the postwar world were made, they were concerned not only with one world in peace, but also with a richer world. At that time, it was considered quite possible that the world would see an international investment corporation come into being, to consolidate investments for underdeveloped countries, wherever they were. All those countries that had anything to spare would pool their surpluses for the benefit of those less fortunate. There has been little of that joint action as yet. We must honestly note it. But such a possibility cannot be altogether forgotten, and, in these very days, it is being brought back to our attention by the "bold new program" presented by President Truman.

Adequate World Resources

Nothing less than that vision of a world that could be one and that could be rich should be before us when we start to discuss social ills. We know that the resources of the world are so great that there need not be any sufferings caused by social ills. If human energy could be concentrated upon directing and developing the resources at hand for the benefit of everybody, there would be ample food and clothing and housing for all—in varying degrees, but at least with a minimum standard of decency for everybody.

[1] Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1.

It is quite important that we insist on this range of actual possibilities. There are scaremongers who want us to believe that this planet is too poor to house and feed us all. They are right only insofar as we allow our rich resources of knowledge and modern techniques to lie unused.

To illustrate this and to show that the belief that we must always be bound by our present resources is as dangerous as it is ill founded, I need only ask you to look back at the numbers of people fed in this world a century ago and the numbers of people we can feed today, despite all the age-worn prophecies about depletion of resources. While Africa has increased its population only by some 55 per cent since 1650, Europe has during the same time seen its population grow five times, with no increase in natural resources, but with a tremendous increase in man's resourcefulness. And the whole world has this possibility of becoming rich by sharing not its wealth, but its wealth of knowledge and of techniques.

I want to emphasize that the misery and poverty of the present world are self-inflicted and could be remedied by man's own will. This must be the cornerstone for any conviction that international action against social ills is worth while.

HAMPERED BY FEARS

What, then, is delaying economic and social development? Of course, more than anything, the fear of war—the fear of war that makes each people try to live within narrow national boundaries, that causes us to relinquish possibilities of freer trade, freer exchange, for mutual profit. Everything that narrows us down can only make us poorer. We might even say that under the more and more autarkic systems, we are developing what might be called "barricaded almshouses"; and if "war fear" increases, this tendency accelerates.

Moreover, there are other irrational psychological fears which make for unnecessary poverty in the world. Most people on this earth are still walled in by superstition; by fear of the new, by fear of doing something different, by fear of the "rational," one might say. We are still the prisoners of ignorance, living within man-made walls of false beliefs. That wonderful brain of man which has been so creative in certain fields and directions has not allowed all its cells to function to the best advantage.

An example of that may be given, which has come to my notice during my work at United Nations. The report of the Visiting Mission to East Africa discloses that in the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, under Belgian administration, there are approximately a million head of cattle which do not serve as a source of meat but which take over land badly needed for food and other crops, and constitute the thorniest problem of Ruanda-Urundi. The mission found that this cattle problem was not one of stockbreeding or agriculture, but "essentially a social problem" created by the extraordinary attitude toward the cow as sacred—"Except the king, nothing is above the cow."

From the outset, I want to make clear that the fear of war, which means the prevalence of ill will among men, and the fear of the rational, the fear of modern advancement, which means the prevalence of ignorance among men, still make the world very much poorer than it need be.

MODEST BEGINNINGS

I have made these general observations with one purpose in mind, to make you all realize that what can be achieved by the United Nations must be very

modest in comparison with the tremendous needs and also with the tremendous possibilities. So I am not going to make a promise that we shall see social ills obliterated in our lifetime. We must talk in much more modest terms about what is beginning to be done; for joint international action is just starting. United Nations and most of the specialized agencies have been acting for only a few years, an infinitesimal time in relation to human progress. The annual budget of the United Nations and its agencies is very limited, indeed. It is often compared with the larger amount that a cruiser would cost. There is a very small investment in this international action.

When one remembers on the one hand these very modest resources, and on the other hand the disturbing fact that among the member nations of the United Nations the gift of life itself is very unequally distributed, one realizes how meager indeed are these beginnings. Women in Scandinavia and New Zealand have a life expectancy of nearly 70 years; for those in India it is not even 30 years. This is a yardstick for success; only when such differences in the span of life are reduced can we know that something is being achieved.

EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

The first steps to combat social ills through international action are, however, impressive enough. Let us take as the first example the International Labor Organization, which has a history of almost a whole generation. During its successful period of work since the end of World War I, it has drawn up several international conventions, which have been fairly widely adopted, regarding labor conditions, work of juveniles and women, health and safety problems in various industries, and social security for workers. It has published a great many valuable scholarly studies and rendered technical advice to many member governments. It would be worth while to try to imagine how much or rather how little of progress with regard to labor relations would have been achieved without such an agency, particularly when we remember that the trade unions of the world have not succeeded in joining together into one international force.

Take another of these organizations, the young World Health Organization. It has started world-wide campaigns to suppress malaria, tuberculosis, and syphilis, and has already established successful and vigorous control of epidemics, in a task inherited from the League of Nations. It keeps watch for dangerous outbreaks of scourges which, in former centuries, terrorized mankind. For instance, the cholera epidemic in Egypt in 1948 was controlled with amazing speed and small loss of life, thanks to serum, doctors, and equipment which were rushed by planes from all over the world. The improvement of health conditions which could be achieved by continued international action is simply stupendous. And it could never be attained if medical groups were left to operate in their own countries only.

The Food and Agriculture Organization is increasing the production of food and improving standards of nutrition all over the world. Its missions, consultants, and advisers are concerned with raising rice production in the Far East and wheat supply in the West, fighting the tsetse fly in Africa, improving irrigation in the Middle East, and providing better agricultural instruction in Latin America.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is tackling the problem of that half of the population of this planet which is still

illiterate. We can all understand that if illiteracy were left to be cured by the natural process of advance within the countries afflicted by it, it would take centuries to achieve a real improvement; and we might well ask whether the world can afford to wait for that.

The kind of international action thus illustrated is the most vigorous and the most modern one: that of *international operations,* with squads of international experts tackling a particular problem regardless of where it appears.

CONTROL BY INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

What I have tried to do in this sketchy survey is give some examples of present international *social* action. What direction shall we take through the maze of problems? What are the *types* of international action to be applied? We have listed joint operational missions as the Number One type, being most dynamic and direct. But it can certainly not be relied on as the only one or even as the most common one. Can we really hope to achieve any final betterment by international action, when the social problems as such are really national problems? Can we really hope to achieve more equitable social conditions when countries, after all, must guard their sovereignty, and when their standards of economic development are so very different? What ambition would be realistic in this field?

A comparison may be made with international economic problems. By virtue of the fact of international trade, these problems themselves are international. There the task is often the truly international one of getting agreements between different countries through negotiations. Of course, social problems are very rarely international in that sense. There are, however, a few instances of that kind of international activity also in the social field, corresponding most closely to what is known conventionally as international action—that is, the treatment of a social problem when it appears on the frontiers between nations. There are also international agreements of a social character, particularly to prevent people from bringing social ills with them to another country.

Prostitution

For example, one of the first international attacks was made against prostitution. International action against the traffic in women and children in the form of multilateral agreements to suppress this evil started with the 1904 agreement, which was merely of an administrative character. In 1910 there followed a convention making traffic in women who are minors a criminal offense. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the 1921 convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children followed, and then the 1933 convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age was concluded. Taken together, these instruments protect minors of either sex and also women of full age from being sent abroad for immoral purposes.

The United Nations has continued the work of the League of Nations and has taken up the task of combining all these instruments in one comprehensive convention. At the same time, the United Nations wants to extend this protection to both sexes; thus a convention is now being prepared for suppressing traffic in "persons." The Social Commission of the United Nations has fair hopes that the international aspect of this problem of white slave traffic, which is still not quite ruled out from the modern world, will be settled. When this convention is agreed upon, including protective rules against the

exploitation of prostitution of others, real achievement will have been made through the means of control, and thus the ground cleared for an effective remedial and preventive approach to prostitution as such within the nations.

Migration

A similar situation, though not so sinister in character, is migration. Migration itself is an international problem, as the persons really move from one country to another. Only quite recently have any efforts been made to draw up intergovernmental instruments concerning the problems connected with migration. Until comparatively recently, migrants were left to their own resources; their fate was their own. Even their countries of origin limited their theoretical and political concern to the possible effect emigration might have on population. Then, between the two wars, the bilateral character of this problem was recognized, and governments started to make agreements as to the welfare of migrants.

Today, international attention is focused more and more on the social and economic aspects of migratory movements. The United Nations and especially the International Labor Organization among specialized agencies are actively engaged in the creation of international instruments for the protection of migrants, and in advising the governments on related problems. It ought to be plain to everyone that international planning is the only realistic approach to a problem which is so fundamentally an international one.

Narcotics

Narcotics control presents a similar problem, and in this field a quite considerable improvement has been effected. Here again, the questions concerning narcotic drugs are dealt with by a division of the Department of Social Affairs. Narcotic drugs have a dual nature. They are indispensable to modern medicine, they are used the world over to alleviate pain and restore health. Thus used, they bring a great benefit to mankind. But abused, they cause havoc and misery.

The potential social dangers of narcotic drugs have made it necessary to submit them to the most stringent international control. In the general interest of the world community, some seventy governments, parties to international treaties on narcotics, have renounced in this field certain prerogatives of national sovereignty and have accepted a system of universal international control vested with powers of automatic sanctions or embargo on trade in narcotics. This control, which is functioning now under the auspices of the United Nations and expanding rapidly to the field of newly discovered synthetic drugs, ensures a limitation of their manufacture, trade, and consumption to legitimate needs.

These particular instances of international control and these treaties have far-reaching significance, applying more widely than to the field of narcotics alone. If these principles of controlling international dangers, of governments voluntarily giving up their sovereignty over the power to do harm, could be applied with equal success to wider fields of human endeavor, to other kinds of dangerous weapons, peace and a world-wide security system would be within our reach. Senator de Brouckère, the president of the International Conference which in 1931 adopted the basic treaty on narcotics control, put it this way: "Nothing of the kind has ever been attempted before . . . if a similar system could be established . . . for far more dangerous drugs and far more murderous weapons, we men would have made a considerable advance."

This, of course, is the second type of international action—that of *international agreements, legally binding nations.*

AGREEMENT ON STANDARDS

A third type is international agreement not on joint control but on common standards. There are quite a number of recommendations on social standards which have been agreed upon and thus constitute a goal for social action within the different nations. That particular method of approach was typical in the work of the League of Nations in the social field, and has also been typical of the approach of the International Labor Organization. I need mention only one example: the successful effort to raise the minimum age for employment in industry by discussions from year to year between governments, employers, and workers as to what might be laid down as desirable standards in this respect.

This attempt to reach a joint agreement as to standards of decency or minimum standards seems to have considerable promise, but it also has limitations. These become quite clear if we examine international social legislation as enacted in various countries, and especially as applied. Not all countries can ratify these conventions. The different standards which exist in the world very often make one common convention quite inapplicable. The underdeveloped countries cannot honestly subscribe to the standards which are too costly for them, and the overdeveloped countries, if I may use the term, have already achieved perhaps more than the standards call for.

We can still go forward along this path. It may be found possible to define what are the elementary standards of nutrition and what are the essentials with regard to housing requirements, and then achieve international recommendations to assure all citizens these minimum desiderata. Still, it is hard to believe that the problems of underfeeding and overcrowding in the world can be solved by this particular means. It must disregard the most important thing of all—the tremendous regional and national differences. What should be the common denominator of hygiene and adequacy for the kraals in Zululand and apartment houses in Philadelphia?

INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

We must look for still another method —and I now come to what I should like to call the fourth degree of internationalism—that is, international technical assistance. It is also the fourth point in President Truman's program. It calls for the sharing of technological knowledge by putting advisory experts at the disposal of governments that want them, and by providing for training abroad on a large scale through scholarships and fellowships. The techniques of social progress that can be studied in one country obviously could be to the advantage of less developed countries.

The Economic and Social Council at its recent session has given ample evidence of its belief in these possibilities. Preliminary work is going on, leading to a United Nations program for vastly extending all kinds of such technical advisory services to governments in underdeveloped countries, so that they may receive a fair share of the capital of the technical know-how about social progress which is available in the world. This is, however, not altogether a new thing. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration started such technological assistance on a large scale, and it has become a prominent feature of the social activities of the United Nations.

The Department of Social Affairs has been fortunate in having special funds for this very purpose. The fund this year amounts to $675,000, and is utilized for international fellowships in social service and for sending consultants in social welfare to governments. Some 225 fellows were sent abroad in 1947–48, and some 25 advisers have already been utilized by various governments in an attempt to better their social services. This project is continuing; about 150 such United Nations Fellows in social welfare are to be appointed this year. These services have in the first instance gone to the war-devastated countries, but the present trend is to extend them to the underdeveloped countries.

CLEARING OF INFORMATION

I come finally to a fifth method of international action against social ills, which is more passive than the others, but still is certainly not without importance; that is, clearing of information between countries. To make available knowledge about conditions as they exist in different countries, about the improved methods used in a particular country, about the efficiency and results achieved in different parts of the world, is the main part of the daily work of the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Department of Social Affairs thus acts, and will act more and more, as a world clearinghouse by setting up reference centers and publishing bulletins, and by giving greater and greater publicity about international conditions relating to housing, standards of living, crime and crime prevention, and other fields from which I have drawn examples.

We should not minimize the importance of this method, although it has not the glamour of the other, more active ones. We know that we cannot remedy housing as a social problem by international action; we cannot build a single house for those who need houses so badly; but we can let the world know about both conditions and possibilities regarding housing. It is not without effect if the world at large comes to know that people in many sections are compelled to live under far from adequate conditions of housing—many families in a single room or whole families keeping house in doorways as a means of temporary shelter or other people living in cow sheds or, lacking even that, sleeping in open fields. U.N. can perform a service just by letting it be known that there are more than 200 million people in the world estimated to maintain some sort of existence under such deplorable conditions that we can say that they have practically no housing, still less homes.

U.N. cannot go into a country and really improve the housing standards, but it can arouse social consciousness in the world. By the exchange of information, by the notices which repeatedly appear in reports to commissions and councils, U.N. can enable the representatives of the different governments to read about their own countries in comparison with others. These reports which from the outside may seem dry and unimportant have, nevertheless, great potentialities. No country wants to be at the foot of the international roster. No country wants to be pointed out as having the highest infant mortality. Such comparisons provoke a feeling of emulation, resulting in definite social progress. And U.N. can be at hand with a more positive support, that of furnishing information about improved methods which are profitable under various conditions.

SUMMARY

Thus, on one hand it must be admitted that social problems belong to

each country for itself, and international action cannot solve them. On the other hand, international action can be valuable as a mutual support in the endeavors within the different nations. The five main patterns for such international activity against social ills must be: joint operations on a world-wide scale, international conventions controlling undesirable effects of transfers, international recommendations on desirable standards, international sharing of technology, and international clearing of information.

This does not promise immediate success. We know that the way into the future is long and arduous. But the fact that governments meet, that experts meet, that people in all corners of the world are working on material from other lands, that efforts are made together for progress, does mean something. The fields are very, very vast and the pace is slow; the distance between the actual situation and the goal set by our conscience is still tremendous. But there is this new important phenomenon: a world conscience has been awakened and is concerned about social ills, not only at home but in the countries of our brothers as well.

What we need first of all is a live desire to achieve peace and social decency. The machinery exists. However short the steps we can take year by year, and however hampered the wills of peoples on account of the fear that paralyzes our age, we cannot escape that vision of one world, a world where men will live in peace and work together for the common welfare, for the pursuit of happiness for all mankind.

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Religion and World Order

By Walter W. Van Kirk

WHY should the American Academy of Political and Social Science request a paper on "Religion and World Order"? This question suggests the thought that political and social endeavor is powerless to achieve international concord except as that endeavor is inspired and sustained by the spirit of the Living and Eternal God. Once this truth possesses the minds of statesmen, and the reconciling influence of religion is brought to bear upon the political and social disorder of our generation, peace may yet emerge out of the chaos of war's aftermath to enrich mankind with its countless blessings.

It is not so much what man has done that has brought our own and other nations to the brink of disaster; it is what man has left undone. Through scientific research man has extracted from nature the secrets of material power—only to discover that that power may, and doubtless will, destroy him unless recourse is had to a power not his own. Through political, social, and economic institutions man has devised schemes and strategies to ensure security for all nations—only to discover that the moral solidarity essential to the success of these institutions is lacking. It is imperative, therefore, that religion be taken into account in the search for peace.

In the struggle for world order, religion has a curative and creative function to perform. In this respect, among others, religion is to be distinguished from diplomacy. Religion is concerned with history in relation to the timeless processes of God. Diplomacy is too often concerned with history in relation to the political circumstances of the moment. It would, of course, be fatal for diplomacy, as for religion, to ignore the problems of the present. These problems must be met and dealt with, especially in a world where power pressures exert their influence on the day-by-day decisions of state departments and foreign offices.

Religion and Government Policies

Religion cannot be expected, however, to give its unqualified support to those policies of government that are hastily improvised to meet the real or imagined requirements of a power struggle. Religion, in relation to world order, is concerned with universals. The sanction of religion is reserved for those policies of government that are intended to advance world order through the application of principles that are universal, and not partial or fragmentary in character. A United Nations which takes the offensive in quest of a global peace, and for the furtherance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the progressive development of subject and dependent peoples, is much more likely to receive the sanction of religion than is a regional arrangement which is not universal in character and which seeks to establish a balance of power as between two or more groups of states.

From the standpoint of religion, therefore, a distinction must be drawn between those institutions of the world community that creatively seek to uproot the causes of war, and those power alignments of nations that are primarily defensive in character and that have the effect of accenting the struggle for power.

In the United States, at the moment,

diplomacy appears to be largely occupied with the tactics of a defensive strategy. When the visiting football team rushes the pigskin close to the goal posts, the frightened fans in the home bleachers cry out with one accord, "hold that line." In much the same way our diplomats are shouting, "hold that line." They see the Kremlin Varsity breaking through right tackle near the Greek frontier, so they promulgate the Truman Doctrine, which is the diplomatic version of "hold that line."

Again, with the home team on the defensive, the Kremlin Varsity gives the ball to Stalin. He passes it to Molotov who passes it to Vyshinsky who passes it to Gottwald, and when the whistle blows, the play has moved into Czechoslovakia. The home team counters with an ERP strategy, and the European Recovery Program gets under way.

The Kremlin Varsity then shifts its position to the Berlin sector. The home team, thoroughly alarmed and not a little bewildered, counters with an NAT operation, and the North Atlantic Treaty is signed. Then the Kremlin Varsity pulls a really fast one. Stalin takes the ball and shovel passes it to a Chinese Communist, who makes a wide sweep around left end; and when the whistle blows, the ball is resting firmly on the Peiping-Nanking line. This time the home team appears to be completely confused. Latest reports from the playing field indicate that the strategy designed to counter this Kremlin offensive is still the subject of considerable controversy.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The most spectacular of the defensive operations thus far employed by the United States is the North Atlantic Treaty. At this moment there appears to be little likelihood that the major religious bodies will either support or oppose ratification of this treaty by the Senate. For the most part, religious leaders are reluctant to pass judgment on political instruments of this kind.

Despite this fact, it is proper that the voice of religion be heard in the public discussion now under way. The National Study Conference on the Churches and World Order, held in Cleveland, Ohio, March 8–11, 1949, and attended by 450 delegates drawn from the major Protestant communions, asserted that "regional pacts can add to the total of common security if they are genuinely within the universal framework of the United Nations; if they are based upon a natural community of interest and are in fact designed and operated to preserve and to promote the general welfare of participating nations." The churchmen there assembled then observed that "such pacts can on the other hand add to insecurity if their words conceal what is essentially a military alliance which might validly appear to others to be aggressive."

During the progress of the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty, the churches may be expected to stress the fact that the proposed alliance is not regarded by them as a substitute for those more positive measures which are required if the social and economic health of those areas most vulnerable to the influence of communism is to be restored. The churches are likely to demand that the proposed alliance be not so implemented as further to expand the influence of the military in the formulation of foreign policy. The churches will request that such military aid as may be given to the states signatory to this pact shall not be of a kind to imperil the successful operation of the European Recovery Program or of President Truman's "bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." The churches, or at least many of them,

will demand that the proposed alliance shall not be made the pretext for closing the doors of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

The churches will demand that our Government regard the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Pact, and other similar pacts or regional arrangements to which it may subsequently adhere, not as substitutes for the United Nations, but as instruments designed to strengthen the United Nations and to fortify the efforts of that body to establish the conditions under which a global peace may thrive.

Let it be remembered that the churches of America supported ratification of the United Nations Charter in the conviction that the security of the United States, in the last analysis, could be derived only from the collective security of the international community. They still hold to this conviction. That is why the voice of religion with respect to the North Atlantic Pact is likely to be a voice of caution and a voice of warning. Pacts of this kind never have been, and never can be, foolproof guarantees of peace. The path of history is strewn with the wreckage of defensive pacts and of political and military alliances.

CURATIVE PURPOSE OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

It must be conceded, however, that holding the line is important—very important. Many of the defensive measures initiated by our Government have also a curative purpose that is deserving of the highest praise. This is particularly true of the European Recovery Program. The religious forces of the United States, Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish, have supported and continue to support that effort. They have done this on the ground that the restoration of a healthy economy in western Europe is essential to the maintenance of a freedom-loving and democratic society, not only in the ERP countries but also elsewhere. The Berlin air-lift is another example of an imaginative and enlightened policy, the effect of which has been to accelerate the processes of economic recovery on the Continent. In many other respects, however, the tactics of American diplomacy on the world front have the appearance at least of being predominantly defensive in character.

POSITIVE MEASURES NECESSARY

Football games are not won simply by holding the line. They are won by getting possession of the ball and moving it down the field, under the skillful direction of a captain who knows what he is doing, where he is going, and why. Nor can world order be achieved simply by holding the line. Whether we like it or not, ours is a revolutionary age. When millions of people in many lands are bent upon change, it is not enough for the United States, or for any nation, just to hold the line. Ours is an era in which conflicting ideologies have engendered a mood of restlessness on a scale unprecedented in history. At such a time holding the line is not enough.

Foremost among the ideologies that challenge the way of life to which we in America are devoted is communism. Communism, as an ideology, cannot be stopped by defensive operations. The more violent and overt forms of physical aggression by the Soviet state may be stopped by pacts and regional arrangements, but ideas and philosophies are not stopped by pacts. No international revolutionary movement has ever been stopped by the pens of diplomats who draw lines on the map and say, "Thus far, and no farther." If communism as an ideology is to be stopped, it must be transcended by a spiritual movement of dynamic energy and persuasive power, and by a diplomacy that

seizes the initiative with a program of advance that is global in dimensions and constructive in purpose. The organized forces of religion in the United States must ceaselessly exert their moral pressures upon government to the end that efforts to transcend communism by processes of reconciliation and mutual understanding, and by enlarging the areas of political and spiritual freedom throughout the world, shall take priority over efforts to stop communism by encirclement and containment.

RECONCILIATION

Religion, as might be expected, stresses the element of reconciliation in diplomacy and statecraft. The weapons of power politics and of military alliances are not the essential weapons of those who would establish peace under the guidance of Almighty God. Accordingly, it is right and proper that the churches should petition the President to keep open the doors of negotiation with the Soviet Union. The times in which we live are desperately serious. The nations are perilously close to war. It is late in the day for the statesmen of the major powers to meet around the conference table. But it is not too late. It may be too late six months or a year hence. While there is yet time, the voice of religion must be raised in support of negotiations.

It is not for ministers in their pulpits or laymen in their pews to say how or under what circumstances negotiations shall be carried forward. It is for the people of our churches to say to their government that every possible effort should be made to find a basis for further conversations. It is true that past efforts in this respect have been none too reassuring. Agreements of a kind have been reached in face-to-face discussions by the heads of states and their foreign ministers. Unhappily, the language of these agreements has been susceptible of varying interpretations, and the result has been not concord but continued confusion. Nerves have been frayed, tempers set on edge. There have been threats and counterthreats, with some name-calling. Despite these provocations, no statesman has a moral right to refuse to sit down around the council table. Who meets whom, and where, may raise academic questions of protocol; but for the plain peoples of the world, peace is prior to protocol.

CHURCH SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations deserves and will receive the continued support of the people of our churches. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly, can be made to serve the ends of peace. Standards of freedom and of liberty are therein set forth which can be used by the forces of religion to place the violators of human rights under the moral indictment of the world community. For the first time in history there has been negotiated a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. When this convention is laid before the Senate, the churches will press for its speedy ratification.

Under the aegis of the Trusteeship Council, subject and dependent peoples are moving toward independence and self-government. The International Children's Emergency Fund is working on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and in the Near and Far East, to save the lives of the orphans of war's desolation. The Economic and Social Council is probing into the causes of war. The specialized agencies are fostering cooperation in many fields of concern to the churches.

Where the United Nations has succeeded, the churches rejoice; where the United Nations has failed, the churches will seek to develop the moral environ-

ment in which failure can be turned into victory. The United Nations is the only universal body that holds together, however precariously, a world that would otherwise fall apart. The United Nations is the only international agency capable of summoning the nations to the bar of the world's public opinion. The churches will not join forces with those who delight in sniping at the United Nations because that organization does not, in every respect, measure up to the academic specifications of the perfectionist. On the contrary, the churches will seek to strengthen the United Nations where it is weak, and to provide it with enlightened support when its critics would by-pass it or otherwise destroy it. But more than that, the churches will seek to invest the United Nations with the prestige of moral authority.

CHURCH SUPPORT OF FOREIGN AID

The European Recovery Program will receive the continued support of the American religious community. This program, as stated by the Federal Council of Churches, "can be one of history's most momentous affirmations of faith in the creative capacity of free men." Already the healing effects of this adventure in economic reconstruction are being felt throughout the whole of western Europe. It would be a pity, indeed a calamity, if the Congress, for any reason whatsoever, were to scale down the appropriations which are deemed to be essential to the fulfillment of the purposes embodied in this legislation. For the churches, the economic recovery of Europe remains a priority. Any military assistance program that would siphon off the funds and goods and manpower desperately needed by the countries benefiting from the ERP would be a serious threat to the peace.

Similarly, the churches may be expected to support President Truman's proposal that the benefits of American scientific advances and industrial progress be made available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas. The organized forces of religion will agree with President Truman that "our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens." Such a program would go far toward establishing the conditions of peace in the Far East—provided, of course, that the endeavor to reconstruct Asia economically is not regarded as a tactic in the "cold war" between East and West. Particularly gratifying, therefore, is the recommendation of our Government that this program "should be a co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable."

Also, with respect to the Far East, our religious forces may be expected to request the Government to press for the early negotiation of a Far Eastern settlement that will (*a*) reflect due regard for the moral and material welfare of the peoples directly concerned; (*b*) safeguard the fundamental rights of the human person; (*c*) contribute to and be an integral part of a world settlement; (*d*) provide for that mutuality of interest and creative effort which can increase international understanding and fellowship; and (*e*) encourage the more privileged nations to share their scientific and technical resources with those less privileged.

The Far East is on the move. Half the population of the world resides in that area. Where those people are going cannot now be foreseen—but that they are going somewhere is as clear as anything can be. The policy of the "open door," which in times past meant an open door through which the peoples of

the West might enter for their own economic and political advantage, must now become an open door through which the peoples of the Far East themselves may enter for their own economic and political enrichment and for the enjoyment of those human rights and that degree of economic justice to which all men are entitled as children of the God of creation.

THE PROBLEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

In these and kindred matters the forces of religion are confronted with the problem of world government. World government is a goal toward which men of all religions are committed. World order presupposes world law. And world law, if it is to be universally effective, requires some form of world government. The Federal Council of Churches, in a statement entitled *The Churches and World Order,* declared (1946) that "the nations must make full use of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and develop as rapidly as possible a spirit of world community which will be reflected in world government." The World Council of Churches, in session in Amsterdam (1948), expressed the view that "no state may claim absolute sovereignty, or make laws without regard to the commandments of God, and the welfare of mankind." It was held by the Protestant leaders there assembled that "unless nations surrender a greater measure of national sovereignty in the interest of the common good, they will be tempted to have recourse to war in order to enforce their claims."

Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant leaders in a series of parallel statements (1943) subscribed to the view:

> An enduring peace requires the organization of international institutions which will develop a body of international law; guarantee the faithful fulfillment of international obligations, and revise them when necessary; assure collective security by drastic limitation and continuing control of armaments, compulsory arbitration and adjudication of controversies, and the use when necessary of adequate sanctions to enforce law.

This statement might well be interpreted as endorsing, in principle, some form of world government. Religion, by its very nature, must be counted on the side of those who strive to end the chaos of competing and warring national sovereignties by establishing a world body invested with such prerogatives of government as are required to promote the common good. The crucial question is *how,* and *when.*

UNSUCCESSFUL MEASURES

In seeking an answer to this question the temptation invariably arises to resort to short-cut methods—to close one's eyes to the difficulties of the present in the vain hope that by so doing the promised land of tomorrow can be immediately occupied. It may be pertinent, in this connection, to recall a bit of history. Not many years ago the forces of religion were mobilized in support of the outlawry-of-war movement. The Briand-Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy was hailed by religious leaders everywhere as the beginning of a new era in international relations. The signing of this pact was accompanied by the ringing of church bells. The faithful assembled in their respective places of worship to thank God that war had been placed under the ban of law. At long last the peoples of the earth were to pursue their peaceful ways unperturbed by wars and rumors of wars. The wonder was that mankind had waited so long to renounce the methods of military violence. It was all so easy. Just assemble the

statesmen around the conference table, put a pen in their hands, apply the pen to the parchment, and thereafter the demons of war would be chained forever.

Let it be confessed that most of us were victims of this illusion. Most of us joined in the celebration of war's renunciation. Most of us followed the Pied Piper of peace-by-fiat into a romantic world of make-believe. Little did we then dream that this paradise of peace would so quickly be transformed into a wilderness of warmongering. The Briand-Kellogg Pact was signed in 1929. Eleven years later a conquering army in hobnailed boots marched through the Arch of Triumph to take captive the city of Paris in which the pact was signed, while throughout the whole of Europe, and in Africa, China, Malaya, and the Philippines, there were heard the roar of cannon and the thunder of bursting bombs. The warless world proclaimed by statesmen and hailed by priests and pastors and rabbis had become a world at war. The effort to establish peace by fiat had failed. Golden words had been inscribed on paper, but these words were unrelated to the dynamics of a power struggle that in due time was to reduce the cities of Europe and Asia to dust and rubble.

One experience of this kind is enough. The forces of religion must not again yield to the temptation to establish peace by rhetoric. The collapse of the outlawry-of-war movement has proved the futility of such short-cut methods. There is no sleight-of-hand procedure by which the swords of the nations can be sheathed. There is no magic process by which the tensions that imperil peace can be made to disappear.

World government as a goal toward which to strive is to be commended. Let this issue be discussed in classrooms, public forums, and legislative halls, and on political rostrums. But to encourage people to believe that world government can or will be established next year or the year after by the simple act of writing a constitution is the sheerest nonsense. It is not for preachers, priests, or rabbis to pass judgment on constitutional blueprints. Theirs is not the experience from which is derived competence in international statecraft. It is the duty of churchmen, of whatever religious persuasion, to remind the drafters of world constitutional blueprints that the problem of world government must be viewed at a deeper level than that of structure.

NATURE OF THE CRISIS

The crisis of our time is not so much a legal crisis deriving from competing national sovereignties as it is a spiritual crisis deriving from man's inhumanity to man. The crisis of our time is not so much a crisis in intergovernmental relations as it is a crisis in human relations. Individuals and states that refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of the moral law are not likely, by the flourish of a pen, to acknowledge the sovereignty of a world state.

What we are witnessing today is not the structural breakdown of international organization but the moral breakdown of the world community. There is today a widespread denial of the absolutes of the God of history. Of no single nation can it be said that the gospel of forgiveness, mercy, and reconciliation has been practiced in high places. There are, to be sure, degrees of moral delinquency of which nations are guilty. Some nations are less tolerant than others, some more obstructionist than others, some less responsive to human needs, some more given to deception and subterfuge. Once allowance is made for these degrees of guilt, it must be recognized that there is under way today a competitive display of

power—not the power of righteousness, but the power of politics, of atomic bombs, of alliances and spheres of influence.

This display of undisciplined power is not to be attributed to the lack of a world government, but to the lack of a spiritual cohesiveness within the family of nations. Everywhere among all peoples there is distrust, suspicion, ill will, animosity. The call of this hour is to the evangel of reconciliation, not to the drafter of world government blueprints.

CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGION

Religion could make a more significant contribution to world order if Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews worked more closely together. It is not suggested that these three religious bodies confer together on matters of faith or doctrine or church polity. Protestants know what they believe and why. So do Roman Catholics. So do Jews. The religious community in the United States is enriched and not impoverished when each of these three religious bodies practices and propagates its faith in its own way and in a spirit of tolerance and good will.

During the war the great powers subordinated considerations of national pride and prestige for the sake of victory. Political differences were not permitted to interfere with the supreme task of shaping a strategy by which the war might be won. Since the war this co-operative mood has vanished. The result is the cold war and the ever-present danger that the cold war may develop into a shooting war.

Similarly, during the war, Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews achieved a unity of parallel action. Its purpose was to safeguard the rights and prerogatives of religious institutions in those lands threatened by the Nazi and Fascist menace; and in those lands, as everywhere, to make certain the achievement of a peace with justice and freedom to all. In Germany, Norway, and the Lowlands, Roman Catholics and Protestants labored together in defense of those who refused to render unto Caesar the things that belonged to God. Leaders of both churches realized that the liquidation of the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships and the projection of an international society that would be responsive to the canons of human decency and justice would require the mobilization of the total moral resources of those who called themselves Christian. Insofar as world Jewry was able to speak, its voice in support of an ordered world community was added to the voice of Christendom. In the United States, during the dark days of the war, Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant leaders, in their *Pattern for Peace,* appealed for parallel action in support of those principles which they believed to be essential to the winning of the peace.

Since the war this interfaith demonstration of co-operative endeavor and of parallel action for the common good has been weakened by tensions between Roman Catholics and Protestants and between Christians and Jews. Just as there has been name-calling in the United Nations, so has there been name-calling within the religious community. Just as there is confusion and distrust in the secular world, so also is there confusion and distrust in the religious world. The resulting situation is one that is productive of despair and frustration.

THE WAR IN PROGRESS

In this situation it is well to remind ourselves that the war is not over. The military phases of the war may be said to have been won, at least for the present. But the war to establish the rights of man is not over. The war to achieve economic and social justice is not over.

The war to vouchsafe freedom and independence to subject and dependent peoples is not over. The war to strengthen democratic institutions and to expand the areas of a free society is not over. The battles of these wars are being waged with relentless fury on many fronts. That is why it is so crucially important that all men of religion shall stand together in this fateful hour to ensure the triumph of good over evil.

It ought to be possible for Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews to stand together in their support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, particularly as that declaration bears upon the problem of religious liberty. It ought to be possible for Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews to stand together in support of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Interfaith co-operation should be possible in support of the United Nations, of the European Recovery Program, and of measures for the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons. In many other areas of common concern there is need for collaboration on the part of men and women of good will the world over. If Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews will concert their spiritual resources in a cooperative endeavor to establish the conditions of peace in our own and other lands, it may yet be possible to save our own and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

In these days when revolutions of one kind or another are rampant throughout the world, it would be well to bear in mind the fact that religion, in its own right, is a revolutionary movement. Let those who doubt this reflect upon the writings of Amos and Hosea, and the gospel utterances of Jesus of Nazareth. The spiritual power resident in the affirmations of these men of God is greater by far than the power resident in the atom. Many billions of dollars have been expended and laboratory facilities on a scale hitherto undreamed of have been set up to advance experiments in unleashing the power of the atom. Is it not time for those to whom has been entrusted the responsibility of religious leadership to consider how the dynamism of religion can be more effectively exploited for the healing of the nations?

Religion is revolutionary in the sense that it challenges every social, economic, and political system that degrades human beings. Unlike secular revolutionary movements, religion does not destroy, but builds upon, the past. Whereas secular revolutionary movements are related to the surface manifestations of tyranny and injustice, religion operates beneath the surface of the circumstantial and the contingent; it wars upon the hidden vices of the mind and heart by which man and society are corrupted; it engenders a mood of discontent with the lesser good and rallies mankind to the support of policies of justice, freedom, liberty, and good will. Religion reminds all and sundry that the God of history must be reckoned with; that men and nations who defy the moral precepts of the God of history are destroyed. It is high time, therefore, that political and social scientists take into account the place of religion in their efforts to establish world order.

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Denazification from an American's Viewpoint

By Joseph F. Napoli

DENAZIFICATION, a term which first meant the eradication of National Socialism from Germany, has gradually degenerated into meaning the whitewashing of National Socialists. It has become fashionable after almost four years of occupation to describe denazification as an unjust ex post facto and maladministered procedure.

We who are working to carry out Military Government policy have fought what now appears to be a losing battle for a thoroughgoing denazification in both public and private employment in Germany. It has been charged that millions of people have been unjustly dismissed from their professional jobs, and further that common labor has been the only work allowed members of the Nazi party. It has also been charged, inter alia, that students have been excluded from universities because they were members of Nazi-affiliated organizations; that there is no uniformity in the law; that the trial tribunals have become commissions bent only on political chicanery. These arguments have been ornamented with the assertion that the German is politically naïve but devoted to his government.

It is also asserted that the punishment of Nazism becomes the punishment of freedom of thought, and that the courts which were established to try Nazis are composed exclusively of persons selected because of their political viewpoint. Opponents of denazification make a very plausible point in stating that the procedures under the Law for Liberation hinder the reconstruction of Germany under the Marshall plan and encourage "corruption, venality, and political egoism."

We who have been active in denazification have realized from the first days of the occupation that we were swimming against the tide. We have been attacked as Communists, as Jewish *Rächer,* and as impractical idealists. The attacks on us have come from both German and American sources.

Elements Fighting Denazification

Looking back over the four years of the occupation, it is safe to state that the persons who have most insistently and skillfully fought denazification are the identical elements that have been dissatisfied with decartelization, demilitarization, restitutions, and reparations. The same element that argues that Germany must be armed to meet the threat from the East is the one that argues that the West is being impractical in penalizing those people who fought Bolshevism so long and so courageously. There is in the occupation forces a politically immature element which holds that the Gestapo and the *Sicherheitsdienst* must today be employed in conection with our intelligence forces in order to take advantage of their knowledge and experience against Communism. There are in both the German and the American population persons who say that fullest use cannot be made of German industry unless the experienced industrialists who financed Hitler are permitted to return to their plants.

Incidentally, these are the same persons that lament the creation of an international Ruhr authority, even though this authority will have the mildest of police power. These are the persons who see the restitutions program of Military Government as a pernicious measure which punishes those aggres-

sive entrepreneurs who made off with all the available transportation and art in Norway, Denmark, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Italy. They are the same persons whose factories produced cannons and weapons of terror, but who would today tell us that if reparations continue, their factories will not be able to produce milk cans and toys for the children of Germany.

We Americans came into Germany with stars in our eyes. We often doubted the reports we had heard of Belsen, Buchenwald, Oranienburg, Sachsenhausen, and Dachau. Atrocity stories were nothing new to us. We had all seen pictures and heard the propaganda. It took the evidence of bones piled on bones by the ton to convince us of the truth. Today the people who would in their turn discredit denazification and its allied "negative" measures have conveniently forgotten the nauseatingly sweet smell of the dead Jews, gypsies, and foreign slave laborers in Germany. They have not written learned treatises of repentance or contrition, or worked out plans for preventing the philosophical prostitution that was National Socialism from recurring in Germany or Europe. They write about the ineptitude of unskilled administrators, the venality of the new bureaucracy, and means of combating subversive thought and behavior.

HISTORY OF DENAZIFICATION

In order to determine what denazification means in terms of democratization and the realization of Military Government objectives, it is necessary to go back to the genesis of the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism. At Yalta, Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin solemnly declared their intention of guaranteeing the peace after the unconditional surrender of Germany. It was stated that the inflexible purpose of the Big Three was "to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world," and to "wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions, [and] remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people."

At Potsdam in July 1945, Truman, Stalin, Churchill, and Attlee expressed in the following language their determination to wipe out Nazism:

> German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated . . . all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism. . . . To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. . . . Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities . . . shall be removed from public and semipublic office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings."

The noble language of these two declarations was later supplemented by Directive No. 24 of the Allied Control Council sitting in Berlin. The phrases of Potsdam and Yalta were used almost without alteration to express the inexorable opposition of the Allies to Nazism. The directive further proclaimed that with the removal of Nazis, their places would be taken by those who by their positive moral qualities were deemed

"capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany."

Subsequent to the pronouncements of Yalta, Potsdam, and the quadripartite Control Council Directive No. 24, and embodying very similar language, came the "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism." This was a German law promulgated by the German Council of States, the *Länderrat*, and implemented in each of the four states of the American zone of occupation. The Law for Liberation, at the time of its passage, contemplated the task of processing nearly twelve million questionnaires and of trying three million persons for more than nominal adherence to the Nazi doctrines. In addition to the phrases of Yalta and Potsdam, it spelled out the terms and conditions of trials of persons incriminated under this law.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

When the Office of Military Government was established in Germany, some of us pleaded that it was nonsense to attempt to try 11 to 13 million Germans for adherence to National Socialism ranging from nominal membership to active terrorism. We argued that those persons who were guilty of war crimes would be found easily enough, and those who had been more than nominal subscribers to National Socialism could be quickly listed in each community. We wanted to cleanse the German judicial system, to staff it with known anti-Nazis—of whom a few remained—and to try these top elements of Nazism in the courts. We submitted a list of positions from which all Nazi activists, profiteers, and sympathizers would be excluded. We had in mind the years of sacrifice and loss of opportunity which anti-Nazis, persecutees, and returned prisoners of war had suffered.

We were overruled by those who persuaded General Clay that a trial of millions of Germans was actually not a trial of the whole German people. The whole procedure of denazification, therefore, has become a farce, becoming increasingly ludicrous with each subsequent relaxation of the law. Today a *Kreisleiter* of the party may return to his home and obtain the eviction by a German court of a woman whose husband died in a concentration camp. The *Kreisleiter* was punished by paying a fine of 100 Deutsche marks for fifteen years of fanatical adherence to National Socialism with increasingly active participation in the work of furthering its vicious aims. Today a former S.S. concentration camp guard may return to his position as an official of the State Food Office. A former police chief who in the days before Hitler abetted the rise of National Socialism and then profited from its advent is back as a police official. Such a sorry showing have we made that in the city of Bremerhaven, 60 out of 61 police officials are former Nazis.

The original instructions to the Germans from the Military Governor stated:

> English is the official language. You and each of your department heads must get a thoroughly qualified interpreter for your conversations with my officers and typists who can submit reports in English. You are charged with the immediate eradication of all traces of Nazism and its attendant evils. No longer will you discriminate against anyone because of creed, race or color. You will dismiss from all branches of Government any remaining Nazis. You will be answerable for any whom investigation reveals to be still in office.

DEFECTS OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL

The American Military Government officers were policemen from Miami, engineers from Pittsburgh, teachers from Binghamton, and lawyers from Nashville. To the policeman, his job was

only to see that the German police were armed and clothed. The engineer wrestled with the problem of the local water works. The lawyer attempted to salvage what he could out of local courts. The doctor studied disease and sanitation. The former banker from Chicago surveyed the financial institutions. They all labored mightily to accomplish a difficult functional job. Their approach was functional, as befitted experienced if apolitical administrators and technicians.

In the chaos of the first days of the occupation there were many factors which played key roles in the eventual failure and collapse of denazification. The most important, however, was that there was simply no desire among Military Government functional officers to denazify—or at best a rarely evinced sympathy with the objectives of denazification. There came the inevitable slowdown of the antifascist drive in Germany, and soon there existed what could be labeled a rapprochement between certain American officers and Germans who were politically incriminated. All bureaus and sections of the city and state public administration were thoroughly nazified in the Hitler regime. After the first days of the occupation, beyond the "necessity for using Nazis" there was the feeling of "let George do it"—meaning the German, and too frequently the Nazi, counterpart of George.

Often the men who first staffed these posts were more interested in acquiring Leicas, diamonds, and mink coats than in acquiring a social and political awareness of what was going on about them. The corruption of some of our first officers was a heartening sign to the Nazis. Later these men were replaced by other Americans, who were honest from a dollars-and-cents point of view; but this honesty did not prevent their constant interference with denazification and their intervention on behalf of Nazi friends. Some were influenced by women, by hunting parties, by whisky. Most of them were influenced by the fact that they did not hold an inner conviction that Nazism should be extirpated. There were a few who labored against the mass apathy of the American contingent, but they were unpopular, often ostracized. American Military Government officers found that Nazis were human, genial, often charming persons.

NAZIS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

It has already been mentioned that one of the suggestions for denazification was to turn the trials of the important Nazis over to courts which had been staffed with known anti-Nazis. The spectacular failure to purify the courts is nowhere better illustrated than in the city of Bremen, in which most of the persons in the office of the district attorney are former Nazis. On the bench and throughout the Bremen judicial system, 65 per cent of the top positions of the Justice Department are filled with former Nazis. It is impossible to say that there is one known anti-Nazi active in the court system of Bremen.

Our idealists tackled the problem of the youth of Germany, attempting to guide them along a new democratic path. The disheartening truth is that two-thirds of the teachers in German schools today are former Nazis. These are naïvely expected by Military Government and the German authorities not to play Pied Pipers for a future Hitler as they did for the Hitler of the recent unlamented past.

The spectacular renazification of German public office is amply shown in the Finance Division of the state of Bremen, and in the *Reichspost* and *Oberpostdirektion*. At this writing the *Oberfinanzpräsident* has 75 per cent of his highest-category jobs staffed with former Nazis. The postmaster has a

record of 100 per cent Nazis in the policy-making positions in his office.

What are the causes that led to the collapse of denazification? We have already discussed the apathetic attitude of American functional officers. That same attitude was prevalent in the French and British zones and resulted in the failure of denazification there also.

SHORTAGE OF ANTI-NAZIS

The most optimistic person could not foresee the end of the trials. Reasonably enough, it had been assumed that the tribunals must be administered and conducted by known anti-Nazis. Military Government denazification officers were anxious to use anti-Nazis. It was thought that enough personnel could be found among those released from concentration camps and others who had been constantly persecuted by the Nazis to staff the tribunals and the denazification offices. The brutal fact, however, is that there were not enough persons of this category left to do the job. The militant anti-Nazis had for the most part died in the concentration camps, and a large percentage of those surviving were too weak to participate in the program.

So it was that the trial tribunals were staffed with non-Nazis and as many known opponents of National Socialism as could be found. It was hoped to obtain the participation of attorneys, teachers, doctors, and other professional people. It was impossible to find unincriminated persons from these groups in sufficient numbers to staff the trial tribunals (*Spruchkammern*). We comforted ourselves with the selection of shoemakers, carpenters, and day laborers who had records of opposition to Nazism or who had never been politically incriminated.

Unfortunately, the anti-Nazi background of a shoemaker does not endow him with the skill or the academic background of an attorney. In many cases, therefore, the attorneys acting for the defense have been able to obtain decisions from the tribunals which were illogical and even illegal, because our laymen were too often dazzled and confused by the legalistic terms and brilliance of the defense attorneys.

TRIAL PROCEDURE

It was thought that major offenders should be the first to be tried. These were defined as those who had contravened the provisions of international law, and who were responsible for deportations, excesses, or plundering—crimes against victims of National Socialism. The category included leaders of the parties, those who had gained advantageous positions through their party conections, members of the Gestapo, the S.D., the S.S., the Field Security Police, and the Frontier Police. Thus a wholesome example was to be given the population. The "real" criminals were to be tried first. But it was necessary to train investigators and analysts, to gather documents, and to persuade witnesses that it was not risky to testify against influential persons. More important and difficult, the motives of witnesses often had to be examined. All too often those motives proved unworthy, at best.

In the complicated denazification machinery there was set up a system of trial supervision by Military Government. Where Military Government found the final verdict to be illegal, orders were given to the Senator for Political Liberation for retrial. In the first eight months of the operation of the trial tribunals in Bremen, 60 per cent of the trials held were found to be illegal and retrials were ordered. But that was not all. Those verdicts which were permitted to stand were in almost every

case appealed by the defendants to the court of appeals (*Berufungskammer*).

KEY GERMAN OFFICIALS

One cannot overemphasize the importance of key German officials in the implementation of the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism. The Bürgermeister of Bremen is, of course, the leading citizen of the city. He is in almost constant contact with the Director of Military Government, with the Division Chiefs, and frequently with Generals Clay, Huebner, and Hays. He speaks no English. It was, therefore, necessary for him to procure the services of a man who spoke fluent English to act as interpreter in his conferences with the American authorities. The man he found for the position had studied some years at Columbia University before coming back to Germany.

As an interpreter, the man was satisfactory. To the embarrassment of the persons concerned, a questionnaire falsification was discovered after this man had been employed for two years in that trusted capacity. The Bürgermeister's interpreter declared he had been forced to join the National Socialist Party in 1937 in order to be permitted to study law at the University of Berlin. Without a party card he would not have been permitted to matriculate. Consequently, as he was a nominal party member, Military Government approved his appeal and allowed him to keep his job. However, subsequent investigation revealed that he had entered the foreign organization (*Auslandsorganization*) and the Nazi Party while living in New Rochelle, New York, almost two years prior to the date shown in his questionnaire.

To make the problem more critical, when the falsification was discovered, this man was no longer a mere interpreter. He had become by this time the liaison officer between Military Government and the Bürgermeister. Military Government ordered his removal, but he was merely transferred to another position in the city government, and not long thereafter his request for reinstatement was submitted by the Bürgermeister on the ground that the man was irreplaceable. Today he is in America studying again at an American university.

THE LIBERAL ELEMENT

At this time in Germany the liberal element is busy disovawing the denazification program. The warm support of these groups was always sought. In the flush of the capitulation they proffered their services to the Military Government officers and were very helpful in the early days. However, these groups, composed of victims of fascism (Communists, Socialists, and nonparty liberals), began to organize as political pressure groups at a time when political parties were not yet permitted. They grouped themselves into organizations, such as the Victims and Fighters against Fascism, and attempted to requisition homes, to confiscate Nazi property, and to legislate against Nazis. Almost consistently after the first cordial days their offers of assistance were repulsed, so that the support of these groups today is only rarely forthcoming.

Less than half of 1 per cent of the total population can be classified as anti-Nazi. The elements of the population which might have been a nucleus for a democratization program had been efficiently decimated. The existence and efficiency of the concentration camps were in this respect a tribute to the diabolical genius of the Hitler regime.

Only rarely today are there found persons of the old Social Democratic tradition. For the most part, these men and women are debilitated by years of imprisonment, or since the war they

have grown weary of their interminable struggle with the Communists.

The re-created trade unions should have been the first to offer support in the completion of the denazification program. They have done little because of the autocratic, almost dictatorial nature of the trade union bosses.

PROGRAM ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE

Denazification is a failure. It has been essentially negative. Originally it was meant to remove, to exclude; and, in the words of the Potsdam agreement, to choose persons "who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany." American Military Government long ago abandoned responsibility for the placement in really important private and public positions of persons of positive democratic convictions. This responsibility was turned over to the Germans, much to the grave concern of those Americans who saw this development at close range. The tragedy of Weimar in failing to replace persons of known antidemocratic convictions in private and public institutions was well known. But it was apparently no lesson to the American policy makers, since there were no safeguards retained such as the screening of key personnel in German government and industry. The cardinal principle would appear to have been overlooked: that denazification was not an end but a means—one important aspect of the task of establishing in Germany the climate in which a democracy can flourish.

When the Law for Liberation went into effect, the plan called for the Germans to implement the negative aspect of the program, but for American Military Government to ensure the success of the positive aspect by requiring Military Government investigations and approval of persons considered for appointment to key executive or policy-making positions in government and business. As was feared by some Americans, the reasoning behind the proposed division of responsibilities has proved accurate. The Germans can recognize a Nazi; but the Germans cannot guarantee the recognition of a democrat.

This plan was never put into operation. Instead, the responsibility was placed upon German officials for "appointing or reinstating persons to offices in positions above ordinary labor . . . which would require positive political, liberal and moral qualities which will assist in the development of democracy in Germany." Unfortunately, elected officials are subject to no requirements except being eligible to vote and gathering sufficient votes for election. However, it is these very officials that should be the ones to ensure that subordinate offices are filled with persons possessing these required qualities. Then, too, the industrial and commercial fields have been completely ignored. The tremendous influence that the German economic leaders wielded in permitting and furthering Hitler's rise to power has also been ignored.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF EXECUTION

The scope of the program was entirely too broad. Some of us constantly asserted that the program was unwieldly and cumbersome because of its magnitude. It was estimated that formal trials for every incriminated person might last thirty years. Thus it became obvious to all that the program was an impossibility from the very start.

Among the first to realize this impossibility were the political parties. First, the parties of the right made political capital out of the long, ineffectual program, and the parties of the left (notably the Social Democratic Party) have been saddled with it. A genuine

liberal element which insisted on a thorough denazification in the early days either has been discredited or has become discouraged. Politicians were unanimous in agreement that any connection with denazification or the trial tribunals meant political suicide. Leaders of the Social Democratic Party were most unhappy about being associated with denazification, and in their way often gave covert support to those forces which have wrecked the program.

The parties have been forced by political necessity to appeal to the incriminated groups for electoral support. Obviously, a political party can exist only when appealing successfully to the electorate. Today the parties of the right tell the little Nazis that they have always been in favor of a speedy termination of denazification. The right-wing parties have consistently attacked denazification with such slogans as: "12 years of Hitler—1000 years of denazification."

Many German officials have been reluctant to denazify. Often they are honest enough to admit their fear of what will happen to them if they carry through a thorough denazification policy. They are afraid that with the eventual departure of the American troops they will be subjected to the same fate as those German officials whose unhappy lot it was to sign the first Armistice and later the Versailles Treaty. They are determined not to be made the goats of a future anti-American rally. And it is obviously difficult to staff important offices with non-Nazis when technical knowledge and academic background were restricted to those persons who embraced the Nazi faith.

There was another source of pressure. Incriminated persons in Germany wrote their friends in America about their postwar plight. Military Government was subjected to a bombardment of letters from Americans from all walks of life. In the internment camp near Bremen, where major offenders are held, a former S.S. captain was serving a seven-year sentence. He was not returned to Czechoslovakia to stand trial for his participation in the Lidice massacre; however, a respectable dowager from upstate New York wrote Military Government to plead that this man was a pious churchgoer and the most devoted of family men. A letter from an English baron interceded on behalf of a certain local nobleman who was a colonel in the S.S. And so it went, *ad nauseam*.

No Quadripartite Agreement

One of the most telling blows was the failure to evolve a quadripartite pattern in denazification. The French gave little attention to the problem outside of the lip service they paid in the Allied Control Council meetings. They did insist on a clean sweep of the schools and universities of their zone of occupation, but did little more. The Russians in their first entry into the eastern zone appear to have liquidated the leaders of the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) or to have absorbed them into the Communist Party. With their ruthless tactics they have been able for the past three years to point to a clean judiciary and public administration. The little Nazis have been wooed to perform their acts of contrition within the Communist-sponsored Socialist Unity Party. The English have been lenient to the point of disinterest in their denazification program. Beyond Control Council Directive No. 24, there has been no uniform implementation of denazification policies. At times it has appeared that our program was closest to the Russian program and farthest from the British program. This has been one of the ironies of the occupation.

REINFILTRATION OF NAZIS

With the completion of denazification even as a travesty, the problem is no longer the purge of Nazis from public office but rather the prevention of the reinfiltration of these incriminated persons into the public administration. The bulk of the incriminated millions have gone through the whitewashing machinery and have come out as followers (*Mitläufer*). In his urge to complete denazification, General Lucius D. Clay announced certain crippling amendments to the law, which were implemented in April 1948. These amendments permitted a speedy clerical process. But the amendments were the coup de grâce to denazification. Today, any Nazi who holds a clearance certificate, as millions of them do, may return to any position in public or private life.

There has been some discussion as to the desirability of closing the high civil service positions to former Nazis by making them ineligible to rise above a fixed civil service rank. This proposition has no possibility of being enacted into law. Too many of those responsible for legislation are themselves affected. Studies of many public offices show that the percentage of Nazis in all grades of the civil service is equal to that in the years 1935–45. Here and there a voice rises to protest the return of the Nazis to their former positions, but for the most part they are thin, querulous voices, disregarded by the policy makers and leaders of the public administration.

It is easy to see that the democratic and anti-Nazi fervor which accompanied the drive of our occupation troops into Germany is gone. In May 1945 the word "Nazi" was anathema; in 1949 it is no longer so: among the Germans it is practically an accolade. As righteous ambassadors of democracy we were prepared at all costs to extirpate Nazism. The tragedy is that we have paid the cost and are now witnessing the Nazi revival. It couldn't happen here, but it is happening NOW!

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Book Department

MORGENTHAU, HANS J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* Pp. xv, 489. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Text, $4.25; trade, $5.50.

This book is in many ways a remarkable piece of work. It combines learning with philosophic insight. It is a healthy counteragent to the overidealistic kind of treatise on international affairs. There can be little question, however, that its general tone is so profoundly critical as almost to give one the impression of hopelessness as to the future of international relations.

Professor Morgenthau believes that "nations no longer oppose each other as they did from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars and then again from the end of the latter to the First World War, within a framework of shared beliefs and common values, which impose effective limitations upon the ends and means of their struggle for power." He has no very great confidence in any of the instruments by which it is sought to promote peace. International law lacks much of being an effective code; disarmament is not likely to come about except in terms of a more orderly world; collective security is a means by which local struggles become general in scope; the United Nations is not organized to cope with the central situation in the world of international politics; the organization of a world government is something for which the world is not by any means prepared. Moreover, diplomacy has become more and more corrupted by the conditions of a democratic world. It is a great mistake to debate great issues in public, and leads only to the exacerbation of the differences involved; it is a mistake, too, to try to decide international questions by majority vote; it is a mistake to bring up individual "cases," and by so doing obscure the chances of a general settlement. If the future is to be brighter than the past, diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit; the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power; diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations; and nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.

In all of this there is much truth and much wisdom. Unhappily, as already stated, such generalizations do not leave one in a particularly buoyant frame of mind. Of course it is not the business of the scholar to provide good cheer. But there are elements in the existing international situation which might somewhat mitigate the harshness of Professor Morgenthau's judgments, and which offer a slightly more hopeful view of the future. In the Western-minded world, diplomacy still performs its function; in the great conflict between that world and the Slav world, not so much compromise as a sense of the real limits of the present policies of support for self-government and economic reconstruction would seem to be fundamental. But to examine these matters in detail would carry this reviewer beyond his assignment.

DEXTER PERKINS
University of Rochester

REISER, OLIVER L. *World Philosophy.* Pp. ix, 127. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948. $2.50.

This book, although quite short, can hardly be summarized in a few words, because it is essentially a summary and a prospectus itself. In five compact and eminently suggestive chapters it sets forth the claims of a philosophy known as "scientific humanism" to be recognized as the most promising guide out of our present world chaos and confusion.

The "humanism" part of this title stresses the fact that in seeking for a world philosophy—a philosophy which will in essence be understandable and acceptable to all peoples in this distracted world, no matter how different their recent political and intellectual histories may have been—a start must be made with the study of man himself as the most compli-

cated of all natural organisms, in the belief that when we understand man himself, the essential man behind all the divisive forces of regional languages, religions, and cultures, we shall be well on the way to a planetary philosophy without which no world government or peace will be possible.

The term "scientific" indicates that the method of the sciences will be the guide of this relatively new philosophy. Science in its very nature knows no regional boundaries, and in its operation is essentially democratic in character. With truth as its only goal, it cuts across all the divisive influences and is the only hope of achieving what H. G. Wells called the World Brain. The ramifications of scientific humanism are sketched out—scientific humanism as a theory of education, as a basis for world government, as a way of releasing creative forces in society, as a means for enabling universal geniuses like Leonardo da Vinci to appear again, and finally even as a religion—"scientific mysticism"—based on the awe-inspiring recognition of the "As-yet-unknown."

Professor Reiser draws on many sources of inspiration for his program, from Ikhnaton to Korzybski. He surveys a vast range of special studies—philosophy, religion, anthropology, social psychology, semantics, and many others. He stresses the importance of the work of F. C. S. Northrop in trying to work toward a synthesis of eastern and western modes of thought, and he attacks those forms of sectarian religion which claim absolute truth for their own dogmas and thus act as exclusive and separative forces.

From time to time the text reads like a burst of applause for the work that many scientists and social thinkers are doing—applause intended to encourage them to carry on. It is primarily a plan and a hope, with no limit to its optimism and ambition. The recurrent emphasis on the eminent desirability of universal truth, freedom, social creativity, and world-embracing patterns of thought, is undoubtedly a timely reminder to us that stagnation, bigotry, and provincialism are, today as always, our gravest dangers. But it is difficult to estimate whether this book, for all its brilliant flashes of imagination, will actually point out new methods of investigation that are not already under way.

MASON W. GROSS
Rutgers University

NORTHROP, F. S. C. (Ed.). *Ideological Differences and World Order.* Pp. xi, 486. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. $4.50.

With the exception of Arnold J. Toynbee, it is probable that no writer in the English-speaking world has received more acclaim in intellectual and quasi-intellectual circles than Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop. This has been due mainly to his earlier volume, *The Meeting of East and West* (1946). The thesis of this book was that it is mainly ideological differences that cause international misunderstanding and wars. If the peoples of the world could only understand one another, violence and massacre might come to an end.

This is an important contention, and worthy of serious reflection and study. It is especially congenial to the reviewer, whose major interest is intellectual history. But when taken alone as a complete interpretation of international hostility and disputes, it is as inadequate as the most extreme Marxian interpretation of world affairs which attributes our troubles mainly to economic causes. Ideologies are very frequently only a reflection or rationalization of underlying economic conditions, racial contacts and conflicts, cultural clashes, and the like. Until these causes of ideological conflicts are removed, we are not likely to have either understanding or peace. The ideological interpretation is valuable as a corrective, but as a complete explanation it is almost as inadequate as Emery Reve's notion of national sovereignty as the sole cause of war.

Mr. Northrop has now edited a comprehensive symposium developing further the same frame of reference. While virtually every chapter is scholarly and thoughtful, the volume does not present a systematic picture of the conflicting ideologies of our time. It is not inaccurate to say that only a minority of the chapters conform in a precise and important way to the title of the book. Such chapters as

those of Chiang Yee on "The Philosophical Basis of Chinese Painting," of Matila Ghyka on "The Pythagorean and Platonic Scientific Criterion of the Beautiful in Classical Western Art," of Robert Grinnell on "Franciscan Philosophy and Gothic Art," and of Clyde Kluckhohn on "The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians," while each admirable in itself, would seem to be rather trivial or irrelevant in relation to the ideological basis of world order in our time. On the whole, the volume is more a symposium on general intellectual and cultural history than a definitive and well-planned exposition of the ideological conflicts of the mid-twentieth century.

The chapters most cogent to the title of the book and its assumed purpose are those by Fung Yu-Lan on "The Philosophy at the Basis of Traditional Chinese Society," by Charles M. Bakewell on "The Philosophical Roots of Western Culture," by Overton H. Taylor on "Philosophies and Economic Theories in Modern Occidental Culture," by John N. Hazard on "Soviet Law and Its Assumptions," by T. V. Smith on "The New Deal as a Cultural Phenomenon," by P. W. Bridgman on "The Potential Intelligent Society of the Future," by Lord Lindsay on "The Philosophy of the British Labour Government," and by Julian Huxley on "Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy." Many of these chapters, however, fail to come to grips with contemporary realities. Even Mr. Taylor's chapter, the theme of which should logically occupy at least half the space in the volume, inevitably had to be sketchy, and it gets down to the twentieth century only in the last few pages.

If one is motivated mainly by what Veblen called "idle curiosity," and is satisfied to acquire bits of casual and desultory information of a highly scholarly quality, he will feel richly repaid by a close reading of this volume. On the other hand, if the reader is fervently interested in discovering the great philosophical, religious, aesthetic, social, economic, political, and juristic ideologies which help to divide the world, whatever their causes, he is likely to acquire a progressive sense of frustration and exasperation. Those of the former group will acclaim the book as a masterpiece of editorial planning and author execution; those of the latter group will probably demand a volume which the title of the present book logically led them to expect.

HARRY ELMER BARNES
University of Colorado

BOYD, ANDREW and FRANCES. *Western Union: A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity*. Pp. v, 183. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949. $3.00.

This little volume is well written and contains much useful information. It is also a well-reasoned interpretation of the movement for European unity from the economic point of view. The four chapters cover the present situation, the movement toward some kind of European union in the past, the present status of unification, and the prospects of a future union. A number of useful appendices contain miscellaneous information.

To many people, European unification has come to mean merely economic unification. The North Atlantic Pact is a clear indication that political considerations cannot be overlooked. Nor can the religious, racial, cultural, historical, and many other considerations be lightly brushed aside. It is to be hoped that in any future edition of this very useful little volume, the authors will explore more fully all aspects of the problem of European union. It is too much to expect that economic interests will alone heal religious and ideological differences. Yet these latter are some of the problems which must be resolved before Europe can be unified.

The greatest strength of the work lies in its effective discussion of the past. The interpretations are objective and balanced.

The work, however, is not complete, in that while the movement for unification is traced through many of the classical peace proposals of the past, one misses an analysis of some of the organizations which have been proposed for western Europe at one time or another. For example, while the Briand proposal is discussed at some length, one will search in vain for the thoughts of some familiar stalwarts such as Pierre Dubois and Bluntschli. In this respect Senator Fulbright in his Marfleet lec-

tures set a useful pattern to be followed in rounding out any treatment of the unification of Europe.

Finally, since the authors devote considerable space to a treatment of the Marshall plan, it would not have been amiss to discuss the deep and abiding interest of the United States in the unification of Europe, nor would it have been out of place to suggest some of the major difficulties which stand in the way of a united Europe.

THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI
Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F. (Ed.). *Technology and International Relations*. Pp. vii, 202. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. $4.00.

The seven contributors to Professor Ogburn's volume were participants in the twenty-fourth annual Institute of the Harris Foundation, held in May 1949, and their chapters are based on the lectures delivered at that time under the general direction of Quincy Wright. Since their responsibility as joint authors is a weighty one, the five contributors in addition to those mentioned above should be listed. They are Bernard Brodie, William T. R. Fox, Harnell Hart, Robert Leigh, and Abbott Payson Usher.

Together these writers explore a new field, that of the relation of technology to "shifts in the relative power of state, the evolution of states in geographic size, and the pursuit of peace." It is sagely admitted that while steam and steel helped to make nineteenth-century Britain great, political coherence is an equally important prerequisite to military power. So throughout the volume there is a neat balance between technological and sociopolitical factors, and their subtle interrelations are recognized. "Newly industrialized nations . . . tend to have confidence," and to feel needs which may easily lead to war. For the formation of cohesive ties on a large scale, means of communication and transportation must be available. When in the final pages Quincy Wright faces the problem of whether technology has made for a national or an international world, he is forced to admit that the cohesiveness is much more evident in the form of nationalism; hence our present race between world union and chaos.

Hope lies in those aspects of the situation which may make nationalism the bridge to regionalism or internationalism. "The increased need of Britain for France is caused by a change in technology" which makes British alarms of not so many years ago seem obsolete and funny.

One cannot lament the fact that the authors did not cling to their subject with superstitious exactness or entirely avoid one another's toes; the result is a less abstract and better rounded book.

Harnell Hart demonstrates once more the "association between governmental growth and general technological advancement," and that "since prehistoric times, areas controlled by any one government have been increasing with accelerating speed," and he relates the increase to specific technological gains. While the Horse Transportation Age lasted thirty-five hundred years, the Age of Deep-Sea Sailing was less than a tenth as long, that of Steam Transportation less than a century, and the recent Gasoline Engine Age is already yielding to other forms of power.

Professor Usher's chapter on the Steam and Steel Complex wisely introduces considerations of convergence, cumulation, the organic character of innovation, and the long sequence. "The present crisis in international relations is primarily due to disturbances . . . growing out of the Industrial Revolution." Even when all due allowances are made for their characters as estimated, his tables of world production and resources of mechanical energy are fascinating. The basic conclusion to which they lead is that Europe and the United States, which recently have provided twice the percentage of energy output which their resources would suggest, will ultimately be less important, and China more important, in fact potentially a great world power. It would appear, however, that politics does not lag behind resources and technology, for the United Nations has already anticipated these possible events of a century hence by giving China a major role.

In very meaty and close-reasoned chap-

ters on Atomic Energy and New Techniques of War, those former collaborators (in *The Absolute Weapon*) Fox and Brodie see more aspects of their problem than any other author we have read. There can be no question of following them through all the ins and outs of their argument, which will displease some as cynical, but from many will receive the accolade of our culture's honorific term "realistic."

W. REX CRAWFORD
University of Pennsylvania

GRINNELL COLLEGE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Major Aspects of International Politics.* Pp. 163. Grinnell, Iowa: Grinnell College Press, 1948. $2.50.

This volume consists of a series of lectures given during the summer of 1947, which covered the United States relations with Latin America, the Chinese dilemma, Soviet imperialism, the postwar crisis in Britain, and problems of world organization. It is carefully edited, and will be found useful for the collateral reading shelf in courses on contemporary world problems.

The lectures were given under the auspices of the Grinnell College Institute of International Affairs. One is reminded that of recent years several similar institutes have sprung up all over the United States and are serving a very useful educational purpose. They are particularly valuable because of their contributions to adult education. With the growing responsibilities of the United States in world affairs, it is clear that institutes of this type may have more than a pedagogical purpose. They should become a means whereby the general public may participate more effectively in the formulation of foreign policy through a better understanding of the problems with which the American people must live. In this sense Grinnell College has wisely seen fit to publish this book.

The two most useful chapters deal with the Chinese dilemma and with the relationships of the United States and Latin America, bringing that problem up to date as of May 1947. Both chapters are confined to a summary of developments to the date when the lectures were given. The other chapters are more discursive and analytical.

Since events in the field of foreign affairs move at a rapid rate, one misses (in the closing weeks of 1948) such important developments as the Bogotá conference and its instruments, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the present war in China, the terrific power-political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the travail of the United Nations in Palestine, Korea, Greece, and Turkey—to mention only a few.

Perhaps because Communist activities all over the world have been brought into sharper focus, perhaps because the reports prepared and printed by the Committees of Congress make the Communist menace now more apparent than it was in 1947, the volume leaves an impression of complacency on the score of Communism in Latin America and in China. The chapter on Soviet Imperialism and the United States has been more recently treated in *Communism in Action, Nazi-Soviet Relations,* and *Trends in Russian Foreign Policy since World War I.* But these are differences of interpretation only, and do not represent any fundamental weakness in the volume.

THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI
Washington, D. C.

BIDDLE, FRANCIS. *The World's Best Hope.* Pp. xiv, 175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. $3.50.

The title of the former United States Attorney General's "brief" arouses curiosity, but one should not look for any ideal solution to international problems. There is no appeal for a world federation or similar unrealistic proposition. "The World's Best Hope" is a quotation from Thomas Jefferson's First Inaugural Address and refers of course, more truly now than in 1801, to the American Government.

To resist the further expansion of Russia's Communist totalitarianism, the world does look to America. And Mr. Biddle properly raises the basic question, "can the system of free enterprise of the United

States be made to work in harmony with the Socialist or Semi-Socialist governments of Western Europe?" (p. xii).

The author, instead of evangelizing the blessings of American democracy, clearly illustrates its shortcomings in face of the tremendous responsibilities as the world's greatest power.

This book is a refreshing and stimulating analysis of contemporary American government in theory and in practice. Giving full weight to origins and developments, the wholesome criticism of defects is frankly presented, but more than balanced by demonstrated virtues. Nicely selected quotations from past and present authorities enhance the study. Statements of opposition opinion are given to provide a basis, in refutation, for clinching the author's argument.

For the student or practitioner of political science, the chapters dealing with individual liberty and equality, rule of the majority, freedom of the individual, and the essential rights can be thoughtfully studied with profit. Businessmen and labor leaders should read the chapter on "Democracy, Socialism and Free Enterprise." The high point, "Socialism is not Communism," should be required reading for the National Association of Manufacturers and its political associates. Even Congress could well afford to take time to ponder over Mr. Biddle's suggestions for "American Government in the New World."

However, it is unfortunate that Mr. Biddle, in keeping with Washington and most American observers, refers only to western Europe. In his reflections upon balance of power he overlooks the Orient, where live over half the peoples of the world. To this reviewer the best hope of the world is in carrying out the program of "sustaining the independence of the nations" of *eastern Asia* as much as those of western Europe. For "the backward places of the world," as suggested by Mr. Biddle in his very last paragraph, America must "introduce the benefits of modern industry and science, and the free democratic institutions which are their cultural counterpart" (p. 166).

PHILIP H. TAYLOR
Syracuse University

MARKEL, LESTER, *et al. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.* Pp. ix, 227. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. $3.50.

This volume is the outgrowth of a study by members of the Council on Foreign Relations under the direction of Lester Markel, Sunday editor of the *New York Times.* Part I deals with foreign policy and opinion at home, and consists of chapters on the public opinion role of the President, of Congress, of the Defense Departments, and of the Department of State, by James Reston, Cobell Phillips, Hanson W. Baldwin, and W. Phillips Davison respectively. The first three are staff members of the *New York Times.* Davison is editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly.* A fifth contributor to Part I, Professor Martin Kriegsberg of the University of Michigan, documents the extent of public ignorance regarding issues of public policy.

In Part II, Shepard Stone of the *New York Times* discusses the formation and state of public opinion in Europe vis-à-vis the United States and Russia; Mr. Davison describes the public opinion activities of the Department of State abroad; C. D. Jackson, of Time, Inc., analyzes the role of the press and other private communication agencies in molding public opinion abroad; and Arnaldo Cortesi and an unidentified "observer" report on the ideological struggle for men's minds in France and Italy.

Although Parts I and II are primarily descriptive, the authors sometimes raise questions, state problems, or suggest reforms. Kriegsberg concludes that "we must bring light into the areas of ignorance." Reston finds that the danger of the President's abusing his great, new, extraconstitutional powers in relation to public opinion is remote. Phillips urges Congress (1) to set up an advisory group representing the three main constituent aspects of foreign policy—legislative, military, financial; (2) to encourage the development of foreign-policy information agencies; and (3) to recognize its duty to lead public opinion. In one of the most penetrating chapters in the book, Hanson Baldwin concludes, "The influence of the military on public opinion—a necessary influence in the atomic age—has reached

the point today where it is time to call a halt."

In his chapters on the Department of State, Davison stresses the need for greater completeness in and more careful analysis of public opinion intelligence; also, centralization of the entire public opinion operation in the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs. He recommends more adequate congressional appropriations for the public opinion operation, better personnel, and closer ties between opinion operations and policy making. Shepard Stone, in analyzing public opinion in Europe, concludes with a plea for more propaganda on behalf of American democracy; a theme which is also stressed by Cortesi, who urges that "we must engage in the ideological struggle as vigorously as do the Russians." In the opinion of C. D. Jackson, the press and other private agencies of communication do not appreciate fully their responsibilities in this struggle, and should do more to supplement government public opinion activities.

The basic theme of the book is the need for a bigger and better "public opinion operation" by the United States Government, both at home and abroad. Mr. Markel, in his introductory and concluding chapters, develops this thesis at length. At home, he states, the task is essentially an information job: "The domestic task is basically to give the American people the facts and reasons behind our foreign policy so that they will understand it and, presumably, support it." Abroad, the task is basically a propaganda job: "The foreign task is basically to make certain that we are understood by other peoples, that our purposes and programs are clearly set out so that our own cause may be furthered abroad."

To the possible charge that he is pleading for more government propaganda at home, as well as abroad, Mr. Markel replies, "Cultivation of public opinion is vital to the execution of any foreign policy. Unless the support of the American people, and of nations associated with us abroad, can be obtained for the program, it will surely fail in the long run. This is the information (and propaganda) function of the [State] Department" (p. 29). And later (p. 226), "Let us understand what we are here advocating. Call it information or call it propaganda, it is education on a vast scale."

It is somewhat surprising to find a group of outstanding journalists coming out so vigorously and unqualifiedly for government propaganda on all fronts. Certainly government propaganda, at least on the home front, has not been a popular theme with the American press in the past. Neither Mr. Markel nor his collaborators, with the exception of Mr. Baldwin, seem to appreciate the full implications of their argument. They have not thought the problem through carefully enough to see clearly where the line should be drawn between what the Government should and should not do in the matter of information and propaganda. They have allowed their enthusiasm for certain aspects of foreign policy to obscure the basic issue to which government propaganda gives rise. On the descriptive and factual side, this volume presents much information of value and interest. What it lacks is a carefully thought-through theory of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy under democratic conditions.

HARWOOD L. CHILDS
Princeton University

FENWICK, CHARLES G. *The Inter-American Regional System.* Pp. 96. New York: The Declan X. McMullen Co., 1949. $1.50.

This little volume consists of the three lectures given by Dr. Fenwick early in 1948 at Holy Cross College as the second series of the "Fenwick Lectures." Dr. Fenwick, now the director of the Department of International Law and Organization of the Pan American Union, is well known as one of the country's leading authorities on international law, and, in the past decade and a half, as not only an eminent student of inter-American affairs but also a contributor to their shaping. Hence, it goes without saying that we may rely with complete confidence on the authority of whatever the author may have to say on such matters.

The lectures deal respectively with the

"Historical Background of the Inter-American System," the "Development of Inter-American Law," and "Relations between the Inter-American Regional System and the United Nations." The respective titles are entirely adequate in indicating the subject matter of the lectures.

These discussions are for the layman rather than for the expert or person of long acquaintance with the problem. As discussions which "start from scratch," they are admirably organized and presented. The persons who were privileged to hear them delivered must inevitably have felt that they were listening to an authority on the subject. Only one very trivial factual error came to this reviewer's notice: The author states in a footnote that "with but one or two exceptions, all of the Latin American republics participated at one time or another in the League of Nations"; there were no exceptions.

For anyone interested in getting an introduction to this aspect of inter-American relations, these lectures of Dr. Fenwick's serve admirably; and for the student interested in further exploration of the problems, the careful documentation provides many good leads.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
University of California, Los Angeles

COLBERT, EVELYN SPEYER. *Retaliation in International Law.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. $3.00.

In this pioneer work on coercive retaliation, Mrs. Colbert has made a valuable contribution to the literature of international law and relations. She has judiciously and concisely blended principle with practice, and the historical with the topical. Although the work is scholarly and devoid of dogmatic assertion, and despite the technical nature of its subject matter, it is consistently interesting and challenging. Its rich bibliography, carefully divided as to primary and secondary sources, and its many informative footnotes, should be invaluable to the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further.

The author traces the history of retaliation and the evolutionary changes in the doctrine and law underlying it, in the nature of the acts which have provoked resort to it, in the nature and purposes of retaliatory acts, and in the national and international efforts to make it amenable to the rule of law. At logical stopping points she has summarized the practical and legal effects of this evolutionary process. Her treatment of motivation is realistic rather than legalistic, and reveals the hypocritical use of the doctrine by belligerents, in the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, to coerce neutrals into commercial conduct consistent with the economic and naval strategies of the belligerents. She distinguishes carefully between private and public reprisals, and makes a valiant attempt—as successful as anyone has made to date—to thread her way through the twilight zone between peaceful and wartime retaliation.

Peacetime retaliation, the author concludes, has been less subject to abuse than belligerent retaliation, and has proved sufficiently valuable, as a method of redressing wrongs, to justify its retention, under strict definition by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Wartime retaliation by national states is essentially lawless, and should be outlawed except for its possible use, within carefully defined limits, by the Security Council.

This reviewer has only three contentious questions to direct to Mrs. Colbert. Why does she use so many quotations in French, without translation? Why does she frequently use the words "retaliation" and "reprisal" as though they were synonymous? Why does she dismiss World War II with one brief sentence?

AURIE N. DUNLAP
Lehigh University

BORTON, JOHN C., W. GAYER DOMINICK, and HARRY C. LAMBERTON. *Private Trade in Foreign Aid: A Businessman's Manual on E.C.A.* Pp. xvi, 320. Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1948. $7.50.

The text of this manual, by partners in a firm of international trade consultants, is in three parts: I, What is E.C.A. (Economic Co-operation Administration)? II, How does E.C.A. operate? III, Who runs E.C.A.? There are a glossary, thirteen appendices, and an index. The text (less

than half of the volume) consists of 115 brief sections. This facilitates ready reference. A great deal of data is presented, much of it in outline and tabular form.

Parts I and II should be of interest and value to students as well as to exporters. Part III should be a valuable tool for the exporter. It contains such chapters as the following: How are supplies procured? How is an export license obtained? How is access obtained to foreign materials? How do guaranties operate? Who handles export licenses? Who can provide foreign trade information? Who are foreign representatives in United States? Names, addresses, and telephone numbers as of August 1948 are given. An insert brings Regulations down to October 15, 1948.

H. R. ENSLOW

Albany, N. Y.

OGG, DAVID. *The History of Europe: Europe in the Seventeenth Century.* (Fifth ed.) Pp. viii, 576. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $5.50.

This is the fifth edition, the first having appeared in 1925. The latter contained an amazing array of serious errors, but the present edition is much better. It should be noted, however, that in the year 1672, when the huge army of King Louis XIV was on the road to Amsterdam, the Dutch were unable to open "the sluices at Ymuiden" some 150 years before they existed (see p. 431), nor did "Amsterdam become a small island." What the Dutch did was merely to flood what they called the "waterline" between the French troops and the great port, which did not make it an island. Ogg is also mistaken in assuming that the States-General joined the League of Augsburg (p. 251). Even more misleading is his statement to the effect that the Holy Roman Empire joined this alliance; only the Bavarian and Franconian Circle did, besides Bavaria and the Palatinate. The latter state is not mentioned by Ogg in this connection. He should have realized that the Holy Roman Empire was not a state but a large collection of states, which in 1686 were in no position to adopt a united foreign policy.

When the reader studies the Table of Contents he wonders if Great Britain had ceased to be a part of Europe, since only the Continent is discussed in this book. The first chapter is very useful, but unfortunately the curious implication remains (pp. 6–7) that Peter the Great suffered epileptic fits largely as a result of too much intermarriage on the part of his ancestors. On p. 82 we no longer are shocked by the statement that the Counter Reformation was the attempt, within the lands of the Empire, to undo the work of the sixteenth-century Reformation. The Counter Reformation was indeed much more extensive than that. On the next page the author neatly disposes of the ridiculous, but very popular, thesis concocted by Max Weber and R. H. Tawney regarding the relation between Calvinism and the rise of capitalism. Significant is this conclusion: "It is easily possible to substantiate such an interpretation of the past by playing fast and loose with words having a distinctly modern connotation." Arnold J. Toynbee, by imitating Tawney, also became guilty of this notorious practice.

The chapter on the Thirty Years' War is excellent, and the next three, which deal with France, contain much useful material. Chapter VIII, devoted to the Jesuits and Jansenism, is very weak. Ogg seems never to have received an adequate training in theology, which is necessary in order to understand the seventeenth century. He is still of the opinion (p. 323) that St. Augustine "devoted his life to the elucidation and definition of Christian principles, not as formulated by their Founder, but as enunciated by St. Paul." Christ and Paul were wholly agreed on the doctrines discussed here. In the following four chapters a great mass of political details has obscured much of the cultural development in the seventeenth century.

ALBERT HYMA

University of Michigan

GYORGY, A. *Governments of Danubian Europe.* Pp. vii, 376. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1949. $4.00.

This work presents, rather interestingly, the historical and geographical background of Danubian Europe, especially the politi-

cal developments from May 1945 to the spring of 1948 in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

It is really unfortunate that the book is, as a whole, distinctly disappointing from the standpoint of scholarly performance. It is weakest in its first two chapters, "A Heritage of History—Prewar Danubia" and "Postwar Reconstruction and the Peace Treaties." Being committed to the idea that the six states can be discussed as a unit, Gyorgy poses numerous characterizations which do not apply to the whole region, and in several instances contradicts his earlier statements on later pages.

What is even worse, Gyorgy frequently makes flat assumptions which, directly or indirectly, are misstatements of the established evidence or accepted assumptions. We learn, for instance, that by the time of the Middle Ages Muscovy represented "a homogeneous Russian nation" (p. 9); Charles IV, "who was German Emperor and who founded in 1348 the University of Prague" (p. 10), actually founded it as King of Bohemia; after 1918, "Rumania assumed an unfriendly aloofness and resisted all advances by the Soviet . . ." (p. 32); Bulgaria is not a Balkan but "essentially a Danubian nation" (p. 212). The claim that "Czechoslovakia displayed features of a *presidential* rather than a parliamentary government" (p. 72) shows that Gyorgy has failed to acquaint himself with studies showing how that system did actually operate. "Of the acknowledged pre-Munich leaders of the [Communist] Party, Klement Gottwald was the most prominent" (p. 79); actually, Gottwald became "prominent" only after having been trained for his postwar role in Moscow during World War II.

Although Gyorgy claims that he has "a balanced approach" and a "firm desire to remain as impartial as possible," he betrays his pro-Hungarian background in his selection and omission of sources, and in his statement: "As long as Rumania lays claim to all of Transylvania, the ethnic integrity of these large unassimilated minority groups will constitute a real threat to her future political existence" (p. 13); would it not be more fair to substitute the word Hungary for Rumania?

Unfortunately, Gyorgy's book is frequently not only poor but actively annoying, although it is evident that the author has the makings of a fine scholar and that his future publications may be of more valid historical importance.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

SMITH, JESSICA. *People Come First.* Pp. 254. New York: International Publishers, 1948. $2.75.

This is a very human book, chiefly reporting conversations with the kind of people Americans would call the middle class, but which in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be referred to as Soviet intelligentsia. Miss Smith, editor of *Soviet Russia Today,* returned to the U.S.S.R. for her fourth visit in late summer, 1945. In Moscow she learns of reintegration of Soviet veterans into family, school, or occupation. The chapters on Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Rostov—scenes of siege and battle—give excellent descriptions of wartime experiences of Soviet men and women, their love of country, and their energy in reconstruction. A visit to Gorki affords insight into restoration of industrial production, and a week in Baku reveals the rise and importance of the culture of ethnic minorities in Soviet life.

Education, elections, and trade unions are especially well portrayed. The Mayor of Leningrad explained that "our elections are not just a one-day affair, they are part of the continuing process of our democracy. . . . Unanimity is reached in the course of democratic discussion, and the final balloting simply registers what has already been achieved."

Regarding education, Molotov is quoted as saying that the principal cultural aim is "to make a great step forward toward realizing the historic task of raising the cultural level of the workers' class to engineers and technicians." Miss Smith gives a high rating to the quality of scholarship both in the ten-year schools and in the universities. She fails to note that this standard was set in prerevolutionary Russia, lost during the early years of the Soviet regime,

and later earnestly sought by teachers and students.

In the chapter on trade unions we learn that "hardly any government department or ministry starts anything without consulting the trade unions, since we are in such close touch with the people." "The national wage budget is established by the Council of Ministers and the Trade Union Council in connection with the five-year plan production goals, which the trade unions share in developing every step of the way. The wage fund and prices are fixed to yield to the Soviet people the purchasing power to buy the consumers' goods and services they will produce under the plan, plus a surplus for savings."

Miss Smith quotes the editor of Leningrad *Znamya* as saying, "We love and respect the American people for two qualities that are common to both our peoples —realism and democracy." Professor Voznesensky explains his friendship for Americans "as a result of the tremendous help we received from America in the war." This was in 1945. Three years later, December 15, 1948, *Bol'shevik* stated, "the Soviet Union was in position by its own strength, without help of the Allies, to complete the defeat of Germany and liberate the people of Europe from the Fascist yoke." Miss Smith was probably right in 1945 in saying "people come first," but since then the Communist Party has regained pre-eminence, with consequent change in international relationships.

The book is romantic and uncritical, reflecting these qualities engendered by the party. If corrected by knowledge of the party's role and of the work of the Ministry of the Interior, it is well worth reading, especially to catch the vigor and enthusiasm of Soviet cadres.

PAUL B. ANDERSON
International Committee of YMCA
New York City

STRAKHOVSKY, LEONID I. (Ed.). *A Handbook of Slavic Studies*. Pp. xxi, 753. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. $12.50.

The aim of the editor and his collaborators has been to remedy the present "unfortunate situation" in Slavic scholarship in the United States. They have succeeded to a considerable degree, for here we have for the first time a one-volume guide to the history of every Slavic country and of the Lusatian Sorbs. Of special value are the comprehensive bibliographies of works in English and western European languages. The material is well arranged, and the facts presented by eighteen specialists in twenty-eight chapters are informative, mostly presented with the historian's microscope and fine pencil rather than with the artist's broad brush.

At the same time, the work is not without several glaring weaknesses. The treatment is mostly devoted to the political history of the Slavic peoples (especially during the second half of the volume) and to their literatures. Very little, indeed, is said about the social and artistic aspects; in this respect the first twelve chapters are the best, while the rest of the book (with the exception of the chapters concerned with literatures) is often distressingly stale. It is also unfortunate that most of the manuscripts were in the hands of the editor "by the end of 1944," although the book was not published until 1949. The whole field of Slavonic studies has been considerably changed during this period.

In spite of these faults, the book is a distinct contribution to the field so persistently ignored, until World War II, by America's historians and social scientists. It offers a vast store of new material in English and is a praiseworthy jumping-off-place for the student who desires to dive into the deeper waters of the impact of the Slavonic world on the whole course of world history.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

WHITE, W. L. *Land of Milk and Honey*. Pp. viii, 312. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949. $3.00.

This is the story of a young Soviet proletarian who rose from the bench of the industrial worker to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in Air Forces—of his school and college years, his loves and friendships, his war activities, his disillusionment, and his desertion from the Soviet armed forces.

The book is the outcome of co-operation between this ex-Soviet officer and the well-known author and journalist, W. L. White.

The volume is well written and very readable. In addition to the discussion of the personal fates of Kotov and his beloved Galya, it offers a considerable amount of information on such controversial topics as the Moscow panic of 1941, the impact of the "liberated" countries on the Soviet conquerors, and the attitude of the latter to the local Communists.

A fairly large part of the Soviet citizens who found themselves abroad at the end of the war, either as German slave labor or evacuees, did not want to return home. A substantial number of war prisoners taken in the Soviet Union had enlisted under Hitler's banners in the so-called General Vlasov's Corps. There is also the steady trickle of deserters from the Soviet armed forces into the Allied-occupied zones of Germany and Austria.

It is a matter of the greatest importance to the western democracies to be able to gauge the degree of the dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with the Stalin regime. Kotov was influenced at college by a group of brilliant students who were active enemies of the regime. His personal tragedy involved the turning of Galya into a modern "temple-prostitute" by the NKVD. One is tempted to doubt whether he would have escaped at all, had it not been for the example set by his friend, who was a son of an old-regime scientist. The question arises, To what extent are Vasili Kotov's views characteristic of those of the educated Soviet citizenry?

Possibly the answer to this query could be found right here in America. There are three groups of immigrants from Russia in this country: the large pre-1914 immigration, the much smaller group of the so-called White emigrees, and the vanguard of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons belonging to the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. The political attitude of the last group is sharply differentiated from that of the other two by its members' fierce hatred of the Stalin regime. These DP's are disgusted with the lukewarmness of even the former fighters of the White armies. It would seem that a detailed study of the experiences and views of these DP's by a group of cultural anthropologists might yield valuable results in making it possible to judge to what extent Kotov's views, as well as those of the DP's in general, are typical of those of the various sections of the Soviet population from which they come.

D. FEDOTOFF WHITE
Philadelphia, Pa.

DURANTY, WALTER. *Stalin & Co.* Pp. vi, 261. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949. $3.00.

Walter Duranty's newest book is subtitled *The Politburo—The Men Who Run Russia.* It is essentially a collection of biographical sketches of the ten members and three candidate-members who make up that august body. Given the meagerness of official Soviet records, Duranty's performance is something of a tour de force. He has made much out of very little. For the most part, his accounts are accurate and illuminating, though there are occasional slips, such as the reference to Andreyev as a party secretary, a position which he has not held for some time. Particularly valuable are the sections of the book devoted to some of the newer and less-known figures in the Politburo circle, such as Malenkov, Voznesensky, Beriya, Kosygin, Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Shvernik. Of necessity, however, the available information about them rarely extends beyond a formal listing of offices held and upward progress in the party and governmental hierarchy. Not even Duranty's skill can transcend the bareness of the record.

There is little point in criticizing this book for what it does not purport to be. One might wish that Duranty had undertaken a systematic analysis of the development of the Politburo against the background of the evolving power structure of the Communist Party. That he has not done, and the very brief sketch of earlier developments which he has provided is far from precise. His primary concern is with contemporary personages and their public careers.

The present Politburo, Duranty points out, is dominated by the loyal lieutenants

who rallied to Stalin's banner in his struggle against Left and Right opposition in the twenties and early thirties. Duranty sees Stalin as an all-powerful figure, and the team around him as a united and disciplined phalanx following his leadership. Talk of disunity within the Politburo is dismissed as without basis, and Duranty doubts that the problem of the succession to Stalin will precipitate any serious crisis. He expects power to pass to the Politburo as a collegiate body, although he also visualizes the possibility that any imminent prospect of war with the West may again lead to the concentration of supreme authority in the hands of a single man.

Underlying Duranty's speculations is a fundamental conviction that the Communist leadership has stabilized its position in Soviet society, that by and large it enjoys the confidence of the mass of non-party people, and that, over the long run at least, its policies will operate "against the perpetuation of dictatorship in general and of an individual dictator in particular."

These propositions may or may not be true. At the very best, they appear to be incapable of verification, and the role of force and terror in the Soviet system casts serious doubts on their validity. Despite his long residence in the Soviet Union, Duranty misconceives the nature and dynamics of totalitarianism. As a result, his observations about the inner life of the Politburo and his prognostications about the future need to be treated with more than a faint shade of reserve.

MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

MAUGERI, FRANCO. *From the Ashes of Disgrace*. Pp. viii, 376. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948. $4.00.

This book consists of Admiral Maugeri's own story of the part he played in World War II, first as a cruiser captain, then as head of the Italian Naval Intelligence Service, and, after the fall of Mussolini, as one of the leaders of the "Navy underground" in Rome.

Although he came into direct or near-direct contact with the leaders of Fascist Italy, his descriptions of Victor Emmanuel, Humbert, Mussolini, Ciano, Badoglio, and others, though interesting, shed no new light on the personalities of the principal actors in Italy's tragedy.

Maugeri discusses the policies of the democracies, their grand strategy, their military leaders, and their campaigns, but here again there is nothing new. Although he does not actually say it, the Admiral attempts to show that the Italian Navy was a well-trained and efficient fighting unity; that it was never engaged in battle; and that Mussolini was responsible for its not fighting the British Navy and achieving the mastery of the Mediterranean, which would, the author believes, have given the Axis victory.

If anyone ever doubted the valor and the audacity of the individual Italian sailor, he should read those pages—the most interesting in the book—in which the Admiral describes the exploits of the MAS against Allied shipping in the waters of Alexandria, Malta, and Luda Bay. On the other hand, the descriptions of the more important naval engagements in the Mediterranean, in some of which the author was a participant, are very disappointing. The reader cannot fail to perceive that Admiral Maugeri is not telling the whole story and that the British accounts are probably much nearer the reality.

Nobody will argue with the Admiral in his contention that Mussolini and his regime were mainly responsible for the Italian tragedy. But was not the military a part of that very regime? Did not the leaders of the Army and Navy, along with the Monarchy, subserviently obey the Duce for twenty years without a word of protest, only to become anti-Fascist when they saw that Italy was doomed to lose? Mr. Victor Rosen's excellent English makes pleasant reading; and we cannot help sympathizing with Admiral Maugeri in his brave and thankless task of defending the good name of the Navy he loves. But he has left much, too much, unsaid.

The book deserves wide reading, however. Out of its pages comes the warning that disgrace is the inevitable price that any free people will have to pay when it surrenders its liberties.

From the Ashes of Disgrace made a stir in Italy. Admiral Maugeri was forced to

resign as Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy for stating in this book that the British did not really need any spies in Italy during the war, because they, the British, had too many friends in the Italian Navy Ministry.

ATTILIO BOFFA

Los Angeles, California

RODNICK, DAVID. *Postwar Germans; an Anthropologist's Account.* Pp. xii, 233. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. $3.75.

This book, although in most essentials completed in 1946 and published in 1948, still reflects a very substantial number of the attitudes revealed in the ably reported interviews in which the book abounds.

In 1945 the reviewer was for a time in the part of Hesse from which the present book's source materials are drawn, and in 1947–48 he had a number of fairly close contacts with persons coming from the towns of Eschwege and Weilburg, the centers of Rodnick's field work. It is on the basis of this experience that belief in the accuracy of the recording is expressed.

Moreover, the accuracy extends beyond the first-person interview material. The chapters on "Parents and Children," "Husbands and Wives," and "Political Patternings" contain much competent description. Here again, relevance to the problems encountered in the Eschwege and Weilburg of today is clear.

This is not to say that full agreement, even at the descriptive level, can be stated. For example, the reviewer is quite skeptical of Rodnick's generalizations about the sex behavior of younger Germans. Pages 114, 115, and 116 contain a medley of half truths and downright misstatements for which no evidence of convincing type is offered. Here, in the reviewer's estimation, Rodnick was misled by informants who generalized far too freely on limited experience. Space is lacking to go into detailed criticism, but statements of this kind must not pass unchallenged: "In all classes, including the workers, a boy is expected to have a fiancée and sleep with her by the time he is 17" (p. 115). Even the disorganization of the Nazi and postwar periods brought with it no such general loosening of traditional morality as this. Granted, the reviewer is expressing only an opinion based on reasonable familiarity with German youth, and offers no evidence—but neither does Rodnick. For an earlier period, concerning which the reviewer has firsthand knowledge—reported in part in his book *German Youth: Bond or Free* (New York: Oxford, 1947) —he is prepared to assert that Rodnick's statements would not hold for more than one-third, at most, of adolescents.

These, however, are in some sense minor descriptive details. The basic exception which the reviewer takes lies at the level of interpretation, and here he must be outspoken. Eschwege and Weilburg are not typical of even Hessian Protestantism, let alone German Protestantism. At least three well-defined Protestant subregions can be isolated within Hesse itself, and of major regions the count would run to at least a dozen. The Protestantism of the Schwalm is not the Protestantism of Weilburg, and they both differ strikingly from, let us say, Silesian or northern Westphalian Protestantism. If Rodnick does not know these facts, he should know them. It is little short of amazing to read "an anthropologist's account" on the title page and then find this sort of loose terminology. Any careful anthropologist would think at least twice before lumping the Fort Totten and the Pine Ridge Sioux in one category; he would qualify in several important respects. Why is such caution thrown to the winds when dealing with the peoples of the Euro-American culture area? The same resort to facile speculation is characteristic of Margaret Mead, Geoffrey Gorer, and other anthrpologists when they talk about Americans and the like. As Alistair Cooke recently put it in a review of Gorer's book, "It makes you wonder about what they say about the Trobrianders."

Altogether apart from these strictures is an objection to the fundamental approach, which stems in large part from Kardiner. The early years of childhood, growth within the family, and what may in general be called pre-adolescent formative influences, cannot be made to account for the specifically "Protestant German" traits to which Rodnick points. With only slight adjust-

ments, what he says about "the world as a German child sees it" could be said about Swiss, English, Dutch, or Swedish children. The significant differences between the conduct of the nationalities just named root in factors that begin to exert their effect only after the child is well on the path toward adulthood. If this were not the case, to take a crucial example, the conduct of the German-speaking Swiss of Basel, removed by only the width of the Rhine from the German-speaking population of south Baden, would be utterly inexplicable: one, bitterly anti-Nazi; the other, belligerently pro-Nazi. Whence comes the contrast?

Those making use of Rodnick's study consequently must be very wary. Commendable in its evidence of industry and effort to gather pertinent facts, it falls far short of sound interpretation.

HOWARD BECKER
University of Wisconsin

JEWETT, A. C. *An American Engineer in Afghanistan; From the Letters and Notes of A. C. Jewett.* Edited by Marjorie Jewett Bell. Pp. xiii, 335. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948. $5.00.

One can be glad for every new piece of documentation on the work of Americans abroad. Such chronicles will do much to broaden the understanding necessary for the proper conduct of our affairs. Mr. Jewett was the first American allowed into the "forbidden country" since 1880. He served, apparently quite creditably, as chief engineer to the Amir from 1911 to 1919 to install a hydroelectric plant for Kabul.

Though one can suspect that the Afghanistan Government might prefer to have Americans base their relatively meager knowledge of this remote kingdom of Moslem culture on more recent observations, this very readable story will probably do more good than harm. For one thing, these well-edited letters and notes are generally useful, albeit somewhat picturesque and esoteric, in the present contemplation of any kind of "Point 4" program.

The original one-year assignment was finished after eight long and difficult years —"one cannot estimate time in the East." But this stretch of time makes the book more than picturesque; it becomes a fairly good sample of the interaction of peoples of different cultures and techniques. Some of the obstacles Mr. Jewett found are still with this strategic neighbor of Pakistan, Iran, and the U.S.S.R.—primitive agricultural methods and organization and inadequate communication, for example. Though his later notes have harsh verdicts on the Afghans—"on the whole lazy, ignorant, arrogant, and utterly vain"—possibly Jewett never quite made up his mind about the people or the country. He felt that Afghans of the upper class had no respect for the western "unbeliever," but could be good hosts; then he quotes an Afghan as saying, "A guest is a friend for three days."

This engineer, who was a keen observer, adds that the westerners who served and traded frequently dealt far from honestly with the Amir, and many dubious experts called themselves engineers—an observation which might recall the barb of another Afghan who said, "Once you have been bitten by a snake, you'll see a snake in every rope."

RICHARD H. HEINDEL
Washington, D. C.

ASIAN RELATIONS ORGANIZATION. *Asian Relations, Being the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March–April, 1947.* Pp. 314. New Delhi, India (Dist. in U. S. by Institute of Pacific Relations), 1949. $4.00.

The 243 delegates who attended the conference summoned by Premier Nehru represented virtually every Asiatic country. Although the delegates did not directly represent their governments, there was a strong official element which lent weight to the proceedings. The purpose was to discuss problems of common interest and discover how far Asian co-operation was possible.

The aim of India was also to acquire implicitly some form of leadership in Asia. It was therefore significant that the meet-

ing was boycotted as a maneuver of "Hindu imperialism" by Jinnah's Moslem League, which a few months later became the government of Pakistan. The small countries of southeast Asia and Ceylon favored in principle the creation of an Asian bloc. At the same time they emphasized their fear that European imperialism might be replaced by Indian or Chinese imperialism. They were afraid not so much of political control as of economic exploitation and mass immigration. The delegates from the Soviet Asiatic republics opposed any move towards the formation of a continental bloc. They also lost no opportunity to point out that the ideal solution for every problem was to be found in Russia.

The most important question discussed was the liberation of Asia from European control, and here there was complete agreement. The delegates agreed that the reimposition of colonial rule could not be tolerated, and that help should be given to those Asiatic peoples which had not yet gained their independence. There was considerable divergence of opinion between the Indonesians and Viet Namese who wanted armed help, and Nehru who favored moral support.

The delegates were very suspicious of foreign capital, and felt that political independence would be endangered unless it were accompanied by economic independence. At the same time the conference agreed that industrialization was by far the most important solution of the problem of how to raise the low standard of living. This could be accomplished only by means of large credits from the West, since the value of Asiatic exports was too small to pay for the capital equipment needed. No solution was evolved of how to borrow heavily abroad and yet prevent the foreign lenders from obtaining political influence. There was suspicion of American dollar imperialism as well as of European and Chinese capital.

The discussions revealed a fairly wide area of agreement and desire to act in concert. There was a strong sentiment for Asian unity, tempered by fear of Indian or Chinese dominance. One might perhaps hazard the conclusion that nationalism will make for division in Asia as it has done in Europe. Each country is determined to be independent, and this will set limits to the extent to which co-operation is possible.

LENNOX A. MILLS
University of Minnesota

SJAHRIR, SOETAN. *Out of Exile.* Translated by Charles Wolf, Jr. Pp. xxii, 265. New York: John Day Company, 1949. $3.00.

The keynote of this book is contained in the last sentence: "Our ultimate victory —the establishment of Indonesian freedom —is assured." The purpose of the writer was evidently to let the world know that Indonesian freedom was assured, regardless of the nature of the opposition. The substance of the story reveals the evolution of a most unusual revolutionary.

Sjahrir's imprisonment by the Dutch as a political prisoner was a calamity which he used as a stepping stone to new heights of understanding of himself, of his people, of the Dutch, of the Japanese, of world affairs, and of the meaning of life. He came out of prison with his goals clearly defined. He estimated his principal opponents, the Dutch, as follows: "There is no people in the world who employ the word 'balance' in their thinking and in their living as extensively as do the Dutch . . . and it is precisely in defending and maintaining that balance in the extreme that he himself goes astray and becomes 'unbalanced.'" And, "I know that little Holland is neither magnanimous nor kind, and perhaps it cannot allow itself to be. Everything the colonial government does takes place out of necessity, conceived from the point of view of pure self-interest." As World War II approached he wrote: "A real basis for co-operation between the Netherlands and Indonesia is going to arise, because the situation in the world at present is a threat not only to the Dutch realm, but to the independent future of Indonesia as well. It is now clear that we must take a stand in the same camp as Holland." Even while opposing the Dutch he never lost his feel of the unity of the world and the need for all nations to discover a basis for co-operation.

Of his people Sjahrir writes: "It was as though I were recalled to my people when I received the banishment sentence. . . . Now that my people require from me the dissolution and the destruction of my personal happiness . . . there remains only my deep feeling of . . . alliance to this downtrodden people of mine." He does not idealize his people. He describes their fear of spirits, their superstition that blinds them to reality. He says of their meditation which has been so praised in the West that "there are people here . . . who can sit for hours thinking about absolutely nothing; 'woolgathering,' as the West would call it." He says of the East's negation of life that it is "really only an adaptation that makes an unbearable life bearable." He characterizes the East's attributes, so admired by the westerner, as "those attributes molded and nourished only by the hierarchical relationship of a feudal society—a society in which . . . the vast majority live in squalor, and are made acquiescent by religion and philosophy in place of sufficient food."

Sjahrir goes on to make the astonishing assertion that the Indonesians are the "least conservative people in all of Asia, and consequently the most westernized of any eastern people, including the Japanese." He says that "western influence has penetrated into the masses, into the people's customs, and into the group imagination. . . . In the households of Indonesian regents, doctors, *wedanas,* clerks, and well-to-do merchants, the same sort of pattern is observed as in European households, and this does not apply only to the household itself, but to the habits and even to the meals as well. . . . It is an extremely important fact to note that we are now in the midst of our European period, as before we have had our Hindu, Chinese, and Arab periods." By coincidence, this reviewer has examined the degree of Islamization and the recent development of westernization in Indonesia and incorporated his findings in *Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religion.* He was more cautious in making generalizations and was reluctant to estimate westernized persons at more than 10 per cent of the population. It is understood that a trained observer will go from Yale University during the current year to study this same problem of westernization. The degree of westernization may be in dispute, but the fact cannot be. It is proceeding apace.

Sjahrir says his love for the West is because of its indestructible vitality, its love for life and for the fulfillment of life. He believes that Indonesia is acquiring this. "The younger generation rules, pushes ahead, and gives the old no time to realize what is actually taking place. Women who have themselves spent most of their lives in their houses without being seen by any strange male eyes seem to accustom themselves with remarkable ease to the habits of their bobbed-haired daughters who dance, bicycle, and have boy friends." "We intellectuals here are much closer to Europe or America than we are to the Boroboedoer or Mahabharata or to the primitive Islamic culture of Java and Sumatra. Which is our basis: the West, or the rudiments of feudal culture that are still to be found in our eastern society?" He believes it is the West.

Sjahrir is a student of the world and sees it globally. His pages are replete with mention of Kant, Hegel, Comte, Spencer, Mill, Russell, Eddington, Julian Huxley, and Ter Braak. He mentions the revolution in Spain even as he turns his attention to China's agonies. He has a remarkable faculty for speaking without hatred but with understanding of what is happening to others as well as to himself and his people.

The book closes with a description of the beginnings of the Republic of Indonesia. It probably provides westerners with the best insight into the Indonesia of today and hints at the sort of Indonesia which may be expected to evolve tomorrow.

KENNETH PERRY LANDON
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

DUBOIS, CORA. *Social Forces in Southeast Asia.* Pp. 78. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. $2.00.

This little book contains three interesting lectures given at Smith College by Dr.

Cora DuBois, chief of the Southern Areas Branch, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. She is an anthropologist who knows southeastern Asia well from many years of research, much of it spent within the area. The first chapter, "Some General Concepts," serves as excellent background for the two following chapters, but contains little of specific application to the region. Chapter II, which treats of "Some Factors Discernible in 1940," contains some interesting and significant interpretations. In the third chapter, which deals with the "Potentialities of these Factors," Dr. DuBois hazards some prognostications.

The volume is suggestive, and all persons interested in southeastern Asia will read it with pleasure and profit. Because of its brevity many important subjects are necessarily discussed only in bare outline, which is sometimes a bit annoying. Dr. DuBois is on the whole rather optimistic about future developments in the region, probably more than the facts warrant. Making an analogy with Europe, she suggests that the population of the region may increase sevenfold before it reaches stability; yet she ignores the depressing effect this must have on welfare and all phases of life. The economic factors receive the least satisfactory treatment, but these are the factors which will largely determine social and political developments. With China as an object lesson, the treatment might have been a little more realistic.

The Philippines do not receive as much attention as one might expect, and American policy and achievements in the islands are viewed rather uncritically.

AMRY VANDENBOSCH
University of Kentucky

JACOBY, ERICH H. *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia.* Pp. xiv, 287. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. $4.00.

This book deals with the agrarian situation in each of the six countries of southeastern Asia, giving a detailed analysis of the position of the peasants and farm laborers. As regards the Philippines, it is based on the author's own observations during four years' residence there, while for the other countries he relies on the work of other investigators. Mr. Jacoby shows that in many respects the position is fundamentally the same throughout the whole area, including the politically independent kingdom of Siam. Throughout southeastern Asia, between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of the population are engaged in agriculture. There is a high birth rate, and (apart from Siam) the death rate has been markedly lowered by such effects of western rule as medical and health services and the provision of a more assured food supply by irrigation works and the improvement of native agriculture. This has greatly increased the population, and in Java and parts of French Indo-China there is a serious problem of overpopulation. Simultaneously local handmade goods have to a large extent been replaced by imports of cheaper, machine-made manufactures, and the former native craftsmen have been forced to earn a living as farm laborers. The combined effect is greatly to increase the pressure on the land, since there is little manufacturing to provide alternative employment.

Cash crops have to some extent replaced subsistence farming, and this has destroyed the former immunity from the business cycle, since the standard of living of a considerable part of the peasants depends upon the world price of such exports as rubber, rice, and copra. Simultaneously a cash economy has replaced barter. Everywhere there is a very inadequate provision of farm credit at reasonable rates of interest, and of co-operative marketing organizations. The result has been to give something like an economic strangle hold to the Chinese and the Indians, who have the triple monopoly of village retail shopkeeping, produce buying, and money lending at excessive rates of interest. Particularly in the Philippines and French Indo-China, native landowners and usurers play a similar role; and there and in Burma a large number of the peasants have lost their land and become tenants or laborers. The general picture is that a static, agricultural society composed

of thousands of self-sufficient villages is disintegrating under the impact of economic forces introduced from the West.

LENNOX A. MILLS
University of Minnesota

SEN, GERTRUDE EMERSON. *The Pageant of India's History* (Vol. I). Pp. xii, 431. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1948. $4.50.

The title of this book indicates its focus perfectly: Mrs. Gertrude Emerson Sen has given us a glowing account of the colorful "pageant" of the long and rich history of India. In this beautifully illustrated volume she ranges from the Indus civilization of the third millenium B.C. down to the time of the Moslem invasions in the latter part of the first millenium A.D. In a volume scheduled to appear later on, she will carry the story down to our own times.

For the task indicated by her title the author is admirably equipped. After serving as an editor of *Asia* magazine in its heyday, she went out to India and wrote a moving account of village life in her *Voiceless India* (New York, 1930). She has since married an Indian scientist, Dr. B. Sen, and made India her home. A perceptive and sensitive observer, Mrs. Sen is also a gifted stylist, with an enviable capacity for vivid description. Readers of her book cannot fail to get some feeling for the fascinating story of India.

Mrs. Sen's talents, in fact, constitute the chief danger to the reader. For her writing is so full of life and movement that the reader may come to think of it as more than a gilded spectacle, as perhaps even an authentic and trustworthy history. And this it certainly is not. The India she describes is much too remarkable a place ever to have existed in fact. The high point of her book, for example, is a picture of India's "Golden Age of Civilization," the Gupta age of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. "In the whole contemporary world of Asia and Europe," Mrs. Sen tells us, "it ranked first in civilization and culture." Receiving "every possible encouragement" from the Gupta kings, all intellectual and artistic enterprise flourished. The social framework for this spiritual outpouring is depicted as nothing less than idyllic. "Indian craftsmen, with the simplest of tools, produced not only magnificent stone buildings but exquisite textiles, lovely jewelry, carved ivories and woodwork, metal utensils and a thousand other things. Skilled craftsmen held an honored place in a society whose aristocratic rulers were cultured, rich and indulgent. The rulers were immensely proud of the achievements of these simple Indian workmen, and many thousands were kept constantly employed on state works and in the production of all those articles of luxury which were avidly sought after. Children performed simple tasks under the watchful eyes of their elders. . . . The masons and carpenters and metalworkers and stoneworkers received not only excellent technical training but cultural training as well. They certainly acquired a thorough knowledge of religious symbolism, and were familiar with the epics and puranas and also with Buddhist and Jain lore."

This resplendent age of the Guptas, however, was celebrated for another aspect of its culture which Mrs. Sen neglects to emphasize, namely, its highly developed police and espionage network. That elaborate network, it would appear, included among its functions the controlling of an overworked and underpaid labor force. One wonders whether the laborers who hacked away the hundreds of thousands of tons of stone for the great Gupta monuments regarded the India of their day as a paradise or a prison.

In dozens of instances Mrs. Sen's uncritical adulation of things Indian has led her astray. Thus she finds it difficult to concede that the Aryan-speaking peoples, to whom Indian civilization owes so much, could really have originated *outside* of India and descended from the northwest down into the plains of upper India about 1500 B.C. Rather she would have us believe that "there are equally good arguments" to support the view, so much more palatable to ultranationalist Indians, that the Aryan-speaking peoples originally migrated outward *from* India. Similarly, she tells us that the basic script of ancient India was invented indigenously about 1000 B.C. by the Brahmans, whereas modern scholarship has shown that it is closely re-

lated to the Aramaic script of the eastern Mediterranean, from which, in all likelihood, it was taken over.

Mrs. Sen's book should be read and enjoyed for what it is, a delightfully embroidered "pageant" of India without blemish; those interested in finding out what actually happened in India's history would do well to look elsewhere.

DANIEL THORNER
University of Pennsylvania

SAKRAN, FRANK C. *Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights Versus Zionist Aspirations.* Pp. vii, 230. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948. $3.25.

The author, of Christian Arab parentage, a citizen of the United States for more than thirty years, has written this volume because of his feeling that "despite a flood of literature" on the subject of Palestine, "the Arab side has not been adequately presented" in the United States. This volume, in its attempt to fill in the gap, is divided into three essential parts: (1) the country and its people; (2) Palestine in history; and (3) the present muddle.

Many readers will have much sympathy with the author's contention as to the "Arab side" of the case, but it is to be doubted that Mr. Sakran has contributed weightily to a solution of the problem. For one thing, he could have summarized the earlier portions of his volume, dealing largely with ancient and medieval history, in much more convenient fashion. For another, a more scholarly treatment of the "secret treaties" of 1915–17, and of the problem of Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, could have been written on the basis of materials now readily available. The author appears somewhat more successful in his treatment of the interwar period, despite the generally polemical character of his work. Although his work was obviously prepared before the establishment of the new state of Israel, it is clear that the author is skeptical concerning any solution of the problem of Palestine, since he holds that a "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" under the United Nations Charter would have dictated another solution.

While the author has made a contribution to the Arab side of the story of Palestine, one lays down his volume with the distinct feeling that the time has not yet arrived for a more sober, objective, scholarly account of the many developments in the problem of Palestine in the period from 1917 to the establishment of Israel in 1948.

HARRY N. HOWARD
Arlington, Virginia

JONES, TOM B. *South America Rediscovered.* Pp. ix, 285. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. $4.00.

In contrast to the many new books on Latin America, this one written by a professor of history does not take into consideration the present and future situation of the other Americas. It offers a vivid and multilateral, often humorous, picture of Argentina and Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as seen during the years 1810 to 1870 by travelers like Humboldt, Darwin, and dozens of less-known writers, from North America, England, Spain, Germany, Sweden, and France (missionaries, merchants, scientists, government officials).

Not only do we get information about social and economic conditions, we become familiar with almost all sides of human activity regardless of race. The critical bibliography covering eighteen pages and about 250 publications in the various languages is probably the only one in the world.

Some of the great mass of interesting facts should be mentioned. In 1828, as explained by Sir Walter Scott: "The immense plains surrounding Buenos Aires are peopled by a sort of Christian savages called gauchos whose principal furniture is the skulls of dead horses, whose only food is raw beef and water, whose sole employment is to catch wild cattle . . . whose chief amusement is to ride wild horses to death. Unfortunately, they were found to prefer their independence to our cottons and muslins." Great advance was made possible "by enlightened Argentine statesmanship, European and North American technology, European immigration, and the investment of British capital." Most im-

pressive seems to me the chapter on Rio de Janeiro. It is amazing how much characteristic material has been concentrated in fifteen pages (180–195) to show "the impact of narrow streets, crowded with Negroes, black faces and savage songs, and an unintelligible babble of Portuguese and African dialects." On the other hand, many a traveler learned a great truth from a visit to Brazil about 120 years ago, namely, "Color was an accident affecting the surface of a man and having no more to do with his qualities than his clothes." The able selection by the author, his talent for evaluating and integrating the mass of observations—certainly of differing value—make the book a welcome source of information for all classes on Latin America.

ALFRED MANES
Bradley University

CORWIN, EDWARD S. *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948—History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion.* (Third ed.) Pp. xvii, 552. New York: New York University Press, 1948. $6.75.

In the third edition of his standard work on the Presidency, Professor Corwin has not only thoroughly revised the text and notes of the earlier edition, but he has added much new material as well. A brief summary of the changes made, chapter by chapter, will reveal the extent to which this is really a new book. (I am indebted to Professor J. Arthur Funston of Earlham College for assistance in analyzing some of the new material in this edition.)

Chapter I has a new section entitled "The Presidency Occulted—Congress Dominant," which is a combination of old and new material, and another new section dealing with "Emergence of the Twentieth Century Presidency." Included in the new material in Chapter II is a discussion of the Joint Resolution of March 24, 1947, proposing a constitutional amendment to restrict re-eligibility to the Presidency. Professor Corwin criticizes this proposal because the arguments against the second term are as potent as those against a third term when viewed in the light of the combined force of personality and power in the Presidential office. Professor Corwin tucks away in note 89 to Chapter VII his idea that perhaps an amendment to neutralize the Presidency by limiting tenure to one term might be wise. Included in Chapter II is also the treatment of the act of July 18, 1947, changing the order of succession to the Presidency. The author is likewise critical of this act on the ground that the Secretaries of State have been more able and more representative of the national viewpoint than have been the Speakers of the House. For vacancies occurring during the first half of the term, Professor Corwin suggests that Congress might provide for an election at the mid-term congressional elections.

In Chapter III the disloyalty orders and investigations, with their numerous ramifications, are discussed. The author defends their constitutionality but suggests that greater care might have been taken in the initial stages of the investigations to make certain that everyone would be treated with fairness.

Two aspects of the Executive office which were formerly treated as part of the function of Commander in Chief are now dealt with as part of the Executive power in Chapter IV. The topic of Presidential intervention in industrial disputes is also to be found in this chapter, and many readers will be interested to learn that in twenty-five instances Presidents have intervened in major industrial disputes without legal authority. The order of Chapters V and VI has been reversed. Professor Corwin draws heavily on the data of his *Total War and the Constitution* for the new material in the chapter on foreign relations. On page 263 the author seems to have succumbed to the general impression that Executive agreements and treaties are virtually interchangeable; but this reviewer feels that the Belmont decision is narrower than its opinion. Professor Corwin notes hopefully that Congress seems to be entering the foreign relations field as if to stay in it as a partner with the President.

Chapter VI on the Commander in Chief has been completely rewritten. One of the most interesting phases of the new matter in this chapter is the treatment of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's request to Congress that it repeal certain sections of

the Price Control Act, failing which he would act as if they had been repealed. The author believes this went beyond Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship" theory. This reviewer was interested in the conclusion that war does make the rules on delegation of power and on some civil rights somewhat more plastic than in time of peace.

"The Literary Sources of Presidential Leadership—Woodrow Wilson" in the earlier edition is missing in Chapter VII. Professor Corwin is not frightened by the trend towards Executive domination, as brought out in this chapter, provided that proper steps are taken to ensure responsibility. The author retains the core of his earlier suggestion that the Cabinet be modified to include congressional leaders.

This book in the third edition is a fine book made better. It fairly bristles with succinct statements of principles and points of view that are the product of a rich historical scholarship, of an analytical mind, and of a lively and constructive interest in life and politics of the society of which the Presidency is a part. Readers are the better served by the patient and careful work that Professor Corwin has put into this revision, and only those who have revised their own books can know how much more fun it is to write the first edition than the third edition. Arthur Krock has written a brief, appreciative Foreword to the edition.

OLIVER P. FIELD
Indiana University

HART, JAMES. *The American Presidency in Action: 1789.* Pp. xv, 256. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $4.00.

This is a very valuable study in the development of the executive powers of the President—the most difficult matter that came before the Federal Convention of 1787, according to the framers themselves. It is also a timely study, because in recent years the Supreme Court has been conferring such powers upon him as it thinks he needs in this totalitarian world by *implication* (*Myers* vs. *United States* 272 U.S. 52 [1926]) and by *the doctrine of inherent powers* (*United States* vs. *the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* 299 U.S. 304 [1936] and *United States* vs. *Belmont*). The author has chosen to see what light the history of the first administration can shed on this issue—when it was debated by contemporaries of the period of the adoption of the Constitution, some of whom participated in the drafting of the document.

The method used is practically to duplicate these debates by quoting the arguments pro and con made on the floor of the Congress, and to comment on these arguments. The author, of course, decides which of the arguments he feels are the most valid, usually favoring those which add to the President's powers. A tremendous amount of material is cited in both the body of the text and the footnotes. This is the chief value of the book for the critical student, because it makes it possible for the reader to make his own deductions from the sources. However, it largely sacrifices the author, because its abundance prevents a readable style and tends to make his comments an expression of the obvious. But it was either this or omit most of this material, because it could not all have been woven into a flowing style—such a style as was so characteristic of some of his Virginia predecessors. No doubt the author debated this matter and, from the point of view of the value of the book, made the right decision. By this it is not meant to reflect on the importance of the author's comments.

The first part of the book deals with some ceremonial questions involved in the first inauguration which had to be decided as means of procedure—such as whether a senator should sit with his hat on or stand bareheaded, or whether the wife of the vice president or of the speaker of the House could sit by the President and his lady—questions apparently of transcending importance in those days, but ones about which a Texas cowboy would not get excited.

The chief issue discussed is the President's removal power. It is exhaustively treated by quoting the material in a hair-splitting debate over the meaning of the Constitution on this matter. In this de-

bate four theories of the removal power were advanced: (1) The Impeachment Theory, (2) The President-Senate Theory, (3) The Legislature-Grant Theory, and (4) The Constitutional-Grant Theory. The author swears by James Madison on this issue and decides in favor of the Constitutional-Grant Theory.

Of course, swearing by "Little Jimmie," as he was called, is usually a rather safe proposition, but it is not always easy to harmonize his statements, and some Madisonian tenets need to be kept in mind. He was one of the most antistate and antilegislative members of the Federal Convention. He was convinced that the states would destroy the Union, a conclusion he reached from the study of previous confederations. He was afraid of legislative power. He wanted not only judicial review but a Council of Revision as a third house for both the states and the Congress—his famous refining process of legislation by repeated "filtrations." While he wanted the President as a member of the Council of Revision, the majority of its members were to be members of the Supreme Court. The council was really a collective form of the veto. Madison's idea was to strengthen the veto as a check on legislative power. He deplored the fact that the governors of the states were figureheads. In other words, he leaned toward executive power and would naturally be inclined to construe the Constitution in its favor.

C. PERRY PATTERSON
University of Texas

PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN. *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947.* Pp. xvi, 314. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $5.00.

Professor Pritchett has come into prominence in recent years as the author of several informative articles, appearing in various learned publications, which profess to calculate arithmetically the positions of the individual justices of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to particular decisions and with respect to each other. This book is an elaboration and continuation of these studies, and adopts as its title the useful if somewhat ambiguous description of the nation's highest tribunal, *The Roosevelt Court.*

The Roosevelt Court consists of ten chapters in 287 pages. Eight chapters, those from II to IX, deal exclusively with the examination of some 660 "nonunanimous" decisions that have marked the court's progress from 1937 to 1947. Chapter I provides a general orientation to the problem of what makes a court decision and is, quite rightly, entitled "At the Center of the Tornado," an expression that Professor Pritchett ascribes to Max Lerner but one that Lerner himself would gladly admit having borrowed from Justice Holmes. The final chapter, X, describes "The Plight of a Liberal Court" and while it represents a rather vigorous effort on the part of the author to answer some of the questions raised in the earlier nine chapters, it suffers from the obvious shortcomings that the use of the term "liberal" imposes upon it. The use of this much abused and never defined word is all the more surprising in this case in view of Professor Pritchett's expressed regard for the scientific spirit of Lord Kelvin that appears in the preface.

As a study of judicial voting behavior, replete with tables, graphs, and charts, *The Roosevelt Court* can certainly lay claim to general usefulness—at least for those who are interested in knowing how many times Justice Black voted with Justice Douglas. But there is a question in the mind of the reviewer whether a political scientist is not called upon to do more than measure. On page 251, for example, Professor Pritchett states: "In 1941, divisive forces of some kind hit the Court in full force." He then proceeds to analyze the split. But what of the "divisive forces"? On that question Professor Pritchett is silent.

Another major criticism of the volume under review is that the "scientific" measurement of judicial opinions answers only one part of the question of what happens in a given decision. Justices are important, but so is law. To devote one's attention to voting behavior without digging into the legal foundations of the discussion seems to this reviewer to be a breach of trust. "Nonunanimous" decisions did not begin

with the present court. English law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was marked by a similar state of inquiry and flux. Yet no one today would read the great case of *Millar* v. *Taylor* to see whether Yates agreed with Mansfield. A modern scholar would read it because that case is a landmark in the field of incorporeal possession and the currents of opinion there expressed are essential to an understanding of the growth of law.

For too many years lawyers have tried to sell the people on the idea that law was not politics. That dogma has been reversed with a vengeance. But there must come an equating somewhere. Perhaps that is the real challenge to political scientists who write and study in the field of law.

E. BURKE INLOW
Princeton University

HOFSTADTER, RICHARD. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It.* Pp. xi, 378, xviii. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. $4.00.

The author offers this reappraisal of our political tradition because he believes we tend to glorify our past without trying to understand it. Now particularly, when we feel overwhelmed by problems of big business and big government, we look nostalgically back to times when (we assume) there were leaders who had coherent programs of political and economic reform and fought valiantly to carry out their programs. Professor Hofstadter surveys critically the careers of representative leaders, from the Founding Fathers through Franklin Roosevelt, in order to show that most of them were far different from the romantic pictures usually painted for us. In one instance he undertakes to correct a current undervaluation of our past. He follows the late Charles A. Beard in praising the Constitutional Fathers for their "realism," "statesmanlike sense of moderation," and "scrupulously republican philosophy." He maintains that, since property was widely distributed in their time, it was natural and proper for them to design a government that would protect property rights and preserve a reasonable balance among opposed or differing property interests. After that, the author's main object is to dispraise those whom we currently praise, by showing that our more democratic leaders have generally failed to devise or execute programs suited to the conditions of their times.

Jefferson, Hofstadter maintains (again confirming Beard's estimate), talked of an agrarian democracy for America, yet did nothing to destroy the privileges of either the older landed aristocracy or the newer commercial aristocracy fostered by Hamilton. Jackson achieved only superficial or transitory reforms of the economic system he condemned. Lincoln resolutely attacked the slave system only when it became politically expedient to do so; he never believed in racial equality, and held onto orthodox economic views, advocating only mild reforms for the benefit of common white men. Cleveland remained essentially the "ideal bourgeois statesman . . . the taxpayer's dream." Theodore Roosevelt, assailing the evil deeds of rich men, did nothing to change the system that induced their malpractices. Wilson made only out-of-date efforts to restore small-scale competitive enterprise. Franklin Roosevelt, for all his "rhetoric" of planning, had no long-range economic vision, and let his New Deal end in "political bankruptcy."

Professor Hofstadter does find some virtues in these democratic leaders. Jefferson accomplished something for religious freedom and tried to advance popular education. Jackson destroyed the Bank and appointed Supreme Court justices who brought some progressive ideas into the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Lincoln tried to prevent the spread of slavery, risked war in order to save the Union, and spoke forcefully for the rights of small owners recently risen from a hired-labor status. Cleveland obtained tariff reductions, and Wilson established useful currency and credit controls. Franklin Roosevelt, daring and skillful in his humane opportunism, brought about some long overdue economic reforms.

None of these leaders, however, planned for the fundamental changes the times demanded. Although they talked of new ways of protecting human and community

rights, they concerned themselves chiefly with protecting property rights. All our major political controversies have been over competing claims to property; newer against older property owners, industrial owners against landed owners, small against large owners. All our outstanding leaders have believed that the community as a whole gains from this competitive pursuit of economic gain by individuals acting according to man's unchangeable nature. All have believed that it was the proper function of government to protect and promote this selfish competition, correcting its abuses but not enfeebling it by any plans "for common collective action." Thus the author's central theme is that we have been wrong in our traditional appraisals because we have not acknowledged that our leaders acted according to wrong assumptions about man and society, or because we have not understood that their assumptions were wrong.

Critical readers may want to question some of Professor Hofstadter's own assumptions. Is he right in believing that he upsets some popular, academic, or literary legend when he points out that Jefferson failed to follow a policy of "pure" democratic agrarianism, that Jackson had no program "to uproot property" and reconstruct society on "drastically different lines," that Wilson did not plan systematically for "the larger collective life ahead," and that Franklin Roosevelt "did not propose socialism"? How certain is he that drastic, uprooting reforms were desired or needed in Jackson's time, or some "pure" economic system in Jefferson's time, or in ours? And does the newer psychological and political knowledge he talks about show us that a republican philosophy and a sense of moderation ceased after the time of the Founding Fathers to be praiseworthy, realistic, statesmanlike traits?

However much Professor Hofstadter may overstate his thesis at many points, he sets it forth with a wealth of vivid and relevant illustration, making clearer some phases of our tradition that we may underemphasize. He has produced a scholarly, highly readable, and useful book.

FRANCIS W. COKER
Yale University

WALKER, HARVEY. *The Legislative Process: Lawmaking in the United States.* Pp. vii, 482. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948. $5.00.

During the past decade there has been a renewed interest in the legislative process, which constitutes so vital a part of the democratic process as a whole. During that period substantial improvement has been achieved at the national level under the terms of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, while among the states some improvements have already been made and many more may be expected. Under such circumstances it is most appropriate that authors and publishers are giving some attention to this field.

In 1934, Professor Walker published his *Lawmaking in the United States.* Much has happened in the meantime; although the present volume—says the author in his Preface—"follows the general outline of the earlier one, it is not so much a revised edition as a completely new book." This statement is substantially true. There were nineteen chapters in the old book as against twenty-two in the new. The number of pages is aproximately the same, although the new ones are larger and contain more text per page. A change of emphasis in the presentation of material has resulted in a different space allocation and grouping of chapters. The discussion of the constituent process has been reduced from five chapters to two, from 91 pages to 26, while the space given to public opinion and the outside influences which exert pressure upon legislators has been increased from two chapters to four, from 46 pages to nearly 100.

Space given to procedural questions is also about doubled; that given to organization, to the relations of the legislative branch to other branches of the government, and to legislation arising from other than normal legislative channels, remains about the same. A new chapter has been added on legislative research. Comparative data on numerous important questions are presented in sixteen tables, scattered throughout the book. A 9-page bibliography is broken down under chapter headings. Separate indices for names, political

jurisdictions, and subject matter are included. The general format and appearance of the book are attractive.

One who undertakes to prepare a general treatise of moderate size on American lawmaking is confronted by a task of enormous difficulty. Because of the general interest in the Congress, and because its documentary records are reasonably adequate and are generally available, there is a natural tendency to devote a disproportionate amount of space to it. The legislative records of the states are, with a few exceptions, generally inadequate and in many cases almost nonexistent, while diversity in organization and procedure makes generalization difficult if not actually hazardous. Add to all this the complications arising from great numbers of municipal councils and from a variety of types of subsidiary legislation, and you have a task the total magnitude of which is well-nigh appalling.

Professor Walker has succeeded admirably in overcoming the barriers inherent in the size and complexity of the assignment and the serious lack of special studies on many important problems at the state level. His own research on such subjects as the sources of legislation and executive-legislative relations has made his discussion of these subjects particularly interesting. The result is a volume which will be useful as a handbook for legislators and those who have to deal with the legislative branch, as well as for text purposes in university and college courses in legislation.

W. BROOKS GRAVES
The Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

GRAZIA, SEBASTIAN DE. *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie.* Pp. xx, 258. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. $4.00.

The term "anomie" is borrowed by Professor de Grazia from Durkheim, who uses it to describe a condition in which the norms which society imposes upon its members are shaken and they are left ruleless and distraught. Professor de Grazia amplifies this conception in the light of modern psychology and uses it to describe a state in which the individual, owing to the breakdown of common values, feels cut off and isolated, and is overcome by a sense of futility. His book is thus a study of the malaise of modern society. His procedure is, first, to bring out the importance of common ideals for social integration and to trace the means by which they are inculcated. The function of common ideals, whether these be religious or political, is, he shows, to bind the individual to his group and to give him reassurance in situations of helplessness. Following the psychoanalysts, he stresses the importance of the years of infancy in shaping the patterns of these beliefs, and argues with many illustrations that adult ideologies closely follow these early patterns.

When common ideals are disturbed, "anomie" results. Professor de Grazia distinguishes two kinds of "anomie," simple and acute. What he calls "simple anomie" results when there is a conflict between ideologies. In its application to modern culture, simple anomie is traced mainly to two forms of conflict. In the first place there is the conflict between the rules urging love and co-operativeness rooted in the teaching of Christianity, and the norms of struggle and competitiveness inherent in the economic structure of modern society. In the second place there is the conflict between the rules stressing the importance of energy and initiative associated in particular with the Protestant mentality, and the rules which inculcate gentleness and quietism more closely associated with the Catholic mode of life. As a result of these conflicts the individual has no assured guidance, especially in moments of crisis. Being apprehensive, he seeks relief in anything that will make him feel at home in the world and provide opportunity for union with his fellow men. Hence the proliferation of associations and the eagerness to join them. Hence also the predisposition to war, which for many individuals is an escape from the intolerable sense of responsibility, and provides the opportunity of feeling themselves at one with others in a common cause.

While simple anomie results from the conflict between ideologies, acute anomie arises when there is a conflict within an

ideology, and in particular when people lose faith in their rulers. Left rulerless, the individual is in the grip of anxiety; and this is revealed on the one hand in the wide prevalence of mental disorders, and on the other in mass movements characterized by an abnegation of personality and a search for a leader who is credited with the power of resolving all conflicts.

The range of the book is very wide. This is not altogether a merit, for it makes for a certain vagueness of treatment. The illustrations are drawn from the vast fields of ethnology, history, and records of contemporary societies. Without preliminary classification and attention to differences of level, the illustrations lose much of their force. The linking of the anomie of the adult with the separation-anxiety of the infant is, to take one example, no doubt an interesting hypothesis, but it is difficult to see how this hypothesis can be tested without a comparative study of the relation between the different modes of bringing up children and the norms which influence adult behavior which we find in different societies. In general, the discussion of the problem of the moral malaise of our time is hindered by the method of choosing illustrations at random from the whole history of mankind. Nor does our author face the question of the nature of the common ideals which would be necessary to restore equilibrium. He disarms criticism somewhat by saying that he is concerned only to elicit the causes of anomie and to show its debilitating effects. Nevertheless, a plea for the restoration of a common faith in ideals is likely to be ineffective without some indication of the direction in which this common faith is to be sought.

MORRIS GINSBERG
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and Political Science

GODSHALL, W. LEON (Ed.). *Principles and Functions of Government in the United States*. Pp. xxxiii, 1121. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1948. $5.00.

Professor Godshall and his associates have added another volume to the list of texts for the basic college course in American government. Thirteen of the fifteen contributors are university professors; the remaining two are Dr. John B. Bennett of the Department of the Interior and Dr. W. Brooke Graves of the Library of Congress. They are all well known in the particular field of their contribution.

In recent years much stress has been placed on the National Government with the result that frequently state and local governments have been slighted. The authors of this volume have steered a middle course, but they have attempted to show that all levels of government are integrated in many respects and are dependent one upon the other. Stress is placed upon the fundamental principles of American government and the volume is so organized as to point up these principles. The nine major divisions are: Foundations, Fundamental Principles, Instruments of Political Power, The National Administration, National Functions, The States in the Nation, State Government, Local Government, and the Conclusion; this last presents a summation of the American Philosophy of Government.

The authors place a list of pertinent cases at the end of appropriate chapters and there is a table of cases in the back of the volume. Another device of value to the student is the pages, found at the end of the first chapter, devoted to a concise review of the primary and secondary materials available to the student of American government. Also available for ready reference in the appendix are such basic documents as the Constitution of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, and the Charter of the United Nations.

Like most of the other texts in the field, the volume is overgrown. In most of our colleges today the introductory course in American government is taught at a rapid pace. The student is expected to grasp a bewildering assortment of odds and ends and to assimilate them quickly. A very helpful textbook would be one which would be complete and yet omit all extraneous material. Leisurely and careful consideration of a subject is often frowned on in undergraduate circles these days.

STUART A. MACCORKLE
University of Texas

ERNST, MORRIS L., and DAVID LOTH. *The People Know Best: The Ballots vs. the Polls.* Pp. 169. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949. $2.50.

Before the 1948 pre-election utterances of the leading "molders and guagers" of public opinion can grow cold, Ernst and Loth have performed the worth-while task of conducting an autopsy—and drawing a moral therefrom. The rationalizations and forecasts of reporters, editorial writers, columnists, radio commentators, and pollsters are excised and examined. The moral is that since the press seems clearly to have lost touch with the people, popular support for that much abused principle, "freedom of the press," is in jeopardy. Why should the public worry about maintaining freedom for a press which provides so faulty a mirror?

Centralized wire services, syndicated pundits, opinionated owners, and "scientific" opinion polls are shown to have inserted themselves between the working journalist and the "pulse of the public." As Ernst and Loth see it, specialization of labor, indolence, and fear of being wrong—wrong alone or wrong in the wrong direction—led to mass abdication of prerogatives by the traditional pulse takers in favor of the pollsters. It was a consummate case of "Let George (or Elmo or Archibald) do it!" And so they were all wrong together. The members of the working press now seem to be agreed that they were wrong because George and Elmo and Archibald were wrong. But precisely why the Big Three Pollsters were wrong is a problem over which much wrangling will yet be heard.

The authors hope that "the greatest upset in political history" will have a chastening effect upon all who were upset. They also hope that the public will have learned to "cultivate a healthy sense of doubt" and will "beware of prophets." But they note, as many of us have noted, that "already the pontifical tone is back." After all, a prize fighter doesn't quit the ring just because he has lost a fight. Why should a pundit—or pollster? In putting this timely little case study on their shelves, social scientists might well place it between the Commission on Freedom of the Press's *A Free and Responsible Press* on one side, and Gallup's *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls* on the other.

The book is appropriately dedicated to "Harry S. Truman, our favorite pollster."

ROBERT COBB MYERS
Educational Testing Service
Princeton, New Jersey

ROGERS, LINDSAY. *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership.* Pp. xi, 239. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. $2.75.

On the surface this book appears to be a polemic against the pomposities, absurdities, and *argumenta ad hominem* of Pollster Gallup and his "academic acolytes." But underneath it all runs such a tone of rancor and bitterness against all social science that one is surprised to see it issued under the imprimatur of Knopf rather than, say, Sheed & Ward. The author's main thesis boils down to this: Since Gallup and his cronies do not seem to know what they are trying to measure, and are significantly bereft of even a basic sense of social responsibility, it is high time that all social scientists execute a general abjuration and admit that they themselves are, after all, nothing but social *philosophers*—and rather naive ones at that. This argument is a vicious *non sequitur;* but one with which social scientists will have to deal, and for which they are partially to blame.

The author is a lawyer of the old school, and has liberally dipped into his Columbia University lectures in public and constitutional law to pack his book with quotations from such worthies as Dean Swift, James Mill, Disraeli, Shakespeare, Hume, Alexander Hamilton, Bernard Shaw, Hobbes, Carlyle, Aristotle, Edmund Burke, and Lord Bryce. He is by no means equally conversant with the writings of twentieth century sociologists and psychologists. Whether he has limited himself in this way because his main protagonist is George Gallup, or because of ignorance, is not made clear.

Unlike the recent Ernst & Loth philippic, this book was prepared for publication prior to the 1948 Presidential election. However, Rogers has been able to insert

some diatribes concerning the farcical performance of Gallup, Roper, and Crossley last November, as well as a brief mention of the December release of the hastily assembled SSRC Committee on Analysis of Pre-Election Polls and Forecasts.

This reviewer finds himself congenial to Rogers' warning that pollsters should not be permitted to reach the position of a Metternich, to which at least one of them has seemed to aspire. But that the failings of Gallup should be used to tar and discredit all the work of such men as Likert, Link, Katz, Clyde Hart, Lazarsfeld, Stouffer, and Merton is mischievous and inexcusable. There are many conscientious workers in the vineyard of attitude and opinion research who are fully aware that they are not measuring *Stimmung* and no more than a small part of *Haltung,* and who are content to push their research forward slowly, cautiously, and openly in the fashion of scientists.

The Pollsters is an excellent title; it is too bad that it could not have been used on a better book.

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Princeton, N. J.

CAIRNS, HUNTINGTON. *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel.* Pp. xv, 583. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. $7.50.

This book summarizes the legal philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Because Mr. Cairns holds, quite soundly, that modern jurisprudence "is a prolongation ('extension') of the great philosophical systems," he has summarized the "general philosophy" as well as the legal philosophy of each of his subjects; and he has added discussions of legal problems (e.g. administration, and interpretation of statutes) which, though treated in a practical, rather than in a jurisprudential, manner are nonetheless helpful supplements to the philosophical discussions. The book is one that has long been needed. It will be a helpful guide to students of legal and political philosophy; and it will aid future writing in the field by providing an example of specific accomplishment, bibliographies, and highly suggestive, critical comments.

It would be no service to Mr. Cairns, however, nor the discharge of a reviewer's obligation to pass over the serious shortcomings of the book. The principal deficiency results from the fact that Mr. Cairns does not articulate his own legal philosophy and does not use it in interpreting the philosophers whose theories he summarizes. The book lacks pointed discussion, continuity, and significance for the reason indicated. It is possible to achieve the desired result even though an author does not articulate his own perspective and use it as the analytic organon, if he formulates and emphasizes the perennial issues of jurisprudence throughout his work. There certainly are such problems; and in the usual fashion of text writers, Mr. Cairns has discussed some of them, but only in the context of each of the philosophers examined.

Beyond this general shortcoming, there are many features of the book which will trouble the professional reader. Because Mr. Cairns chooses to cover a very great area of philosophic thought, he has spread himself very thin; and he makes questionable and, sometimes, definitely invalid assertions. This may be indicated if we attend briefly to Mr. Cairns' chapter on Plato—the first philosopher discussed. Mr. Cairns emphasizes the *Minos* and it is evident from his later remarks that he identifies the core of Plato's theory of the nature of positive law with that dialogue. But the fact is that the *Minos* represents a marginal point in Plato's thought. I do not have in mind its controversial status as a Platonic Dialogue nor, especially, its relatively late appearance but, instead, the fact that, except for two or three scattered remarks of like tenor, especially in the *Laws* and the questionable *Greater Hippias,* it cannot be shown that Plato regarded "virtue" as an essential element of positive law. His preference is assuredly in that direction; but to miscast that into the position actually achieved by the later Stoics is surely a carelessness of the first order. E.g., it leads Mr. Cairns to assert

that "there are no elements in St. Thomas' definition of law which were not insisted on by Plato." Apart from the invalid imbalance of interpretation that results, the major effect is that the book lacks significance because the above and other perennial problems of legal philosophy are neither clearly apprehended nor discussed with a realistic interpretation of the progressive stages of their development.

A final point deserves notice. In recent philosophical writing, there has been considerable reliance on history as a tool to aid analysis, e.g., Lovejoy and Russell. The results have been uncertain, and there has undoubtedly been more promise than performance. But it is nonetheless evident that the traditional stringing together of ideas culled from the philosophers is greatly suspect if it is not definitely in the discard. There is no mention, e.g., of Jaeger in Mr. Cairns' book; and one must certainly believe at this stage in the history of philosophy that at least some reference to the contemporary situation, to the problems pressing for solution, and to the particular milieu of the philosophers discussed would have added much significance to the work. But our last word must be to express appreciation for an important contribution to the literature of jurisprudence.

JEROME HALL
Indiana University School of Law

ROWE, WILLIAM HUTCHINSON. *The Maritime History of Maine.* Pp. 333. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948. $6.00.

"Along the Maine coast," Mr. Rowe tells us, "people are born with salt in their blood. From Kittery on the Piscataqua to Calais on the St. Croix, twenty-five hundred miles of shore line and tidewater have been the scene of shipbuilding and seafairing for more than three centuries." To the task of writing a history of this seacoast Mr. Rowe has brought a lifetime of research, study, and writing. His previously published *Shipbuilding Days in Old North Yarmouth,* and *Shipbuilding Days in Casco Bay* dealt with particular segments of this larger area to which he has now turned. His work as secretary of the Maine Historical Society has given him additional recognition.

The first chapter of this book provides a historical and geological discussion of the Maine coastline. The next three survey the earliest Maine fisheries, the mast camps that sought timbers for the Royal Navy, and shipbuilding in colonial days. Here, for example, are such brief but interesting quotations from the sources as the following extract from Samuel Sewall's journal:

"Ride into a swamp to see a mast drawn of about twenty-six inches or twenty-eight; about two and thirty oxen before, and about four yoke by the side of the mast between the fore and hinder wheels. 'Twas a notable sight."

Or this observation from a Boston newspaper of 1727:

"Captain Farles in one of the mast ships now lays at Casco Bay, who we hear, is not a little pleased with the commodiousness of that fine harbor to carry on said business. And as this must tend very much to encourage settlements in those parts of the country, especially the flourishing bay that will be the center of it; so there is no reason to fear that our government will in their wisdom, look upon it very much to their interest to protect and encourage it."

Other chapters deal with particular periods of time or with types of commerce. Here is a discussion of the years of war, from 1775 to 1815; of the West Indies trade and of the growth of large shipyards along the Maine coast; of the colorful State of Maine Clippers and of the destruction of much of the "Maine fleet" by Confederate cruisers. Here also are discussions of the more prosaic "lumber and lime, ice and granite" commerce, and an appraisal and description of the Maine seacoast in the present generation.

"Even now in the quiet villages and towns of the Midwest and West to which Maine-bred people have scattered there are men and women who have . . . 'salt in their blood.' Although the wharves have crumbled and the building yards are grass-grown, although the ships, barks, brigs, and even the great schooners are now to be seen only in pictures and their captains sleep on the hill overlooking the ocean

they loved so well, they have the sea woven into the fabric of their lives."

This volume is well illustrated with maps, photographs, and charts. It also contains several photostats of unusual source material. There is a good index, an appendix, and a bibliography that testifies to the scholarship of the author. The style is clear and direct. This is a book that will prove interesting to the general reader and rewarding to the specialist. A rich and interesting segment of Americana has met an author worthy of his subject.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
Cortland State Teachers College

OSTERWEIS, ROLLIN G. *Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South.* Pp. x, 275. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. $3.75.

In this book the author seeks by an exhaustive accumulation of evidence, mostly literary, to show that there was a causal relation between ante bellum love for romantic prose and poetry and romantic conduct (as in the duel), and the spirit of southern nationalism. He insists not once but many times that the ante bellum South sat on a three-legged stool, two legs of which were the plantation system and the slavery system, and the third leg of which his monograph supplies. He notes the diversification of romanticisms and rightly sees that there was no uniform "South" but a series of regions, in each of which the formula of "romanticism" worked out according to local needs and factors. He has read widely, and supports his thesis with extensive citations from books, southern magazines, diaries, journals, orations, and the like.

One may grant that "romanticism," both of the Byron-Scott-Bulwer order and of that more sentimental type represented by Tom Moore and Felicia Hemans, had its appeal to the South (as it did to the North, for that matter), and find with Dr. Osterweis that parallels between the imaginative revival of medievalism and the quasi-feudal institution of slavery are an attractive theme. Mr. Osterweis' enthusiasm, however, carries him a little beyond the modesty of nature. It is difficult, for example, to square his picture of a clan society looking up to its overlords with the facts about desertion from the Confederate army in Miss Lonn's classical study; or to make "romanticism" include revival meetings in the piney woods; or to overlook the constant complaint of southern writers and editors that the South would not support them; or to ignore the small circulation and short life of the ante bellum magazine in the Old South. Mr. Osterweis tends to assume that the reading habits and cultural tastes of a small upper class were either so nearly shared by, or so attractive to, the great mass of rural southerners—whose libraries were often confined to the Bible and two or three other books—as to enable him to generalize for the whole region from the habits of a small minority. That "romanticism" had much to do with the habits of the Scotch-Irish in the valley of Virginia or the Carolinas seems to me open to question. But if one allows for the pardonable enthusiasm of the monograph writer, his book is a suggestive, if mildly repetitious, study.

HOWARD MUMFORD JONES
Harvard University

KIRKLAND, EDWARD CHASE. *Men, Cities and Transportation: A Study in New England History, 1820–1900.* Vol. I, pp. xvi, 528; Vol. II, pp. ix, 499. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. $12.50.

This is the definitive history of transportation in New England from 1820 to 1900. It covers turnpikes, canals, steamboats, coastwise shipping, and railroads, but most attention is given to railroads. The study has the virtues of breadth of view and exactness of detail.

By the early 1850's "Massachusetts had one mile of railroad for every seven square miles of her area; New York only one for every twenty-eight, Ohio one for fifty-eight" (I, 285). State by state Professor Kirkland gives a fairly detailed account of the building and growth of the principal New England railroads and of their eventual incorporation into the three main systems that dominated that region by 1900. These were the Boston and Albany leased to the New York Central, the Boston and

Maine, and the New York, New Haven and Hartford. He also approaches railroading from other viewpoints, devoting separate chapters to railroad commissions and regulations, to safety and the many technical improvements in railroading, to the financial aspects of railroad promotion and operation including much that will interest students of corporations, to railroad labor problems, to the internal organization of railroad companies, and lastly to a study of the background and professions of a hundred outstanding railroad leaders. There are 44 well-chosen illustrations and nine maps. This reviewer, although reasonably familiar with New England geography, would have found more maps a considerable help in following the growth of rail lines. The book is painstakingly footnoted, indicating a tremendous amount of reading in company and commission reports, but there is no bibliography. Professor Kirkland's reason for this omission is not convincing. Many of the scholars who will consult this monumental work will be looking for a bibliography. The index likewise leaves something to be desired: it covers names fully, but not ideas. For example, state aid, municipal aid, natural monopoly, and "dowager" roads are all frequently discussed but do not appear in the index. But this is far more than a reference work, for Professor Kirkland writes well and turns many a memorable phrase. Railroad enthusiasts, economic and business historians, and transportation specialists will find it enjoyable as well as valuable reading.

In the early days, promoters of trunk lines spoke in terms of reaching western markets and competing with rival ports like New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Since upstate New York lies between Boston and the west, Boston was at a disadvantage in such a race. In 1841 the road now known as the Boston and Albany reached the east bank of the Hudson but it was always at the mercy of the later New York Central. The same was true of the parallel Hoosac tunnel route. Boston made another attempt to reach the west directly north through Vermont and Canada, but it was a dismal failure. And farther east, Portland, Maine, with a fine harbor and ambitions of outstripping Boston, took a keen interest in building two other lines, the shaky Portland and Ogdensburg (via New Hampshire and Vermont) and the Grand Trunk (via upstate Maine) to Montreal and Detroit. The latter's lack of local business and its hunger for through freight kept New England rate schedules to the west unstable for decades. Railroads that were built presumably to serve the merchants of particular port cities soon devoted their energies to carrying anyone's freight as long as it earned profit for the owners. Professor Kirkland emphasizes this lesson repeatedly.

Waste and corruption, exploiting of government aid from states and municipalities, overbuilding and stock watering were just as prevalent in New England in the mid-nineteenth century as they were shortly after on the transcontinental lines. The book abounds in cases of this sort with ensuing cutthroat competition leading to pooling agreements, consolidations, or receiverships. After the Civil War, Massachusetts had an efficient railroad commission headed by Charles Francis Adams, who soon recognized that railroads were natural monopolies.

The decline in freight rates was probably the outstanding accomplishment of railroads in the nineteenth century. In 1865 the cost of shipping 100 pounds of grain from Chicago to New York varied from $1.60 to 62½ cents, whereas in 1895 the price varied from 20 to 15 cents (I, 502). As early as 1876 the Massachusetts commission said, "The community has been so accustomed to hearing the cry for cheap transportation of Western produce raised that it fails to realize how much cheapness has been secured." New England did not have a granger movement.

It would be highly desirable if investigations similar to this could be made for other sections of the country. A better model than Professor Kirkland's study could hardly be found.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

SHATTUCK, LEMUEL, and others. *Report of the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts 1850.* Facsimile edition. Pp.

ix, 321. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. $4.50.

Since this book was written (next year marks the hundredth anniversary of its first publication) the average length of life in this country has been increased more than one-half—from forty to sixty-five years. Much of this increased life expectancy is due to technological improvement in the environment. Today we are faced with the staggering problems of adapting social institutions, built on a young man's world, to an aging population—as a result of application of principles laid down by Lemuel Shattuck in this book.

Massachusetts does well to honor his memory and Harvard to preserve this classic of social progress. The recognition by a great university of one with only an elementary education in the formal sense pays double tribute. In a broader sense however both are products of a culture which laid the firm foundation of the public health movement at its best in this country. Much of the interest in the book today lies in the vividness with which it reveals this culture.

Shattuck's credo was simple: ". . . the condition of perfect *public health* requires such laws and regulations as will secure to man associated in society, the same sanitary enjoyments that he would have as an isolated individual; and as will protect him from injury from any influences connected with his locality, his dwelling-house, his occupation, or those of his associates or neighbors, or from any other social causes . . . it will be infinitely more valuable to the whole people, to teach them how to prevent disease, and to live without being sick."

To bring about the desired results Shattuck made fifty specific practical recommendations. Of these, thirty-six have proved their soundness by practical application to public health. Experience has shown only four to be unimportant or perhaps in some degree unsound. Ten remain to be fulfilled because their importance has not yet been fully realized; they still offer a challenge to the public health profession today.

This program laid a sound basis for the development of health administration, vital statistics, sanitation, and the control of food and drugs. It provided for the social services of maternal and child health, and school health. Obviously it could not foresee the germ theory of disease and the technical laboratory services we have today, nor the immunization programs which now loom so large in public health. It is the more astounding that so firm a framework of a general program of public health could have been erected before the development of sanitary *science*.

WILLIAM F. WELLS
University of Pennsylvania

SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR M. *Paths to the Present*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. $3.00.

Book markets in the United States have been flooded in recent times with books on the reactions of distinguished foreigners to the contemporary American scene. These reactions have ranged from the superficialities of a British novelist after a three-weeks tour, through the anthropological researches of Geoffrey Gorer, to the real insight of Professor Denis Brogan. But these men, no matter how penetrating their observations, must still look at the United States from the outside, and consequently it is doubly interesting to read the impressions of Arthur M. Schlesinger, who is not only an American but a professional historian of national reputation.

Mr. Schlesinger's book, *Paths to the Present*, is a collection of essays, most of which have previously appeared in various learned journals. The subjects of these brief expositions cover many aspects of the American scene, but as the title of the book indicates, they are designed not only to describe different phases of contemporary America but also to explain the basis in the past for these twentieth-century situations. Here, indeed, lies the great merit of the essays, for they serve to emphasize those elements of our history which have made today what it is. Mr. Schlesinger pays due heed to the effect of the frontier, but he also stresses the counteracting weight of the city, and the constant influence of western European culture, rooted in the heritage of the first colonial

settlers and repeatedly refreshed by immigrants, who gave to their new country as much as they received from it.

Rich though they are in illustrative detail, the essays are not mere accumulations of factual materials. Mr. Schlesinger shows certain of his beliefs clearly: a support of New Deal policy, an advocacy of the obligation of the United States to assume a position of responsibility in world affairs, and a confidence in the democratic future of this country. The essays vary, of course, in quality. It is perhaps to be expected that the most entertaining, "Casting the National Horoscope," is of the least fundamental significance. Many of the others are expositions of material already familiar to professional historians, such as the fallacy of "isolationism" as an explanation of American foreign policy. But even when they cover familiar ground, the essays are well organized, clearly written, and thought provoking, so that they provide food for reflection not only for historians but for general readers who are interested in the past and the future of the United States.

DOROTHY CULP
University of Connecticut

EMERSON, RUPERT, LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN, E. L. BARTLETT, GEORGE H. MCLANE, and ROY E. JAMES. *America's Pacific Dependencies*. Pp. 134. New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949. $1.50.

Each of the dependencies—Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territory—is described in a separate chapter, which deals with its administration, its racial, political, and economic situation, and, for Hawaii and Alaska, the agitation for admission to statehood. George H. McLane, who writes the chapter on Hawaii, argues that its half-dozen races have fused by intermarriage and have accepted the American way of life. Guam, Samoa, and the Trust Territory (the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands) are administered by naval officers who are responsible to the Navy Department. The first two dependencies have legislatures with advisory powers, but otherwise the people have little share in the government. The Guamanians, though apparently not the Samoans, are dissatisfied with the present regime; and the author, Roy E. James, considers that both of them, as well as the Trust Territory, should be placed under civilian rule.

Mr. James also writes with firsthand knowledge of the conflict in Washington between those who wanted to annex outright the former Japanese islands and those who wished to make them a trust territory under the United Nations. The resultant compromise was a strategic trusteeship which gave the United States such comprehensive powers that it came close to annexation. Mr. James believes that "the Navy is doing a creditable job of island administration."

Professors Emerson and Finkelstein deal with the more general aspects of American colonial policy. They are not happy about the strategic trusteeship and the retention of naval rule in the Pacific dependencies. They point out that the latter is in sharp contrast with the American policy of supporting native self-government in, e.g., Indonesia. Not that Professor Emerson believes that this means democracy: he rather expects the contrary for a time. In the long run, however, he believes that the result will justify American idealism. Both he and Professor Finkelstein condemn the American policy of a compulsory open door which would apply only to the tropics and not to the industrialized nations to which they sell their exports. Professor Finkelstein also points out that while the United States demands equal commercial opportunities in the colonies of other powers, it follows a policy of imperial preference in its own dependencies. Altogether, this a valuable and thought-provoking book.

LENNOX A. MILLS
University of Minnesota

MORGAN, THEODORE. *Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 1778–1876*. Pp. xi, 260. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. $4.00.

This survey of the Hawaiian Islands unfolds a panorama of change from the first contact made by Captain Cook in 1778 until 1876 when the Reciprocity Treaty with

the United States was signed. In this century came a transformation from a feudal regime with a subsistence economy to one organized on an alien model for trade and gain.

For seven years after Cook's expedition the Islands were unvisited, but then exposure to Western civilization began in earnest. The coming of fur traders for provisions and the sandalwood trade with China brought the first disruptive influences into the native economy. Then came the whaling ships for safe anchorage, repairs, and supplies. The whalers provided an unstable, seasonal stimulus. Carpenters and blacksmiths were kept busy at certain seasons. Demand for vegetables and meat stimulated their production. The whaling trade, nevertheless, was disorganizing through the diversion of labor and agricultural resources from production for the people's own needs producing goods for irregular sale to visiting whalers. Contact with the whalers also brought in disruptive points of view and habits. The New England missionaries were a potent influence in directing the social and economic transformation of the Islands by placing checks on many disorganizing and demoralizing practices of the traders. The California Gold Rush brought a brief but spectacular boom to agriculture and merchandising. Then several small industries—coffee, cotton, rice—came in. Gradually sugar growing developed and, after the Reciprocity Treaty, boomed into the position of dominance. This introduced the plantation system, with its paternalistic management and several other characteristics of a feudal order.

By 1876 the white merchants, missionaries, and planters had reformed the Islands' economic structure until there was practically no remaining trace of the past. Hawaii had become tightly bound into the expanding commercial network of the world, and the future of Hawaii was inextricably bound up with the future of the plantation system.

Hawaii's story is typical of the development of plantation economies as European nations have expanded and reached out into native societies. Because of Hawaii's limited area, however, the transformation there has been more rapid and thorough than in most areas.

Although this history is limited to one strand—the economic—it gives a good picture of the transformation of Hawaii, a better one than is given by the usual political history.

WILLIAM C. SMITH
Linfield College

MCLEAN, JOSEPH E. (Ed.). *The Public Service and University Education.* Pp. vi, 246. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. $3.75.

This is a collection of the principal papers presented at the Princeton Bicentennial Conference on University Education and the Public Service in November 1946. The writers are a distinguished group of public officials and educators. Two of them, Sir James Grigg and E. L. Woodward, are British, representing respectively the Civil Service and Oxford University. James Forrestal, H. Struve Hensel, and Robert A. Lovett were the politically appointed leaders of major Federal departments. George F. Kennan, Selden Chapin, and Donald C. Stone represent the foreign and domestic career service of the United States. John Gaus of Harvard, Frederick S. Dunn of Yale, Roland Egger of Virginia, Paul Appleby of Syracuse, Arthur Flemming of Ohio Wesleyan, and Patterson H. French of the Bureau of the Budget all represent the ready interchange between government and university which has characterized the past two decades.

The papers are concerned primarily with developing further the Federal career service, with defining the kinds of abilities which that service requires, and with suggesting the type of educational experience which will best develop those abilities. Discussion of a career service, now that the specter of the spoils system is fading, advances here to the problem of providing a career opportunity for those in managerial and policy-determining positions. The problem arises from the fact that the Federal service today, with the exception of the Foreign Service, is built on the principle of recruiting either specialists or clerks.

These writers are largely agreed that the abilities which are most important to running a governmental agency are not developed by a high degree of specialization in the university, even specialization in the several fields into which the study of public administration has tended to divide itself. They stress the need for "people with perspective and insight into the nature of the governmental process" (French, p. 32); for "greater understanding of political, social and cultural forces which are at play within this country and within the world" (Stone, p. 62); for the qualities "which produce the general manager rather than the specialist: one who can manage men; who can delegate" (Grigg, p. 161). In brief, the goal which emerges repeatedly throughout the discussion is something like, but not identical with, the British "administrative class."

The education of those entering such a service elicits differences of opinion, as is to be expected, but again the area of agreement is extensive. The gap between Sir James Grigg, an unreconstructed advocate of classical education in the Oxford-Cambridge tradition, and Paul Appleby is unmistakable, but even as the latter chastises Sir James, he subscribes to the need for general education and laments "the tendency to make our courses in public administration as narrowly specialized as we make so many of our vocational courses" (p. 185). Thus the problem becomes one of discovering the best way of providing a general education which will pay maximum dividends in the public service. The most specific formula for that kind of education is suggested by Frederick S. Dunn, in his outstanding paper on "Education and Foreign Affairs."

Some will regret that the participants in the Princeton Conference confined their attention almost exclusively to the National Government. Only John Gaus mentions the far more complicated and unsatisfactory situation that besets state, municipal, and other non-Federal public employment. But the omission does not detract seriously from the value of the book, for the problem with which it does deal and its fundamental agreements are applicable to the public service at other than the Federal level. The book is required reading for those who teach public administration; it should be read by all those concerned with the education of leaders for a society of growing public responsibilities.

ROBERT A. WALKER
Stanford University

BROUWER, PAUL J. *Student Personnel Services in General Education.* Pp. x, 317. Washington: American Council on Education, 1949. $3.50.

The Cooperative Study in General Education was carried on from 1939 to 1944, and the present volume is one of four in which the results of the Cooperative Study are published.

The aim of a program of general education as stated in the preface to this report is "the total development of each student." That personnel services constitute an essential part of such a program need not be argued. For some time teachers, counselors and administrators have been accepting responsibility for student personnel problems which in an earlier educational era were either ignored or left to the students to solve for themselves.

Eighteen colleges cooperated in the study, and the report is actually the work of many hands. The colleges are fairly representative in most respects, but there is some concentration in the Middle West. The co-operative effort was directed not toward uniformity either in plans or practices but rather toward a sharing of insights, methods, and experiences. A workshop at the University of Chicago each summer during the period of the study, attended by faculty members and other representatives from the co-operating colleges, contributed probably more than anything else to the success of the effort.

A brief statement on the plan of this book will aid the reader in determining the use to which it can be put. Part I describes the divisions of the college program which offer most opportunities for college personnel services. Among these the most important are: counseling, extra-class life, living arrangements; and specialized services such as health clinics, psychological and vocational guidance clinics, reading and speech clinics. The in-

creasing importance of the clinical approach in education is shown by the fact that we have mention even of "relaxation clinics" and "grooming clinics." All of these services are integrated with classroom work and are not to be taken as a parallel form of activity.

Part II describes the development and use of two inventories designed to facilitate personnel services: the Self-Inventory of Personal-Social Relations, and the Inventory of Counseling Relations. These inventories can be obtained by college personnel workers, and should prove useful.

Part III is devoted to a review of fundamental principles: psychological, physiological, philosophical, sociological. This is without doubt necessary to round out the report but will perhaps be found less useful to the worker than the preceding parts.

Not only college personnel workers, but administrators and faculty members as well, will find this a useful book even though it is to a great extent exploratory. If a deficiency were to be mentioned, it would be that the person who believes that much college personnel work is necessary because we have students in college who do not belong there, will, though he may be in error, likely not be persuaded from his error by reading this book.

MILES MURPHY
University of Pennsylvania

OEHSER, PAUL H. *Sons of Science: The Story of the Smithsonian Institution and its Leaders.* Pp. xvii, 220. New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. $4.00.

Sons of Science is the seventh book in "The Life of Science Library," a series devoted largely to the history of various phases of science and of the lives of prominent scientists of the past. It tells the fascinating story of the foundation and growth of the Smithsonian Institution. The author has very wisely chosen to tell this history through the lives of the several secretaries of the Institution, and, in doing so, has given a very readable and lively account of the first century of its existence and avoided what might easily have been a dreary chronicle.

We begin with the fabulous story of the English chemist James Smithson, who left his entire estate of £104,960 "to the United States of America to found at Washington under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge." Our lack of understanding of the impenetrable motives of this mysterious bequest is itself a fascinating subject.

The formal recognition of the gift was made by President Andrew Jackson on December 19, 1835, but it was not until August 10, 1846 that the bill establishing the Institution was passed by the Senate of the United States. It took Congress eleven years to find out "what to do with this half a million dollars." By great good fortune, the actual beginning of the Institution was placed in the hands of Joseph Henry, its first secretary and one of the greatest physicists America has produced. His wisdom set the standard for the Smithsonian Institution and has served as a criterion of excellence throughout its entire history. After the biography of Henry in Chapter 4, the growth and spread of the Institution to include the ten "bureaus" of the Smithsonian "family" is told by Oehser by means of short biographies of Spencer Fullerton Baird and George Brown Goode, naturalists, Samuel Pierpont Langley, physicist, Charles Doolittle Wolcott, geologist, and Charles Greeley Abbott, astronomer, who resigned in 1944 to be succeeded by Alexander Wetmore, biologist. The whole of this chronicle is amazing when we realize that the Smithsonian family of ten "bureaus" now includes: The United States National Museum, The International Exchange Service, The Astrophysical Laboratory, The National Collection of Fine Arts, The Bureau of American Ethnology, The National Zoological Park, The Freer Gallery of Art, The National Gallery of Art, The National Air Museum, and The Canal Zone Biological Area.

American scientists should read this book, for, besides learning something of the history of one of their great national institutions, it should be of interest to them to observe how much the American nineteenth-century pioneers of science accomplished through sheer individuality, unaided by the long academic training our young man of science receives today. Cer-

tainly, these earlier pioneers profited by not being subjected to too much pedagogy. We may well ask whether our present educational procedures will meet the more intricate demands of technology and at the same time preserve the pioneer freedom which is necessary for greatness in science.

HERBERT S. HARNED

New Haven, Conn.

COHEN, MORRIS R. *Studies in Philosophy and Science.* Pp. 278. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949. $4.50.

This is a book of collected essays by one of America's most eminent philosophers, the late Morris Cohen. The essays cover a wide range of topics indicative of Cohen's fertile mind, and a wide range of time as well (1910 to 1940). Cohen is an important figure in American philosophy, for he, along with Dewey, Woodbridge, and, earlier, William James, was the type of thinker who was establishing a philosophy that was typically American, and not merely an eclectic borrowing from across the waters. It is true that in Cohen's case, his biological origins lay in Russia. But if one were to choose that mind that most nearly reflects the intellectual quality of New York City, it would undoubtedly be Cohen's. His is a wide intellectual interest not hampered too much by details of depth, but bolstered by enormous breadth of reading. His was the brilliance of mind that so acutely reveals the flaws of another. His was the skepticism that could grasp no real system and is free to float intellectually with a minimum number of "regulative" principles. This book is an admirable collection of bits of Cohen-analysis, and should be read by all students of the development of the American mind.

A review of the book in terms of its contents would be futile. The essays, lectures, and seminar discussions cover logic, the meaning of philosophy, scientific method, the mental and the physical, realism, the theory of relativity, and comments on Bacon, Royce, Hegel, Croce, and others. The first essay is interesting in its quality of self-appraisal. It was written some years ago when a number of American philosophers were asked to set down their intellectual biographies in a book called *Contemporary American Philosophy* (Macmillan). Here Cohen reveals himself to have an unshakable faith in logic, particularly the "new" mathematical logic of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica.* This is combined with a theory of scientific method to the effect that all fact-gathering is conditioned by the kind of assumptions we make, and that the assumptions are not fixed, as Kant declared, but may change if subsequent events indicate the advisability of such change. Thus, Cohen derides the common conception of the scientist as a man divorced from any "biases" whatsoever: "In support of the empirical myth in the conventional history of science are the assertions that Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion by looking at Tycho Brahe's tables, and that Galileo discovered the law of falling bodies by rolling balls down inclined planes. I venture to assert that one who does not already have the geometry of conics in mind cannot possibly see Kepler's laws in Tycho Brahe's, or any other . . ." (p. 54).

All in all, Cohen was a transition-thinker; there is much of what he says that is still important to us as guiding principles. But he rarely says anything that has a definite import. It does not do merely to assert that the assumptions that guide fact-finding are subject to change. Sooner or later, we shall have to set down, as exactly as we can, the principles that will direct such change and indicate the movement of progress. Also, sooner or later, we are going to have to rescind the blind faith in logic and mathematics, and recognize that these areas of science are as open to drastic error, and as much in need of guidance from other fields, as is any branch of science.

C. WEST CHURCHMAN

Wayne University

STIMSON, DOROTHY. *Scientists and Amateurs: A History of the Royal Society* Pp. xiii, 270. New York: Henry Schuman, 1948. $4.00.

Probably most of those who now know the Royal Society as an association of distinguished scientific workers, fellowship of

which is a guarantee of outstanding scientific achievement, will be surprised to learn that it is only since about 1873 that the society has possessed this character. Yet this is the keynote of Dr. Dorothy Stimson's excellent history, well entitled *Scientists and Amateurs.*

For the greater part of its long history (it was founded in 1662) the Royal Society was more of a gentleman's club than a scientific organization, and membership, though no doubt coveted, was more likely to indicate social standing than scientific eminence. Nevertheless, it did act as a center round which the main scientific activity of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gathered, and when, early in the nineteenth century, the growing volume of British scientific work overflowed into new societies, each devoted to a particular science, the Royal Society made evident the life that still remained in it by reforms which enabled it to preserve its position as the leading scientific organization of the English-speaking world. Even today, when its right to this distinction is unchallenged and its influence in the scientific world and far outside it is unmistakable, its vitality lies much more in hidden realities than in outward appearance. The ordinary meetings of the society are lifeless and ill-attended compared with those of the more specialized societies, yet it is the heart and soul of the system which holds them all together.

Those who would know how all this has come about will be well advised to read Dr. Stimson's interesting book. They will find it accurate, informative, and absorbing, and a worthy addition to the valuable "Life of Science" Library to which it belongs. After reading it one cannot help speculating on the future of the society. Will it prove equal to the task now laid on it of not only promoting scientific achievement but also illuminating the meaning of science itself now that scientific ideas and discoveries have come to play a dominating part in human life? Time alone can answer this question, but it is hard to believe that the wisdom which has never wholly deserted it in the past will do so now.

HERBERT DINGLE
University College, London

HABER, WILLIAM, and WILBUR J. COHEN (Eds.). *Readings in Social Security.* Pp. xix, 634. New York, N. Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1948. $7.65.

Readings in Social Security brings to the student of this subject, whether he be college undergraduate, legislator, administrator, industrialist, labor unionist, or teacher, a most useful selection from among the scattering of books and the many hundreds of articles, reports, and documents that the field of social security has produced during the last dozen years. Sixty-five items have been chosen to describe the background, the philosophy, the basic issues, and the current developments in social insurance and related programs.

The readings are organized under nine headings. First comes a section on the problem of insecurity, starting with Mary Ross's classic, *Why Social Security,* familiar to the many persons whose introduction to work with the Social Security Board came through the basic training course. Then in the same section follow quotations from the Federal Security Board's 1947 report on its *Survey of Consumer Finances;* W. S. Woytinsky's *Income Cycle in the Life of Families and Individual;* and Ewan Clague's presentation to a congressional committee of the *City Worker's Family Budget.*

Twelve excerpts are devoted to the theory and philosophy of social security and to social security developments. The bulk of the book focuses on unemployment insurance and the employment service, old-age and survivors' insurance, and medical care and health insurance. Included under related social security programs are statements about disability insurance, workmen's compensation, railroad security programs, public assistance, and children's allowances. Four selections discuss the economic and financial aspects of social security.

The readings conclude with a section on appraisal and criticism, its contents ranging from the program of the Social Security Administration as described in its 1947 report to an article by Senator Downey on the Townsend plan. The material is largely drawn from technical journals like the *Social Security Bulletin* and

such documents as the 1946 Report of the Ways and Means Committee and the Recommendations of the Advisory Council on Social Security to the United States Senate Finance Committee. Each chapter concludes with a brief reading list.

This book presents the contributions of administrators to the subject matter of social security. It contains the material which executives have used in their discussions with legislators, in-service training teachers in orienting new personnel, and the operating staff in keeping informed about current developments.

The quotations and excerpts are substantial and well chosen. They express the life of the program. In them the teacher will find a rich and satisfactory source for assigned reading. For the person seriously interested in social security, they form a book of reference to the various sides of controversy and to the underlying problems and the basic economic and social considerations in this field of public administration.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

SARGENT, PORTER. *Dangerous Trends*. Pp. 190. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1948. $2.00.

This book is a separate printing of the foreword and introductory material to the thirty-first edition of the author's handbook of private schools. In these pages Sargent wanders far and wide over the educational landscape, raising questions, making observations, and setting down opinions and conclusions that are invariably provocative and frequently questionable. They are, however, opinions, and unfortunately in many and many an instance there is no substantiation beyond the quoting of other opinions. Accordingly, while the book is interesting and stimulating, it will not satisfy any critical reader, or anyone who believes that the ills of the world and of education to which Sargent points will not be cured by further opinionated talk about them.

The author has a distinct and sharp point of view, as everyone knows who has read his voluminous earlier materials. The dangerous trends he discerns center largely in a concentration of power representing wealth and the military, with consequent suppression of individualism in teaching, notably at the higher level, and a strain toward conformity. These trends, evident on college and university campuses, are also evident in the wider society, where control of information tends to slant attitudes and secure the consent of majorities. The solution to these disruptive ills, as the author sees it, is a complete overhaul of the acculturating process, to the end that men may come to understand the "absolutes and false ideologies" of "our anachronistic culture patterns," and thereby free themselves from them.

Sargent has little hope that education and research institutions will contribute to this end, for men are not free to embark on such an enterprise, and "such a project does not offer aggrandizement to those who hold power."

Although he professes to avoid colorful words and abstractions, Sargent in fact indulges in them constantly, whether in discussing President Conant, the reports of the President's commission, or "the ivy league." The book, in fact, is heavily salted and peppered with loaded language. As a document in higher education (with which it is primarily concerned), it is to be appraised as one man's reaction, fortified with quotations drawn without any apparent system, and presented with a flourish. So far as this reviewer can see after a careful reading, the book really adds nothing new to an understanding of the educational process, and it appears to ignore much that seems relevant.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY
University of Minnesota

WOOD, JAMES PLAYSTED. *Magazines in the United States: Their Social and Economic Influence*. Pp. x, 312. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949. $4.00.

Since I have some strictures on Mr. Wood's book, it may be well to say at the outset that in the absence of any other recent one-volume survey of American magazines, it is bound to be useful. It is lucidly, if not imaginatively, written, and

it can stand on its considerable store of factual information as a valuable book for reference or for teaching assignments. In less than 300 pages of text it spans the story of magazines from English origins to the current situation in magazine publishing. It is informative on the biographies of editors, on the histories of particular organs, and on circulation figures.

There are several grounds on which the book is vulnerable. Its brevity has been made possible at the cost of adequate coverage of certain areas. For example, it should have been possible, after the publication in 1946 of the book by Hoffman, Allen, and Ulrich on the subject, to write a much better chapter on the little magazines. Further, Mr. Wood's concern with the influence of the magazines is not accompanied by any knowledgeable reflections on the knotty methodological questions involved. The potentialities of systematic study of magazine content as a source of information about American ideological development—as done so successfully by Leo Lowenthal in his study of magazine hero images in *Radio Research*—seem entirely outside Mr. Wood's ken.

It is hard to accept such easy optimism as is implied in this sentence: "As the national educational level continues to rise, the magazines must print continually better material for readers who have been taught to be more discriminating," which seems unwarranted by the trends of the last twenty or thirty years. And one is almost stumped for comment when Mr. Wood says, "The magazine today is not essentially different from the magazine in 1741. The *General Magazine and Historical Chronicle* then, and *Time, Life, The Saturday Evening Post,* and *Harper's* now, are recognizably the same in basic identity and function." That seems to me to be the logical equivalent of saying that X has an extremely close resemblance to Y because both have two eyes, two ears, a nose, and a mouth.

Many readers will have difficulty in accepting Mr. Wood's complacent conclusions about the policies, the beneficence, and the quality of American magazines. "People buy and read a magazine primarily for its editorial contents. No honest or capable editor can permit dictation from the magazine's advertisers." Again: "By opposing the trend toward collectivism manifest in the twentieth century, [the magazines] act as a necessary corrective and restraining influence on thought and action in politics and government. . . . They have consistently fought all evidences of dictatorship and the undue expansion of bureaucratic powers, excessive government control of commerce and industry, and the tyrannical exercise of power over their fellows by any group within the population." Mr. Wood does not say whether he means by "dictatorship" and "bureaucratic powers" F.D.R. and the New Deal.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER
Columbia University

ROTHENBERG, IGNAZ. *The Newspaper.* Pp. xvi, 351. New York: Staples Press, 1948. $5.50.

The newspaper as an institution epitomizes a host of relationships: a channel for the expression of opinion, for the transmission of "news," fact and comment; an arm of political organization; an instrumentality for the production of wealth; a channel for official announcements; and a restraint on private and public action through the sanction of investigation and disclosure. Depending upon a commentator's point of view, the nexus of a newspaper is free speech, advertising and artificial demand creation, antitrust, big business, or politics.

Dr. Rothenberg, unlike other writers who have attempted to evaluate the relation of the newspaper to the law, accepts this wide framework and not only considers the facets of the law and the newspaper in a single country but purports to cover the newspaper's relation to law in practically all of the civilized world. It is obvious that in so small a volume the problems of law as they relate to a newspaper in a particular jurisdiction cannot be spelled out with particularity or detail; and thus, viewed strictly as a source book for "the law," there is much to criticize both as to omission of material and as to defect in citation. Such criticism would

be unfair to any work of less than ten or twelve volumes, so *The Newspaper* must be judged as it was written—a well-organized provocative discussion of the legal theories which have received statutory acceptance in many countries in an endeavor to make newspapers serve the public good. So judged, the volume is excellent, for it points out on the one hand the uselessness of uncertain statutory policy, and on the other that firm procedural rule that is unenforceable is also worthless. The law alone cannot cure all human ills or create heaven on earth.

The volume serves as valuable warning, not only to newspapermen and lawyers but also to those who seek legislative reform, that unstudied and thoughtless reform is futile.

FRANK HORACK
Indiana University School of Law

SPIEGEL, HENRY WILLIAM. *Current Economic Problems.* Pp. x, 726. Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1949. $5.00.

This textbook deals with the current economic problems of the American people in relation to four ideas (or values) said to be cherished by all Americans, and to economic theory. The cherished ideas are progress, security, freedom, and peace. It is significant that "progress" is described in terms of "change and growth," which might well include deterioration; the author, that is to say, does not attempt to demonstrate the validity of his values. This acceptance of the popular judgment enables him to distinguish sharply between the public values which affect real situations and economic theory which concerns hypothetical situations.

The problems are arranged in groups to conform to the four cherished ideas, leaving a fifth group for agricultural and other special problems. A great deal of useful information is thus conveyed in a logical and coherent pattern. Some of it is, of necessity, a matter of common knowledge, and frequently the general purpose of the book forces the author to stop short of going to the root of the question. But the result is to give the student an opportunity to relate the economic theory and terminology which he has already learned to matters which the most skeptical of undergraduates would have to consider practical. A prospective teacher should be warned that, as the book presupposes an extensive acquaintance with theory, he will have a hard time if any members of his class are not reasonably well prepared.

With this reservation, the exposition of the theory and the analysis of the problems is admirably clear. And at the end of each chapter there are a concise summary, a well-chosen bibliography, and a set of study questions.

Although the facts are sometimes overstated (for instance, the population of the world is said to be "more than three billion" and its rate of increase "1 per cent. per year"), the tendency is to treat the problems as self-solving. This optimistic result is obtained by avoiding any consideration of the difficulty of obtaining agreement between people with divergent interests and divergent ideals. Perhaps it was a mistake to choose a Canadian reviewer, because, seen from the outside, the United States (like other countries) does appear to reach political and economic decisions with some difficulty, and not always to reach the best decisions in time. The difficulties, seen from the outside, appear to concern conflicts of interest which involve something more than giving relative importance to the four cherished ideas when they are incompatible with one another. A sympathetic appreciation of the magnitude of the difficulties may lead to a more realistic and more flattering appreciation of American statesmanship than does a tacit acceptance of the doctrine of automatic progress, or of ideas established by the facile logic of Kipling's *Bandarlog,* "We all say so and so it must be true."

H. F. ANGUS
University of British Columbia

GIBSON, J. DOUGLAS (Ed.). *Canada's Economy in a Changing World.* Pp. xiii, 380. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1948. $4.50.

ANNETT, DOUGLAS R. *British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy.* Pp.

xiv, 188. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1948. $3.50.

Canada's Economy in a Changing World, written under the direction of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, is a competent symposium on Canada's problems of foreign trade, capital imports, and exchange. It comprises nine chapters by well-known Canadian economists and Gibson's concluding review. More co-ordination has been achieved than is usual with symposiums. Basically, it speculates what to do about the fact that whereas Canada's import surplus from the United States used to be paid for by her export surplus to the United Kingdom and other European countries, the war so damaged Europe's economy that European ability to buy from Canada was seriously weakened. This led to Canada's present balance-of-payments import restrictions.

The uncertainties of the outlook are stressed, but measured optimism is expressed that Canada will adjust to the changing world on a reasonably high standard of living. W. T. G. Hackett and Courtland Elliott incline toward, and Gibson deprecates, devaluating Canadian currency as a possible means of stimulating capital imports into Canada and thereby easing the balance-of-payments problem. But the contributors generally agree on the following main conclusions: (1) Canada has an overwhelming interest in multilateral trade and exchange. (2) Though welcome, the European Recovery Program will not permanently restore European markets; Canada's overseas exports in the foreseeable future will be a smaller percentage of her total exports than they were before the war. (3) It is vital to increase exports to the U. S. As a means of so doing, a customs union with the U. S. is disapproved, primarily as leading to political union. Although a U. S.-Canadian free-trade area is not opposed, such a device, it is emphasized, would entail important structural changes in Canadian economy and pose administrative problems. There is a tendency to prefer a multilateral solution. Further negotiations with the U. S. under the Trade Agreements Act are generally urged. In such negotiations, according to Kenneth R. Wilson, Canada will not hesitate to use the bargaining power of her "temporary" import restrictions, though H. F. Angus holds this illegitimate.

Wynne Plumptre considers the term "reciprocal" dangerous—that in the light of Canadian balance-of-payments exigencies the Canadian tariff against the U. S. is too low and the U. S. tariff against Canada much too high, and therefore the U. S. should make the lion's share of the concessions. If need be, Canada must get tough, despite Geneva, by restricting export of raw or semifinished materials to the U. S. If Congress accepts the International Trade Organization Charter, the U. S., he holds, will be bound to negotiate with any supplier of any commodity, in contrast with the situation at Geneva where the U. S. negotiated only on commodities of which the negotiating country was a principal supplier. (Actually, the Charter requires no change in U. S. practice in this regard.) He is disturbed about U. S. customs rigidities and other alleged U. S. conditions and practices which operate as an "invisible tariff" against Canadian products.

British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy, begun at Harvard and published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, reflects exhaustive research in the United States and Canada (it has 349 footnotes). Annett reviews British preference in Canada from its 1897 start through 1939. He appraises the effect on Canadian trade of the Anglo-American trade agreements of 1932 and 1937, and of preference reduction in the U. S.-Canadian trade agreements of 1936 and 1939. The general theory of the effect of customs unions and preferential blocs is examined. The following guarded conclusions are reached: Pre-Ottawa preference had little effect on Canadian trade. The Ottawa agreements brought short-run gains to Canada through increasing exports more than they decreased them. But Canada never felt comfortable about these agreements, which impeded closer commercial relations with the U. S., and she took the first opportunity to patch up these relations.

Imperial preference in general has prob-

ably not greatly injured the U. S., and, in fact, may actually have aided American exports in that purchasing power generated in the Dominions through their increased exports to the United Kingdom has resulted in greater demand for products which the U. S. can best supply. Nevertheless, the reduction of preferences may have benefited American exports. Wartime Canadian industrial expansion will result in an increase in the Canadian demand for U. S. types in comparison with U. K. types of goods.

CONSTANT SOUTHWORTH
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

SANDERS, THOMAS H. *Company Annual Reports to Stockholders, Employees, and the Public.* Pp. xiii, 338. Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1949. $3.75.

This is a study of the changing content of annual reports and the responses of management, stockholders, employees, and investment analysts to the varying degree of "stewardship" represented by those reports. Drawn from a large sample of reports and of opinion, the book makes a clear case for complete integrity of information and dynamic presentation of the reporting company's problems.

Part I poses the basic aim of the study, namely, to reveal the manner in which the claims of stockholders, employees, customers, and other interested readers may best be satisfied and reconciled in the information management sees fit to divulge. What the president's letter should say and how it should be said; problems of financial-statement terminology and classification; the usefulness of statistics, charts, graphs, and pictures—these are reviewed with unusual insight and tolerance.

Part II assembles the opinions of a large number of company managements, investment analysts, labor groups, and stockholders, drawn from questionnaire letters sent by the author to adequate samples of these groups (stockholder opinion was derived from company questionnaires distributed by nine corporations). This is the heart of the study. A surprising diversity of opinion is revealed concerning the desirable form and content of reports and the interest of various groups in company literature.

Part III, "Accounting Práctices in Annual Reports," presents a factual study of accounting trends drawn from American Institute of Accountants and Haskins and Sells studies for 1933–41, 1942–43, and 1946. Here are some surprises for those who would expect more uniformity in the treatment of balance-sheet and income-statement items. This part of the study adds much to the information and thinking on the acceptance of "generally accepted" accounting principles, toward which Professor Sanders has made other notable contributions.

The study should have wide appeal. Company officers will be interested in the reactions of other executives to the problems of interesting and informing the various readers of annual reports. Investment analysts will find ammunition for their plea for accurate, complete, and informative material. Accountants will be particularly interested in the discussion of financial statements and accounting methods.

The book is unusually well written. The central section, quoting a large number of excerpts from replies to questionnaire letters, could be shortened by the elimination of duplicating expressions of opinion, and one could wish that the author had derived more exact conclusions from the evidence presented. On the other hand, one must agree that "the efforts of each company to portray its operations and achievements in its own industry and environment naturally result in that variety which goes far to make the study of annual reports, especially the modern ones, so attractive" (p. 48).

The study is especially timely these days when increased effort is being directed towards arousing grass-roots interest in corporation securities. It throws much light on the complex problem of reconciling methods of business administration with the public responsibilities of the large corporation.

H. E. DOUGALL
Stanford University

HOWE, WALTER. *The Mining Guild of New Spain and Its Tribunal General, 1770–1821.* Pp. ix, 534. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. $7.50.

In the eighteenth century, after preliminary recommendations and several years of royal inquiry, the Spanish Crown granted the mining interests of Mexico an unusual amount of internal control and self-government. The mineowners were grouped into a guild, under a directing tribunal general, which periodically met with a junta of deputies from the mining districts. This general executive took over a large number of legal, economic, administrative, technological, and educational functions. Thus, after several centuries of enriching individuals and the Crown by the discovery and development of subsoil wealth, Mexican miners acquired considerable control over their own affairs.

This extensive institutional study—the first of its kind on this subject—is based on a host of primary documents gathered from Spain and Mexico, which deal directly with the optimistic beginnings and the dismal decline of the miners' guild. The history of the guild began with recommendations made by the Galvez mission, which suggested new ordinances for the whole industry and the creation of a guild somewhat like that enjoyed by merchants. The tribunal had power to make loans and to finance mines which needed capital. It consequently set up a *banco de avíos* for this purpose. Since the technique of extracting silver from the native ore called for competent scientists, the tribunal created and directed the famous School of Mines, with its noted faculty.

The regulation of mining, always primary in colonial and national Mexico, was given a Mexican organization, with creole officials administering native wealth in colonial enterprises. Hard economic experience was not lacking, and Dr. Howe has not failed to show the fiscal balance of the guild's income and expenses. The guild was criticized by the royal auditor for overinvestment, high salaries, and other weak points of policy, and it underwent several reorganizations. Loans and special gifts to the Crown and other officials were a regular drain upon its funds, although it was given the unusual right to collect a tax upon silver brought to the royal mint. This privilege provided the guild with capital funds which rendered it independent of the royal treasury and produced excellent security for private investors.

As scholarship, this original monograph is marred by misspellings or typographical errors which could easily have been eliminated. These defects are inconsistent with the care which went into the treatment and development of the topic.

The best chapters deal with the lending function of the guild and with the organization of the School of Mines. Dr. Howe has found new material on Fausto de Elhuyar, first director of that outstanding school, and a member of the tribunal. He has gone to considerable trouble to translate into English several reports by Elhuyar and to include them in the Appendix. The whole story of the administration of mining is covered in this superior contribution to the economic and technological history of Mexico.

HARRY BERNSTEIN
Brooklyn College

BURGESS, GEORGE H., and MILES C. KENNEDY. *Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.* Pp. xxviii, 835. Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1949. $3.50.

American railroad history generally begins with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 1828. At first railroads were merely links in existing systems of water transportation. During the nineteenth century many short lines were constructed to satisfy the commercial ambitions of various towns or to make a profit for local construction companies. Philadelphia, a commercial rival of New York and Baltimore, at first sponsored the Pennsylvania Public Works (a combination of railroad, sections of canalized river, canals, and inclined planes) to tap western trade to Pittsburgh. Later Philadelphia favored the Pennsylvania Railroad, which took out its corporate charter on April 13, 1846. By the early 1850's several railroad lines had crossed the Appalachians and were reach-

ing towards Chicago and St. Louis. When the Civil War began there were 31,000 miles of railroad in the country (compared to about 228,500 today), and railroads had replaced steamboats as the principal form of inland transportation. The little lines which had started as links were forming into chains to bind together the different sections of the country east of the Mississippi. Most eastern railroads trace their beginnings to one of these lines that began its history in the 1830's or 1840's.

Recently the railroads have been celebrating their accomplishments of the last hundred years by centennial festivities and by centennial histories. This is proper, for railroads have had a large share in making this country as wealthy as it is, and they still handle about 50 per cent of our transportation. The largest railroad is the Pennsylvania, with nearly 11,000 miles of track, and doing about 11 per cent of all the railroad business.

Several histories of the Pennsylvania Railroad had been written before this one. The best-known ones are H. W. Schotter's compendium of annual reports up to 1926, W. B. Wilson's two-volume collection of organization plans, statistics, and biographies of officials (1898), and E. P. Alexander's 1947 pictorial history. Burgess and Kennedy's book "is a product of a comprehensive engineering study of the origin and development of the Pennsylvania Railroad System conducted by the engineering firm of Coverdale and Colpitts." It is more complete than any of its predecessors. But the authors have chronicled facts for over 700 pages, "deliberately avoiding praise or criticism, economic or social interpretation" (p. xi). Yet the book is far from being just an engineering study. It contains long and detailed accounts of mergers and rivalries, and mentions the acquisition of every new line, no matter how short. Actually, the part that is most engineering in character, a survey of improvements in equipment, is relegated to the Appendix. The book is unquestionably as "full of information" as your family encyclopedia, and about as good reading. Not many persons will learn railroad history from it or much about the Pennsylvania Railroad, for it is too tedious. The Pennsylvania Railroad should have its history told in more interesting fashion. Burgess and Kennedy have marshaled the facts well. Now these facts should be rewoven into the fascinating story that can be made of them.

DONALD L. KEMMERER
University of Illinois

NOVICK, DAVID, MELVIN L. ANSHEN, and WILLIAM C. TRUEENER. *Wartime Production Controls*. Pp. vi, 441. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. $6.00.

This study, by three veterans of the Battle of Washington, is an illuminating addition to a long series of postwar revelations. But, unlike some of their predecessors, the authors eschew questions of high policy, and concern themselves with the details of administration. This approach, though technical and limited in scope, yields significant results in a heretofore neglected area.

Wartime production controls failed to achieve ideal results, for several reasons: lack of administrative organization; dearth of essential information; failure to integrate military procurement with production control; continued reliance on minimum controls; conflicts and division of authority at the top; excessive paper work. These deficiencies precipitated one crisis after another; at each breakdown, new controls had to be improvised. This evolution is traced in detail from the first use of priorities in the summer of 1940, through the Production Requirements Plan of June 1942, to the Controlled Materials Plan of July 1943. Substantial improvement was made, but the system never succeeded in effecting a balance between military procurement and available supplies. Victory was achieved more by the richness of our resources and the productivity of our industry than by proficiency in administration.

To avoid potential disaster in the event of another war, the authors would establish a permanent Industrial Mobilization Agency. This organization would recruit the nucleus of a competent staff, develop complete administrative procedures for

production control, collect and organize necessary factual data, test its procedures by trial runs, educate industrial management in operations under the plan, and be prepared to institute production controls immediately in the event of a war emergency. By this means we could avoid the potentially disastrous delays and the costly mistakes of World Wars I and II.

Excessive concern with administration obscures the relation between political realities and administrative ideals. When Government, yielding to the realities of political and economic power, gave the Military a free hand and entrusted war production to Big Business, the administrative difficulties of which the authors complain were predestined. It was inevitable that subsequent controls should reflect the interests and predilections of those in command, not the ideals of professional administrators. The same fate awaits the proposed Industrial Mobilization Agency. Howsoever perfect administratively, it would operate in a social vacuum, isolated from the sources of power, unable to resolve conflicts or to determine policies, subservient to dominant interests, and just as incapable of controlling the anarchic American economy as was the War Production Board. Short of an actual *Wehrwirtschaft*—which the authors disclaim—the Industrial Mobilization Agency would have only limited functional value.

HORACE M. GRAY
University of Illinois

NOLAND, E. WILLIAM, and E. WIGHT BAKKE. *Workers Wanted.* Pp. xi, 233. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. $3.00.

This is a report on employers' hiring preferences in New Haven, Connecticut, and Charlotte, North Carolina. It is based on interviews with representatives of 135 establishments in New Haven in late 1945 and similar interviews in 105 establishments in Charlotte in early 1946. In each of the cities, establishments included in the survey employ about 80 per cent of the local industrial labor force.

Interviewers sought information on employers' attitudes toward eighteen possible qualifications of candidates for employment, including character, sex, personality, physique, particular experience, general experience, education, color, top age, best age, citizenship, nationality, family status, residence, politics, religious affiliation, church attendance, and military service. They inquired also as to means used in appraising health and physique, intelligence, character and temperament, and aptitude and performance. They also checked employers' preferences with respect to sources of information on job applicants. Results were classified, for each city, on the basis of a fivefold breakdown of occupational classes: common labor; semiskilled production; service, maintenance, and other highly skilled; clerical; and executive and administrative below top management. Industries were classified by type of product, number of employees, type of ownership, age of company, union relationships, and locus of hiring policy. The industry classification was apparently not useful, as evidenced by this report.

As explained by the authors in their preface, they seek an answer to the "basic" question, Why in this situation do men behave as they do? Each study in the series of which this is a part is expected to contribute to the answer to this question. This study, however, is regarded as suggesting hypotheses rather than conclusions, since its findings represent interpretations made by interviewers on the basis of their observations and conversations.

Ten chapters and two appendices outline these interpretations. They suggest that there are a few significant differences between New Haven and Charlotte, and more important distinctions between the qualities regarded as important for different types of jobs. Probably more important, they provide additional evidence of the fact that demands for labor in local labor markets do not, in practice, assume the homogeneity of units usually described in theoretical discussions of labor marketing processes (pp. 152–59).

The study makes a contribution to the understanding of what takes place in local labor markets. However, values of such studies might be enhanced (1) if they

were oriented less to the general question of all social science and more to significant specific relationships, and (2) if they made use of a methodology that avoided extensive personal interpretations and facilitated verification by other observers. It is unfortunate also that the authors have failed to provide an adequate bibliography of other studies with which their findings might be compared. Reports of such studies would be more valuable if they included an index.

DALE YODER
University of Minnesota

MACHLUP, FRITZ. *The Basing-point System.* Pp. viii, 275. Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1949. $5.00.

Under the basing-point system of pricing, the purchaser is charged a so-called delivered price, composed of the price at the base plus freight from the base to the point of destination. There are two types of basing-point systems, one operating with a single base and the other with multiple bases. The best-known of the single-basing-point systems was the Pittsburgh-plus, under which the purchaser of steel was charged the price at Pittsburgh plus freight from Pittsburgh to destination, regardless of the origin of the shipment and the seller's location. The Pittsburgh-plus system was abandoned under pressure some decades ago. It was replaced by a system of multiple basing points, under which the purchaser was to pay the lowest sum of any basing-point price plus freight from that basing point to destination. This meant that the buyer of steel had always to pay the same delivered price; it became a matter of indifference to him whether to place his order with a steel mill in his vicinity or with one located far away from the place of destination. Similar pricing systems had come to prevail in the cement industry and in other branches of manufacture. They had for long been under attack by the Federal Trade Commission and by a number of economists, among whom the late Professor Frank Fetter stood out, untiringly denouncing a pricing structure of which Professor Viner has said: "I have not been able to see how you could design any worse one, from the point of view of national economy, assuming you have free choice."

A year ago the delivered-price system as practiced by the cement industry was outlawed by the Supreme Court. Its subsequent abandonment by the steel industry ushered in a vigorous propaganda campaign aiming at having the Congress legalize what the Supreme Court had outlawed. Professor Machlup's book, coming out, as it does, at a strategic moment, deals what may be hoped to be a death blow to a pricing system called by Fetter "the most effective instrument of monopoly" in wide sectors of the economy. Being the work of an economic theorist of great and well-deserved reputation, the book displays a highly unusual combination of sustained analytical power, public-spirited commonsense, and graceful exposition. Not one of the intricate ramifications of the basing-point system has been left untouched by the author. The sham arguments advanced in its favor are mercilessly demolished. The cost of its abolition is appraised and found to fall short by a wide margin of the resulting benefits.

Nobody interested in a vital economic issue between sectional interests and the common good can afford to neglect this great book. It ill behooves us to despair of the effectiveness of our antitrust laws if we ourselves, by inertia or lack of enlightenment, render this weapon blunt by allowing statutory exemptions. With the campaign for resurrection of the basing-point system continuing, a wide distribution of Machlup's book might well be considered a public function which the great foundations should stand ready to assume.

HENRY WM. SPIEGEL
Catholic University of America

LABOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATION. *Trends in American Capitalism: Profits and Living Standards.* Pp. 128. New York: International Publishers, 1948. $1.50.

This little volume is an application of the Marxist theory of surplus value to current trends in the American economy.

That our profit economy is faced with serious contradictions and that our standard of living is not as high as many popularizers maintain are propositions well

known to welfare economists, institutionalists, Keynesians, and others. We need no longer be reminded of these things by the heavy hand of partisan political dogmatism masquerading under the guise of scholarship. Nowhere in the entire volume is there any explicit indication that this is an out-and-out Communist tract. Labor Research Association sounds very imposing. However, the identity of the publishers, the language of the volume which reads much like a political handbill (e.g., the capitalists "toss bones" to the workers), the frequent ipse dixit citations from Marx, and finally the book's conclusion, give the whole show away. The authors conclude that America is driving toward a complete war economy, whose only purpose is to bolster up "reactionary foreign governments." Political considerations—such as the upsetting of the European balance of power, the political vacuum that is western Europe today, and the fear of further Soviet aggression within the Atlantic community—are omitted.

The arguments of non-Marxian economists are disposed of by labeling them "bourgeois." Where this does not suffice to convince, the authors come up with a quotation from Marx. Keynes, mentioned only once, is disputed in a few brief paragraphs. It is interesting to observe that where it suits their purposes, the authors fall back upon a political argument, namely, that the state, as the executive committee of the ruling class, is compelled to take the part of capital against labor. If, therefore, political considerations must enter, it is fair to add that with all their evils, and they are both many and serious, business enterprise and its historical concomitant, parliamentary democracy, have shown more respect for the cultural and political rights of the individual than the self-styled people's democracies of eastern Europe.

The Marxian formulation has been severely criticized; nevertheless, the matter is far from a settled issue. There is still room for a serious study along Marxian lines of the basic contradictions in present-day American capitalism. However, it will have to be done by persons more interested in the search for truth than in its outcomes; more concerned, that is, with science and scholarship than with defense of party politics.

JULES KOLODNY
New York University

GRAHAM, FRANK D. *The Theory of International Values*. Pp. vii, 349. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. $5.00.

Like many students of the subject, Professor Graham has long been disturbed by the inadequacies of the classical theory of international trade. Most writers have been revisionists, or neoclassicists; he proposes more heroic treatment. He believes that Ricardo set his followers on the wrong path and that John Stuart Mill kept them there. A fundamentally different route is indicated.

The author is primarily concerned with *normal* values which establish "the general pattern of international trade." He finds that the classical and neoclassical writers fail to offer a sound determinant of such values, because of their overemphasis of the demand factor, their preoccupation with the unrealistic reciprocal national demand concept, their projection of the "two-country, two-commodity" analysis into modern complex trade, their failure "to stress (or even to recognize) commodities produced in common in two or more countries," and their consequently erroneous notions as to how equilibrium is brought about and maintained.

Professor Graham contends that "the composition of the exports of any country is determined by opportunity costs in that country in interaction with the evolving ratio of international exchange of products" (p. 262), and that "costs are the sole determinant of the (normal) rates of exchange, and the character of reciprocal national demand schedules for foreign products is either irrelevant or relevant only through the medium of costs" (p. 266). "So far as relative demand is significant at all, the normal value relationships between two, three, or hundreds of commodities are determined by the relative *world* (not reciprocal national) demand of individuals for each of these commodities" (p. 284). "Reciprocal na-

tional demands (if conceivable in individualistic trade) are not, in their effect on markets, segregable from one another and reciprocal national demands are as much a resultant as a cause of international values, and so cannot serve as a determinant of those values" (p. 285).

In a brief review, it is impossible to take up all the author's lines of argument, much less to enter into all their refinements and ramifications or to evaluate his commentaries upon other writers in the field, past and contemporary. The book is avowedly "meant for advanced students in international trade rather than the wholly uninitiated and assumes on the part of the reader a certain familiarity with long-accepted doctrines." It is a book to be reckoned with, and it may well mark an important turning point in international trade theory.

PAUL S. PEIRCE
Winter Park, Florida

HICKS, J. R. *The Problem of Budgetary Reform.* Pp. 96. New York, N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1948. $1.50.

The author of this thought-provoking little volume is Professor of Economics at Nuffield College, Oxford. In it he sets forth a plan for modernizing British governmental accounting in a manner that will promote orderly budgeting, particularly with respect to the economic undertakings. He considers the simple, customary methods of public accounting adequate for the administrative departments. However, the vast expansion of the economic activities of the trading departments in the realm of business enterprises necessitates the introduction of new accounting principles and a new accounting system which will permit public planning and control.

First, the activities of the Government should be classified as belonging to the administrative or trading departments. Some technical and other problems arise here which would be decided by good judgment. For the administrative departments, the traditional accounting would be continued; for the trading departments, new current and capital accounts would be set up in a new Banking Section. The budget would then reveal the financial results of the Government's activities by relating the administrative and the trading accounts. The finances of the nationalized industries would thus be brought within the budget and would be subjected to the needed Treasury controls. The author illustrates his method of modernizing the public accounts with a number of illuminating tables.

The proposal is constructive and will be of interest to all who are concerned with the relations of the national budget to the economic problems of the nation. Budgeting and accounting improvements in America as well as in Britain have lagged behind the recent developments in fiscal policy and the expansion of the public enterprises. If the economic objectives of a stable, steadily increasing, and equitably distributed national income are to be achieved, whether within the framework of modern capitalism, socialism, or some other system, the public accounts and the budget must be improved to meet the requirements of the new era. And as the public budget grows, the need for adequate accounting and budgeting also increases.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER
University of Pennsylvania

HANSEN, ALVIN H. *Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy.* Pp. ix, 236. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949. $3.00.

This third volume in the "Economics Handbook Series" represents Professor Hansen's most comprehensive and profound thinking and rethinking since *Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles.* It is the most authoritative single presentation to date of Keynesian economics in transition and in process of assimilating nutritive elements of pre-Keynesian thought which had been left undigested. In its first year of publication it is already the standard American university text in advanced B.A. or M.A. level courses in monetary theory. It should retain this position for some years, and its repute should spread across both oceans. Every economist worthy of the name, whatever his field of specialization, should read at least the six chapters of the central core: 4–5, 8–9, and 11–12. A

"handbook" in the usual sense of the term—the housewife's cookbook, the attorney's hornbook, the plumber's manual—it assuredly is not. Its level of sophistication, technique, and terminology lifts it beyond all but the exceptional "intelligent layman," not to mention the beginning student of money and banking.

Hansen's point of view we have described as Keynesian in transition. The transitional elements appear to be four in number. First and foremost is a certain hesitance and moderation of tone; Hansen is not so certain of anything as he seemed to be everything eight or ten years ago. Second is a willingness to grant concessions, as for example the importance of accumulated assets as well as current income in determining expenditure patterns, and the possibility of instability in the consumption function. Third is a division of worry almost equally between Hansen's old reliable secular stagnation, and a new flame, secular inflation resulting from wage increases under guaranteed full employment. (Hansen resembles at times a jittery female worrying the doctor about her blood pressure, but uncertain whether it is dangerously high or perilously low.) Fourth and last, there is a revived interest in pre-1936 monetary thought; the volume contains useful sketches in this field—on Hume, Tooke, Marshall, Aftalion. Even for the period since 1936, there is an admirable eclecticism; contributions of Lange, Robertson, Haberler, and Fellner, to mention a conspicuous few, are absorbed and usually acknowledged. Only "Functional Finance" (Lerner) and the "Chicago School" (Simons, Mints, Friedman) have nothing but targets to contribute to Hansen's thought.

Nevertheless, the sharp distinction which Hansen draws between the old (quantity) and the new (income) theories of money and prices seems to some degree overdrawn, particularly in view of the influence of assets on expenditure. After all, an increase in currency and deposits operates generally to increase personal and disposable incomes, and an increase in personal and disposable income usually involves an increase in currency and deposits. The distinction between the two sets of theories is really important only in abnormal cases. Incidentally, did there ever exist on sea or land a quantity theorist quite so rusticated as Hansen's stock stooge, "the naïve quantity theorist"? If so, he was certainly not the late Irving Fisher, for thirty-five years the leader and spokesman of the quantity theorists.

The reader may also find it less than certain what Hansen includes under the general head of "monetary policy," or what the dividing line between monetary and fiscal measures may be. For the most part he appears to use the narrow concept of monetary policy found in the earlier products of his Keynesian period, limiting it to the traditional measures of central bank control over discount rates, reserve ratios, and the like. At other times, however, he expands his use of the term to include manipulation of the current government deficit, the aggregate tax, expenditure, and debt structures, and indeed *all* aggregate as distinguished from specific measures.

Turning finally to current events, Hansen makes a powerful case against monetary (or monetary-plus-fiscal) policy as the major weapon in controlling postwar inflation. In view of wartime accumulation of liquid assets, he suggests, any such controls would be quite ineffective unless they forced tremendous declines in output and employment. This is indeed quite valid, once the accumulation of liquid assets has been permitted, unless we include in monetary and fiscal policy such measures of dubious constitutionality as capital levies and blocking of liquid resources. The moral, however, is not necessarily the need for direct controls which Hansen draws. It may be rather that the time to introduce aggregate controls is at the outset of a war or other inflationary emergency, instead of adopting direct controls as palliatives to disguise the need for them.

M. BRONFENBRENNER
University of Wisconsin

FRIEDMAN, LEE M. *Pilgrims in a New Land.* Pp. xii, 471. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1948. $4.00.

This latest volume by the president of the American Jewish Historical Society is a collection of essays on some significant events in the history of the Jews in America, and biographical sketches of Jewish personalities of the remote and recent past. The book consists of four parts, namely: "Jews in American Life," "The Process of Adjustment," "Jews and the American Spirit," and "Jews in American Economic Life." These are divided into twenty-six brief chapters dealing with a variety of subjects. Among them are: an account of the early attempts in America at writing a post-Biblical history of the Jews, particularly the unsuccessful effort by Cotton Mather; episodes from the life of Jewish pioneers in Colonial America such as Aaron Lopez, Haym Solomon, Moses Franks, and Moses Levy, and from those of a later period, namely, Mordecai Manuel Noah, Oscar Straus, and David Lubin; the story of a ritual murder case in 1928 in Messina, northern New York; an essay on the Touro Synagogue in Newport; an account of the first successful Jewish periodical in America; sketches of the Irish-born delineator of Jewish life on New York's East Side at the turn of the century, Myra Kelly, and of the early nineteenth-century Jewish woman reformer, Ernestine Rose; an analysis of the impact of Yiddish on American English; and sketches of Jewish pioneers in certain American industries.

The author makes no attempt to present a unified or chronological story of any particular period or phase in American Jewish history, but depends upon short accounts of noteworthy incidents, personalities, and institutions, even though disconnected and out of context, to yield a definite picture of the part the Jews played in the building and development of the American nation and its culture. This, in the opinion of the present reviewer, the author falls short of achieving. It is rather surprising that after he notes so correctly in his introduction that meaningful history "is not primarily and merely the narration of great events and great names" but rather an account of the "day-by-day lives of little men," he pays scanty attention to his own pronouncement and proceeds to concern himself chiefly with unusual events or persons. The book, written in a charming style and with scrupulous regard for facts, includes little that is entirely new or based on original research. However, by making the incidents and personalities described come to life and by clearing up some popular misconceptions regarding them, the author contributes considerably towards a better understanding of them.

SAMUEL KOENIG

Brooklyn College

AMES, RUSSELL. *Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia.* Pp. viii, 230. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. $3.50.

Thomas More, Catholic saint, philosophic sage, urbane and charming gentleman, business man, politician, courtier, social reformer and martyr, was one of the most complex and many-sided men who ever lived, even during the Renaissance. Small wonder that he has attracted biographers and commentators innumerable. Russell Ames is most interested in the social reformer:

> More gives to us a description of the struggles, the pains, and the tragedies of the English working people—with a scientific explanation of the causes of poverty, crime, and injustice—which has no equal in English writing. This, rather than his invention of Utopian society, is More's highest artistic and intellectual achievement (p. 176).

He takes a middle ground between the two commentators on More who most interest him, Kautsky and R. W. Chambers. Kautsky finds in More a Socialist ahead of his age, protesting against the cruelties of capitalism. Chambers treats More as a Catholic humanitarian, reacting against economic as well as religious innovations. To Ames, More was a man very much of his own age, and none the less so because he sharply criticized abuses.

More's background of busy bourgeois life is studied in some detail. His political ideas are those of an enlightened business man, impatient of the lazy drones of the nobility, but not altogether trusting the overweening authority of the royal despots, and preferring elected officials and constitutional government to either. Thus

he is more significant as a precursor of Diderot and Jefferson than as an imitator of Plato (p. 6). More was exceptional in his views because his sympathies were wide enough to include the harried poor as well as the struggling middle classes. Nevertheles his great antagonist was not capitalism but "feudalism." This term is used, too loosely, to include the whole agrarian economy and we are startled (as the men named would most certainly have been startled) to hear Gandhi and Lin Yutang described (on p. 21) as "feudal philosophers." The author's general conclusions seem balanced and equitable and he avoids the extreme opinions which have warped the work of so many critics and eulogists of the great Tudor Humanist.

PRESTON SLOSSON
University of Michigan

KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD. *What Science Says About Happiness in Marriage.* Pp. 52. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Burgess Publishing Company, 1947.

Dr. Kirkpatrick has invested a tremendous amount of ingenuity in his effort to make sense out of the welter of statistical and metric research on marriage in the past twenty-odd years. He has taken some thirty-one pieces of such research and shown how they do or do not dovetail as to sample, instrument, findings, analyses, and significance. The result is a table on which one can, after mastering its symbolism, compare at a glance all these studies on any desired point. This was a useful service to perform.

But perhaps the greatest contribution which this summary of research can make is to show up how pitifully inadequate even the best research is to date. There are few truly random samples, for example. (The Milbank study of Indianapolis marriage is not included.) Nor are there even many really large ones. (Kinsey's study is, of course, not yet available.) What we have is a lot of spotty work, so that in spite of all our efforts, we do not really know very much. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the earlier studies of family life were of demoralized, social-agency clients. More recently, our studies have leaned heavily toward middle-class and educated couples. The result is an absence of comprehensive findings. Popular magazines, which make it a point to keep their ears to the ground, lead us to believe that alcoholism, for example, is a problem in many families. It scarcely appears in the respectable research of recent years. What are the facts?

Psychologists who are interested in studying only the populations they are most likely to be called upon to serve and counsel may not be worried about the selective bias in so much of our research. But the sociologist who wants the whole picture cannot but be dissatisfied.

Now that the Social Science Research Council has decided to support family research, it is possible that scientifically respectable work will be done. In the meanwhile, Kirkpatrick's summary will give us most of what is now available.

JESSIE BERNARD
Pennsylvania State College

TAFT, JESSIE (Ed.). *Family Casework and Counseling.* Pp. x, 304. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948. $3.50.

This compilation of articles and case material represents another stage in the development of the theory of functional casework in the private family agency, as formulated by those associated with the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. With the exception of two "dated" articles it includes the material first published in 1944 under the title, *A Functional Approach to Family Casework.* To this have been added Part I of a 1946 pamphlet, *Counseling and Protective Service as Family Casework;* a new counseling record around the referral process with introduction and discussion by the editor; and a brief "Conclusion." This publication makes available again some material now out of print and gives in one volume an exposition of the relation which this group sees between functional casework, counseling, and psychotherapy.

Throughout the articles and case material the central thesis of functional casework is confirmed; viz., that the social agency and its particular structure and function are an important determinant of

the casework process, and that it is this determinant which differentiates the helping that belongs in social casework from the helping found in psychotherapy. The caseworker's activity, it is said, is always triangular—client, agency, worker held together by the focus on the client's reality problem. The psychiatrist's or therapist's activity, on the other hand, is directed to the patient alone without responsibility to the community as represented by the agency.

Counseling has introduced new situations for the agency and caseworker which blur the clearcut distinction between casework and therapy. Counseling problems, which come in increasing volume to the family agency, center primarily around human relationships. Some of the old structures, developed to deal with requests for tangible services like relief, are missing, and new procedures and policies must be created. Progress has been made in this direction in marital counseling, as reported by M. Robert Gomberg. Parent-child counseling as a part of family casework, however, is still "a relatively unexplored and uncharted area." But it is the single person whose problem is self-centered rather than family-centered who raises the most puzzling question as to agency function. Miss Taft concludes that in such cases "only the client's genuine interest in the external focus and worker's skill in utilizing agency structures can keep the worker-client relationship from drifting into pure therapy." Further to complicate the distinction she notes the movement of psychiatry (as represented by Franz Alexander and associates) toward brief therapy and toward placement of the patient's reality problem at the center of treatment.

The evidence offered concerning the place of counseling, especially in its "pure" form, is not conclusive. Miss Taft leaves to the reader the question whether or not the fact that a counseling problem comes to a family agency and is handled by a social caseworker is sufficient to differentiate it as casework. There seems to be a danger that the caseworker will play therapist because of the inadequacy of psychiatric facilities. The outcome, she believes, will "depend largely on the courage and conviction with which the family agency defines its responsibility and sets up reliable policies with supporting structure for the use of its workers." To the uninitiated some of the problem seems to lie in semantics.

ARLIEN JOHNSON
University of Southern California

CRAWFORD, M. D. C. *The Conquest of Culture*. Pp. xii, 449. New York: Fairchild Publications, 1948. $3.00.

Someone once said: Culture is what your butcher would have if he were a surgeon. This book seeks to trace the history of invention and the role it has played in the progress of human civilization. It is the story of "how man invented his way to civilization"—and this seems to be the very presupposition that annihilates the value of the book, for it is not in the invention that the advancement of civilization lies, but rather in its useful or positive application. Surely man has shown an unequaled ingenuity in "solving the pressures and perils of his environment" as far as they are physicomaterial, while the social and sheer human values are still with us quite unsolved and festering. "From ice to Einstein," claims the author, "every time we invent a new and more useful tool we change it by some devil's sorcery into newer and more deadly weapons. . . . We thought ourselves into this paradox of destruction, and only thought can lead us out of it." Then it is not some outside, unknown, inevitable "devil's sorcery" after all, but our own thought—or perhaps our own thoughtlessness! The question arises, then, can culture be conquered, or should culture not be the product of those endeavors which, unlike all cruelty—as Seneca had it—spring not from weakness?

In truth, the book is a compact compilation of factual information; and when we turn to individual inventions and their variegated extensions, such as cloth or tobacco (the weed of destiny), we find the author at his best. The general tone, however, is not so much a general survey as a generalized sermon making things either black or white, pinning medals onto one

and unskinning another. The tragedy of the book is not in the author's lack of material, accurate and plentiful, nor in its linguistic presentation, but rather in its lack of logic. If we are told dogmatically how to think and how to eliminate pleasant or unpleasant things (as the occasion demands), then we defeat the very hope which the author expresses so earnestly in his introduction to this revised edition: ". . . that men should think as men and not as nations."

As a cursory survey, the book serves its purpose; as a compilation of fact, better and more integrated introductions are available; as a lesson, it fails. For the simplification that comes with generalization is not always solution; it cannot remain permanent, for it is conquest rather than persuasion.

BORIS ERICH NELSON
University of Massachusetts

MAGOUN, F. ALEXANDER. *Love and Marriage.* Pp. xvii, 369. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. $3.00.

The 1,968 professors in 550 colleges who, according to the author of this book, give 657 courses on marriage and parenthood, naturally vary a great deal in the approaches and emphases which they make in this highly important area of human behavior. Some deal largely with premarital conduct and questions; some with relationships between husband and wife, chiefly after marriage; others with the requirements of homemaking; a few, thus far, give large or primary attention to the problems and responsibilities of parenthood. The title and the chapter headings, as well, identify the scope of this particular volume. The latter include: the nature of love, the nature of marriage, sources of preparation for marriage, the premarital sex problem, criteria for choosing a mate, courtship, the period of engagement, the honeymoon, the sex relation, emotional adjustments, parents and children, divorce, and religion in the home.

Consideration of these topics is not essentially by way of summarizing the scientific data bearing upon them, although the author makes reference to much of this literature, both directly and by inference. The procedure rather is in the direction of evaluation, admonition, and inspiration. The author, who is professor of human relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of Human Relations, Inc., apparently considers the function of courses on marriage—for use in which this book is intended—to be that of group counseling of students, with particular reference to the problems of more direct and immediate concern to them. This purpose the author has accomplished with admirable success. The book contains much that can be helpful to young people contemplating and consummating marriage. The manner of expression is direct, simple, and interesting. It should prove valuable for student use as well as for other readers.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD
University of Pennsylvania

COYLE, GRACE LONGWELL. *Group Work with American Youth.* Pp. viii, 270. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. $3.50.

In a year marked by a considerable growth in the literature relevant to social group work, Dr. Grace Coyle's compact little volume stands out as a major contribution, if not the most notable one to date. The product of years of distinguished teaching and writing in the field, this book is a skillful blending of sociological and psychological theory basic to group work with concrete case material illustrative of group work as a method in social work and education. This book is directed primarily to the professional or student group worker, trained or employed as a leader of youth groups. It is not academic in its style, which is lucid and makes interesting and enjoyable reading.

Briefly stated, the philosophy and underlying assumptions concerning the needs and equipment of the professional youth leader in a leisure-time agency, as given by Dr. Coyle, are as follows:

1. He should possess a conviction that recreational and educational activities will yield growth and expansion of the individual and will develop and enrich American culture.

2. He needs an insight, a "bifocal" vi-

sion that will see interpersonal relations within the group as well as the group as a whole.

3. The program of activities of the group should be viewed only as it affects individuals of the group, not as an end in itself.

4. The worker should be sensitive to the whole person and see "recreation in its relation to other life situations." The group should be "person centered."

5. There is a basic need to understand human behavior, and use should be made of the best available underlying sciences. A worker will act professionally to the extent that he understands the social sciences and he becomes a social worker in his "conscious use of his relationships" in approaching his clients.

The author proceeds to illustrate these assumptions and principles by concrete examples. Through the use of nine group case records, drawn from Masters' Theses and term papers prepared by her graduate students at Western Reserve University, we are enabled to see theory borne out by practice. The nine group records under study were selected because they were sufficiently representative of divergent type groups in a variety of agency settings and because the members of these groups belonged to different social strata. The subtle interweaving of psychological and sociological concepts basic in group work method and experience is the outstanding characteristic and the virtue of the book. Such sociological and sociopsychological concepts as social status, status hierarchy, class mobility, social distance, social rating, affectional patterns, or sociograms become meaningful as applied by the author to life situations within the groups studied.

There are several instances where one would want more data—some additional information on the personality and background of the leaders, which of their efforts proved successful, which met with failure. However, there is so much that is good about *Group Work with American Youth* that this omission becomes a minor one.

In this rather short review one is unable to do justice to this outstanding work which, in essence, presents group work as a recognizable discipline, a significant educational and social work method with deep roots in the social sciences.

JULIAN L. GREIFER
Neighborhood Centre
Philadelphia, Pa.

DAVIS, JOSEPH S. (Ed.). *Carl Alsberg: Scientist at Large.* Pp. xi, 182. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1948. $2.00.

This work is a joint effort edited by Joseph S. Davis, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, with articles concerning the life and work of Carl Alsberg by former associates—Alfred L. Kroeber, University of California; Donald D. Van Slyke, Rockefeller Institute; Fred B. Linton, Bureau of Chemistry; Robert D. Calkins, Columbia University; and John B. Condliffe, University of California. It also contains three short addresses by Dr. Alsberg.

After reading this book, one will know why this group of biological and social scientists desired to describe and commemorate the life and work of this genial and inspiring person. The fundamental theme of Alsberg's career is contained in his autobiographical address to the students of Reed College. "And so all my life my concerning interest has been research—asking, What is it? Why is it? and What of it?" Not content with the fact and its interpretation, Alsberg had to extend the implications to the whole of society. It is not strange that this man of insatiable curiosity, after receiving the Doctor of Medicine degree at Columbia University, went on to biochemical research, the chemistry of foods and soils, its relation to human population, economics, and other phases of the social sciences. In the capacities of researcher and administrator he served at the Harvard Medical School (1902–8), at the Bureau of Plant Industry (1908–12), as chief of the Bureau of Chemistry (1912–21), as co-director of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University (1921–37), and as director of the Giannini Foundation, University of California (1937–40). Whether as director of research or administrator, Alsberg proved to be a distinguished and inspiring leader—characteristics well set

forth by the five collaborators who wrote this book. Each writes of Alsberg in one or another of the periods of his multiple career, and each was inspired by his contact with this stimulating and modest man. He "wist not that his face shone."

In the address entitled "The Social Scientist and the Natural Scientist" Alsberg accredited the great success of the natural sciences to the integration of many small but very intensive contributions into the moving body of facts, theories, and laws. He felt that social science would gain if there were less writing of books and more publication of brief journal communications devoted to the intensive and creative study of facts. In this way, "new ideas, new theories, new facts would be made known to the world more promptly" and "the tempo of progress would be accelerated." An investigator "would not run the risk of being called to task for overlooking a paragraph buried in some thick tome."

This reviewer likes this kind of book. It is well to publicize the lives of the modest people who have played an integral role in the deeper drama of our times, contributing in a fundamental way to the alleviation of famine and economic insecurity.

HERBERT S. HARNED
New Haven, Connecticut

O'NEILL, JOHN J. *Engineering the New Age.* Pp. 320. New York: Ives Washburn, 1949. $3.50.

Social scientists should be interested in this volume, coming from the pen of a well-known and widely read author on scientific subjects. For here are developed implications of the principle (in Gano Dunn's words) that "engineering is the *art* of the economic application of science to *social purposes*" (reviewer's italics). The engineering feats of the past and of the present were and still are, in large part, reflections of the interests of rulers, of conquerors, of "executives," of "mighty men" (not "mighty minds"), themselves ignorant of or unconcerned with the ever widening social aspects of science and technology. However grave the consequences of this situation have been heretofore in the "low energy" periods of engineering accomplishment, the coming of the atomic age means that scientists and engineers, destined to assume a strategically crucial role in the affairs of men, must add to their skills those of the social scientist, must eliminate the traditional "taboo against discussion of the social effects" of their own contributions, must become truly *professionals* in organization and in the realization of the ethical implications of their functions, and, above all, must develop a "social consciousness." These represent the main burden of Mr. O'Neill's plea.

The author's wide knowledge of scientific technology and of history permits him to develop his theme with lively, but sometimes annoyingly uncharted, excursions into such subjects as the nature of the cosmos (which contains the lessons needed for "engineering" *all* aspects of life), Greek mythology ("Prometheus was the first scientist"), ancient construction projects (e.g., the Imperial Canal of China, the Pyramids), the Gothic cathedral, modern building materials, human anatomy (a superb "engineering" job), transportation systems, and the superiority of lithium over uranium for nonmilitary uses of atomic power. The comments in these various areas are often penetrating, though shot through with unnecessary populese and such unfortunate passing barbs as those aimed at "sophomoric systems of socialism or kindergarten cults of communism": subjects which require serious discussion, not verbal pot shots.

If this book will interest social scientists, it may also tax their patience, for the author's greatest limitations are in the social field. They will find, for example, lengthy illustration of crude organicism and simple mechanism side by side with the claim that the individual actor is all-important. They will recognize their own plea for the application of scientific method to societal phenomena, but may be disturbed by the failure to distinguish between technological and cultural levels of analysis, by the almost Spenglerian anti-urban bias, by the somewhat inconsistent advocacy of planning small decentralized communities on the one hand and fear of government "control" on the other. Some

will applaud the demand for an *altogether* quantitative sociology and economics; others will see here an indication of naïveté. Perhaps a few readers will be as surprised as was the reviewer to learn that the structure of the atom, of the cosmos, the functions of the human body, the "community biology" and "economic physics" and "social chemistry" of tomorrow's "mighty minds," the "ultrauniversities" for the engineers of the new age, the needs of society and of the individual, and indeed the purposes of the divine powers, are in complete harmony with and somehow all encompassed by a single set of principles.

CHARLES H. PAGE
Smith College

THORP, MARGARET FARRAND. *Female Persuasion: Six Strong-Minded Women.* Pp. 253. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. $3.75.

Margaret Thorp has chosen the lives of six feminine propagandists of the mid-nineteenth century for a penetrating social biography of a remarkable period in American history, when high-souled agitation kept the printing presses busy with an outpouring of polemic writing. The group includes Catherine Beecher, Jane Swisshelm, Amelia Bloomer, "Grace Greenwood," Louisa McCord, and Maria Child —names which only faintly stir the memory of the modern reader. To be able to go into the well-stocked closet of that age and pull out six such remarkable characters who have been crowded into oblivion by the more celestial Fullers, Wrights, and Stowes is proof of the amplitude of the period.

Each of these women had a special power of persuasion, from the hard-hitting mockery of Jane Swisshelm, the overpowering reasonableness of Catherine Beecher, the mild and soft-spoken persuasiveness of Amelia Bloomer, and the urbanity of "Grace Greenwood," to the scholarly rapier thrusts of Louisa McCord and Maria Child. They fought for noble causes—the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women, temperance, prison reform, incidentally striking a few blows for costume reform, better methods of housekeeping, improved child care. Whether they were making suggestions for better methods of ventilation or giving advice to young mothers or lashing out at the institution of slavery, they all had the gift of the true agitator to communicate their own deep concern. All felt a fiery compulsion to open the people's eyes to the facts, from Louisa McCord's elaborately reasoned defense of slavery to Maria Child's equally reasoned denunciation of it. All were good-tempered, urbane, and witty, although Jane Swisshelm had a rare gift for knowing when it was better to lose her temper than to keep it. All had great power in their time, and the contrast between their delicate feminine exterior and their fiery and often dramatic expression must have stirred their hearers and readers in a way not open to our emancipated sex today.

Three of Mrs. Thorp's strong-minded women had strong-minded husbands who co-operated admirably with their strong-minded wives, often making their more daring exploits possible. None of these women felt restless under their domestic round, but saw the world's problems as eddying out from their doorstep. None of them wasted energy denying the vital significance of woman's domestic role. Indeed, they bent their efforts to enlarge woman's sphere—"stretched it, into a new shape to be sure, but a shape respectably consistent with the Divine Plan." They were all homebodies. Amelia Bloomer saw nothing difficult about editing a magazine, making speeches, and doing her own housework, even winning prizes for her jellies at the County Fair. Catherine Beecher fused theology and domestic science so well that she was no less renowned for a refutation of Jonathan Edwards than for a Treatise on Domestic Economy.

Mrs. Thorp is no idle trifler with the reader's time. Clearly there are deep matters to be pondered here. Why should an age which denied all formal opportunities to women have been so willingly instructed by them? Women had no political rights, few civil rights, and few economic opportunities. Yet all of these women found ample opportunities to write, to speak, to edit their brave "Lilys" and "Visiters."

Audiences begged for them; editors sought them out; fame and success came to them. Their lives offer food for thought.

The portraits are drawn with insight and irony. Mrs. Thorp has varied her style admirably to suit the differing temperaments of her subjects. It is a pleasure to report that this volume contributes some very luminous insights into the "woman question."

LOUISE M. YOUNG

Washington, D. C.

HERMAN, ABBOTT P. *An Approach to Social Problems.* Pp. xi, 516. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1949. $3.75.

The publisher's brochure which accompanied the book is unquestionably correct in its claim: "A book that avoids the usual atomistic or piecemeal attack on social problems and endeavors to find the basic processes from which most of our problems arise." To this end the author organizes his work thus: Part I, In Quest of an Approach (in which previous typical social problems frames of reference are critically examined); Part II, Problem Implications of Change (in which technological dynamics of social change are emphasized); Part III, Problem Implications of Institutional Attitudes (in which various values such as "individualism," "institutional separatism," and "racisms" are examined); and a highly interesting Appendix, in which verbatim interviews with ministers and public officials on social problems are presented.

Description of a book, its point of view and organization, is easier than an evaluation of it. Professor Herman's work *is* "new and different," but is it *better* than its predecessors and contemporaries? It is well to avoid the piecemeal attack on social problems, with its distracting tendency to get lost in minutiae, but is one's effort more fruitful when he deals in generalities and vagaries (however tremendous) with virtually no systematic handling of any specific current social problem, except by implication and that sometimes rather remote? If one takes the title literally, then Professor Herman is, of course, under no obligation to deal with any single social problem, since his is only "an approach to" such problems. But since the book is intended as a textbook for courses in social problems, the issue of its adequacy for the purpose intended cannot be by-passed by retreat into philosophical ultimates.

It is not being here asserted that this book is in fact inadequate for social problems courses as characteristically taught in American colleges and universities; the question of adequacy and relevancy is merely being raised for consideration. Perhaps, if Professor Herman's contentions are correct as judged by the consensus of his peers who read his book, the philosophy and content of the social problems courses will be reconstructed. That in turn raises the question whether a college and university course which purports to train leaders for our problem-fraught society can achieve its purpose by so generic an approach, when the society does, and for obvious practical reasons probably must, handle problems (however unfortunately) one at a time.

JOHN F. CUBER

Ohio State University

PORTERFIELD, AUSTIN L., ROBERT H. TALBERT, and HERBERT R. MUNDHENKE. *Crime, Suicide, and Social Well-Being in Your State and City.* Pp. viii, 121. Fort Worth: Leo Potishman Foundation, Texas Christian University, 1948. $2.25.

General answers to important problems of far-reaching significance are attempted in this little book through the device of uniform comparisons on objective statistical indices presented as meaningful measures of relative "social well-being" or of relative "social defectiveness."

"The first object of this study is the rank of the 48 states in social well-being. The second is a comparison of serious crime rates in the 48 states. The third is a comparison of the indices of crime in 86 cities of the United States by Southern and non-Southern pairs of equal population. The fourth is a similar comparison of 19 larger cities extending from East to West, from Boston to San Francisco. The fifth is a comparison of suicide-homicide ratios by states and cities. The last ques-

tion is, 'Why not learn more about your state and city?'" (Preface, p. viii.)

The principal contents of the volume consist, therefore, of tables and figures showing the states or cities in rank order, with the appropriate numerical index values indicated in each case. The sources are varied, but the statistics always originate in some form of official publication such as the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* for specified years; *Vital Statistics* for certain years; *Medical Statistics Bulletin* of the Selective Service; *Current Population Reports: Population Estimates* (1947); *Uniform Crime Reports* for appropriate years; and so on. Important limitations to the data and some of the necessary qualifications in interpretation are pointed out in the brief text accompanying the tables. Figures or statistical tables occupy all or part of 65 of the 121 pages. There is a table of contents and a two-page index.

The general results (or findings) shown by these comparisons are not unexpected or previously unknown. Thus, the "social well-being" of the state of New York ranks highest, with Connecticut and New Jersey next in order; at the bottom of the list are Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi, with the last-named in 48th place. In connection with the index of social defectiveness, employed in the analysis of crime, the authors report a coefficient of correlation of +.71 in comparison with the results of the index developed a decade ago by Thorndike in *Your City* for comparable series (p. 5, note 4). Acknowledgment is made of the fact that parts of the three principal chapters have appeared previously in three of the well-known sociological journals.

Quantitative descriptive studies based on official government statistics are often interesting from a journalistic or public-relations point of view, but, of necessity, have only a limited place in more technical research in the social sciences. The extreme generality of all measures used makes it impossible to go beyond the index itself in further analysis. Composite averages based on the average of other averages then computed as a percentage of variation from still another series of averages leave one so far from the recorded data that the careful student will soon try to get back to more fundamental data.

State and local politicians, as well as those interested in certain types of social action programs, will find much ammunition, both pro and con, in the many specific comparisons presented in this book. It should help stir up community interest in local problems and may thus come to serve a very useful function.

GEORGE B. VOLD
University of Minnesota

MACIVER, R. M. (Ed.). *Discrimination and National Welfare.* Pp. 135. New York: Harper & Brothers (Religion and Civilization Series of the Institute for Religious and Social Studies), 1949. $2.00.

In the winter of 1947–48, the Institute for Religious and Social Studies, a graduate school for scholars of religion in New York City, presented a course on "The Costs of Discrimination in the United States." The volume under review consists of the lectures in that series. The articles are mostly factual, describing the costs of discrimination arising from everything from refusal to hire Negroes to segregation in churches. Most of the facts contained in the book have been published elsewhere, and are generally known to scholars.

Most of the articles are frankly propagandistic—their value premises and conclusions are that discrimination is bad. Elmo Roper and Theodore Brameld do an especially effective job of presentation. Milton Konvitz is especially incisive in his point that the courts make the law, and yet try to escape moral responsibility for their product by pretending only to state it. Herbert Northrup and Robert Weaver offer fairly complete, although greatly boiled down, statements on unions and housing. R. M. MacIver and Ira Reid set the problem of discrimination and segregation and their costs. Only one article attempts any sociological theory—that by Robert Merton—but this is of such a controversial character that it would be wise to allow him to publish his

supporting data from a study of mixed housing before comment is made.

The most interesting articles in this review are the ones by Roger Baldwin and A. A. Berle, because they succeed in reporting the attitude of non-Americans toward discrimination in this country. Baldwin points out how the Japanese people turned away from liberalism toward militarism in 1924 because the Oriental Exclusion Act of that year proved to them that Americans despised and hated them. Berle, for many years a high official in the State Department, makes the most significant statement in the book: "It is no exaggeration, I think, to say that the habit of race discrimination practiced in considerable parts of the United States is the greatest single danger to the foreign relations of the United States, and conceivably may become a real threat to American security."

ARNOLD M. ROSE
University of Minnesota

ROSE, ARNOLD. *The Negro in America.* Pp. xvii, 325. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. $3.75.

Five years ago Gunnar Myrdal, professor of social economy at the University of Stockholm, presented his challenging volume entitled *An American Dilemma.* Since then his examination of the status of the Negro in America has evoked countless evaluations, ranging from the ecstatic praise of some of the preliminary reviews to a very caustic book-length critique which questioned both the "definitiveness" and the "accuracy" of the appraisal. Because of the voluminous size of the original study, which was already a synthesis of forty-four monographs, one of Dr. Myrdal's principal assistants has undertaken the responsibility of condensing the volume so as to enhance its popular appeal. The result is the present book, Arnold Rose's *The Negro in America.*

To a great extent the author has adhered to the Myrdal format, skillfully manipulating his editorial judgment to produce a sharpened focus. In a single pithy sentence he has highlighted the nature of our ethnic dilemma. "The Negro is a 'problem' to the average American," we are advised, "partly because of a conflict between the place awarded him in American society and those ideals [inherent in the American Creed]." When the equalitarian liberalism of the Declaration of Independence is negated by the daily realities of discrimination, the moral inconsistencies cannot be shirked. That this is a vital problem affecting the Caucasian as well as the Negro, constitutes a central premise of the book. If only for economic reasons, the author believes that we must rechart our course. Negroes who are prevented from rising economically to the full extent of their capacities will, as was demonstrated during our late depression, invariably require the financial assistance of the government—"a highly inefficient and wasteful process and one bound to cause friction and hatred." In the realm of international relations, especially in our role as competitor with the Soviet Union for the friendship of the colored peoples of the world, we labor under a serious handicap because of our inability to solve this ethnic problem.

What, then, does the author suggest to remedy the situation? Apparently he has reiterated several controversial aspects of the original Myrdal program, including birth control, which some Negroes have interpreted as race suicide. He also recommends educational training consisting of Negro "assimilation of white American culture" as a means of decreasing the gap between colored persons and other Americans. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the study of Negro contributions, which this book has perhaps tended to minimize, might yield even greater benefit to substantial segments of the white population. Opportunities for Negroes, in spite of their training, will invariably depend upon the degree to which the white majority itself is re-educated in the field of race relations.

One of the commendable features of *An American Dilemma* was a relative thoroughness of coverage which transcended even the huge scope of the investigation. In the process of condensing the work to a fifth of its original size, any writer, including the very capable Dr. Rose, is bound to suffer by comparison. Unfortu-

nately, many of the illustrative details have been discarded. Without the presence of substantiating evidence, a sentence such as "The Negro leader feels pride in his skill in flattering, beguiling, and outwitting the white man" (p. 252) appears to be an overgeneralization of the "Uncle Tom" concept. The discussion of the slavery background, which was hastily sketched in Myrdal's book, occupies fewer than a dozen pages. At times even major individuals are dismissed with only an encyclopedic listing, while the index, consisting of barely three pages, neglects to mention such persons as Congressman Powell, Father Divine, and A. Philip Randolph. On the other hand, Dr. Rose, by interpreting for us the developments of the more recent past and making it possible for even the busiest layman to familiarize himself with the essentials of this vital problem, has immeasurably enhanced the usefulness of the Myrdal project.

LEONARD PRICE STAVISKY
New York State Teachers College

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. *Research Frontiers in Human Relations.* Pp. 325–410. Philadelphia, 1949. $1.00.

The papers collected in this publication were given in the course of a symposium held at the Midwinter Meeting of the American Philosophical Society on February 6 and 7, 1948. The keynote of the symposium was well struck by Donald Young in his introductory address when he defined the task of the social sciences as the advancement of knowledge of human relations for purposes of providing "the best possible understanding of the problem of living together in the modern world" (p. 325). The individual papers presented were largely progress reports regarding the pursuit of this goal in various fields of the social sciences. A few others dealt mainly with the difficulties which stand in the way of achieving the goal, with suggestions for removing these difficulties.

It is impossible within the limits of a book review to do justice to the breadth of vision expressed by the contributors and to the varied nature of the work on which they reported. A list of authors and topics covered, however, may give some idea of the galaxy of professional competence represented and the variety of the material discussed in this symposium: Donald Young, Limiting Factors in the Development of the Social Sciences; Samuel A. Stouffer, Studying the Attitudes of Soldiers; Rensis Likert, Opinion Studies and Government Policy; Louis N. Ridenour, The Natural Sciences and Human Relations; Frederic C. Lane, The Social Sciences and the Humanities; Robert R. Sears, Personality Development in Contemporary Culture; Carl I. Hovland, Social Communication; E. Wight Bakke, Industrial Relations Research; Louis Wirth, Research in Racial and Cultural Relations; Frederick F. Stephan, Sampling in Studies of Opinions, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants; Clyde W. Hart, Bias in Interviewing in Studies of Opinions, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants; and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, The Use of Panels in Social Research.

On that basis alone this publication will be justly considered a "must" on the reading list of every social scientist. As to content of specific importance, every reader will of course make his own selection from the angle of his personal interest. To this reviewer, the most remarkable phenomenon appearing in this collection of papers is the increasing awareness of various leaders in the social science field that no "problem of living together" can be attacked successfully with the equipment and selective abstraction bias of any one of the traditional disciplines. This is brought out, for instance, in the paper of E. Wight Bakke, who characterizes the search for basic principles in the field of industrial relations as having resulted in the acceptance of a combination of elements of knowledge from psychology, anthropology, and sociology. It is also expressed clearly by Robert R. Sears, in his report on the child behavior research project in process at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, as follows: "This research program is based on the assumptions that the formalized patterns of a society's behavior on the one hand are a product of motivational systems established in its people and on the other partly determine what the adults will do in rearing their children; and that the

personalities, or motivational systems, of the children are in turn a function of the society's child-rearing practices" (p. 369). The same idea of an interdisciplinary approach appears in Carl I. Hovland's paper on Social Communication, and it pervades implicitly the whole paper of Clyde W. Hart on Bias in Interviewing.

Of great interest to this reviewer was also the panel technique in social research discussed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, which demonstrates the justification of a modicum of optimism with regard to the possibility of experimentation in the social science field.

The American Philosophical Society is to be congratulated for having arranged this symposium and made available so vast an array of valuable papers to the rapidly increasing number of people interested in social science research.

OTTO POLLAK
University of Pennsylvania

ZIPF, GEORGE KINGSLEY. *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology.* Pp. xi, 573. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1949. $6.50.

Perhaps the best brief summary of what this book is about is contained in the following sentences: ". . . We shall attempt to demonstrate in the course of our following chapters that every individual's movement, of whatever sort, will always be over paths and will always tend to be governed by one single primary principle which, for the want of a better term, we shall call the *Principle of Least Effort.* Moreover, we shall attempt to demonstrate that the structure and organization of an individual's entire being will tend always to be such that his entire behavior will be governed by this Principle. . . . In simple terms, the Principle of Least Effort means, for example, that a person in solving his immediate problems will view these against the background of his probable future problems, *as estimated by himself.* Moreover, he will strive to solve his problems in such a way as to minimize the *total work* that he must expend in solving *both* his immediate problems *and* his probable future problems" (p. 1).

The contents of over 500 large pages are devoted to an exposition of the above theory and its empirical support through the analysis of a tremendous variety of data ranging from speech behavior to the geographic distribution of population, and touching the fields of economics, sociology, cultural anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and semantics. Part Two will probably be of most general interest to social scientists. In Chapters 9 to 12 the author has brought together statistical data of newspaper circulation and contents, telephone conversations, bus passenger traffic, diffusion of railway express packages, occupations, manufactures, personal services, insurance, incomes, and so forth, all analyzed to indicate their adherence to the Principle of Least Effort.

Objections have been raised in the past to previously published parts of these studies on the ground that the author relies too much on the rough approximation of the data to the harmonic series, instead of on calculations of the best fitting curves and their probable errors. It is quite true that the data should be subjected to these refinements in the further testing of the Principle of Least Effort. On the other hand, as long as the relationships are obviously statistically significant, the question of the *exact size* of the correlation coefficients and their probable errors can be deferred to a later stage in the development of the theory. There is much other *detail* that is open to question and especially to further investigation. When all the complaints and criticisms have been made, however, it will not be possible to deny, I think, that Dr. Zipf has produced one of the most stimulating books of our time. There are presented here a remarkable number and variety of observations which have unmistakable implications as empiric natural laws, regardless of the theoretical interpretations that anyone wishes to propose. As the author remarks in his Preface: "Our theory, *like all other theories in natural science,* does *not* claim either that no other theory can be found that will also rationalize our data, or that no other data will ever be found that do not controvert our theory" (p. ix).

In the meantime, there is presented in

this book something that has hitherto been sadly lacking in the social sciences and especially in ecology, namely, a comprehensive, rational, theory and a wealth of supporting empirical data which, whatever may be the limitations of both at this stage of development, nevertheless represent a bold, imaginative, and brilliant approach toward a natural science of human social behavior. Zipf's book is a notable contribution to that growing literature regarding which a distinguished physical scientist, J. Q. Stewart of Princeton, has said: "There is no longer excuse for anyone to ignore the fact that human beings, on the average and at least in certain circumstances, obey mathematical rules resembling in a general way some of the primitive 'laws' of physics. Social physics lies within the grasp of scholarship that is unprejudiced and truly modern. When we have found it, people will wonder at the blind opposition its first proponents encountered."

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG
University of Washington

WIENER, NORBERT. *Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine.* Pp. 194. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1948. $3.00.

Professor Norbert Wiener of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has written a fascinating book that is at present being read with more than just novelty or academic interest by scientists of all disciplines and all philosophical camps. Why is this book, parts of which contain some rather advanced and important mathematical developments, of such concern to mathematical and nonmathematical scientists? What is cybernetics? The title is the author's neologism coined from a Greek word meaning steersman. "Steersmanship" or "governorship" is the science concerned with feedback mechanisms like the steering engine aboard a ship. Cybernetics deals with those logical elements that are common to automatic machines and to the human nervous system. It attempts a comprehensive theory of self-regulatory systems as they are found in animals and in communication networks.

Professor Wiener's book traces the development of this new science. Here we find his own contributions to the mathematical theory of automatic fire control or, more generally, the theory of prediction. Here he outlines the "theory of information," which involves the application of statistics to communication engineering. In Professor Wiener's scheme of things, communication engineering ceases to be a branch of electrical engineering and becomes the science of information transfer. The redefined task of any communication system is thus to get the "message" through —a particular message, that is, as a choice from all possible messages.

Professor Wiener reviews for us the history of automata, which each age conceives in the image of its own technique. His own knowledge of the most advanced mathematical machines and his association with leading physiologists led him to investigate the way in which the behavior of the human brain resembles some aspects of the behavior of our most elaborate machines. As Wiener sees it, the brain is still ahead of the machine on two counts: it can accommodate an imposing multitude of discriminating elements in much less space, and it also requires considerably less energy for its complex operations. But the machine can outperform the brain in that it can work much faster and can be "cleared." It can get rid of its "memories." In the brain the clearing remains at best partial, whatever the clearing agent: sleep, psychoanalysis, shock therapy, or even lobotomy.

All through the book there is a generous sprinkling of Wiener's unorthordox social philosophy. To him, fundamentally, the social sciences are the study of the means of communication between man and man. Because of the high degree of interaction between the observer and the observed phenomenon, he is not too sanguine when it comes to the possible contributions of a future social science. However, in his last chapter on information, language, and society, Professor Wiener becomes himself a social scientist. He examines our society for self-regulatory or feedback mechanisms and finds that the degree of homeostasis is inversely related to the size of a commu-

nity. A small, closely knit community is stabilized by the action of public opinion; but in a large community the control of the means of communications becomes one of the chief antihomeostatic factors.

Wiener's evaluation of the outlook for science and scientists is anything but optimistic. He writes: "Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics thus stand in a moral position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable. We have contributed to the initiation of a new science which, as I have said, embraces technical developments with great possibilities for good and for evil. . . . The best we can do is to see that a large public understands the trend and the bearing of the present work, and to confine our personal efforts to those fields, such as physiology and psychology, most remote from war and exploitation."

Elsewhere Wiener states that while the first industrial revolution devaluated the human arm by the competition of machinery, "the modern industrial revolution is similarly bound to devalue the human brain at least in its simpler and more routine decisions. Of course, just as the skilled carpenter, the skilled mechanic, the skilled dressmaker have in some degree survived the first industrial revolution, so the skilled scientist and the skilled administrator may survive the second."

Cybernetics already has a few spectacular successes to its credit; its decisive test, however, will come when scientists apply it to those varied fields whose allegiance it claims in the name of that great unifier, the "message." But Professor Wiener has already performed an important service to science and scientists. He has attempted to bring about a new synthesis at a time when excessive specialization threatens to atomize existing disciplines. The course of science during the past two decades has led scientists and nonscientists to puzzle about the philosophical problems of causality and the limits of predictability. Professor Wiener addresses himself to these problems. He also discusses the usefulness of an approach to certain scientific problems in terms of a nineteenth-century materialism. He suggests the new trinity of matter, energy, and information.

To the nonscientific reader the book has much to offer. Its style is clear and direct, and the mathematical interludes do not detract from the continuity of exciting ideas and provocative speculations. Professor Wiener's book not only tells the story of cybernetics; it is a firsthand report on the strategy of science in our day and age.

WALTER A. ROSENBLITH
Harvard University

TAPPAN, PAUL W. *Juvenile Delinquency.* Pp. x, 613. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949. $5.00.

This year has seen the publication of two volumes on juvenile delinquency which are the first comprehensive ones on this subject since 1932, a fact which should be of special interest to our society. About this widely discussed subject of delinquency the public has much folklore but little substantial scientific knowledge. Tappan's book is by far the best yet to appear, and although in it he presents a detailed analysis of the nature, the extent, the causation, the treatment, and the prevention of delinquency, the method of presentation is such as to make it stimulating and interesting to most readers. The Appendix contains several significant legal cases, sample case records, juvenile statutes, and an excellent bibliography.

Tappan is both a professor of sociology and a lecturer in law at New York University, and, as might be expected, the very important legal aspects of delinquency, including juvenile court procedures, are probably for the first time fully developed and integrated into a volume on delinquency. The treatment of juvenile offenders is also emphasized, with facts, cases, and examples of actual methods in various states and some other countries. There is frequent appraisal of methods in terms of their social psychological effects on the delinquent, rather than the all too frequent emphasis on buildings and other physical facilities without reference to the boys' subjective interpretation of the rehabilitation program.

Any significant criticisms of the volume center in the discussion of causation of delinquency, to which less than one-third of the book is devoted. The author appears

to have no satisfactory theory of human behavior into which both delinquent and nondelinquent behavior can be fitted and at the same time differentiated. All behavior is human behavior whether it is deviant or nondeviant, the two being distinguished by cultural and legal definitions, and we must have some systematic theory to understand both. While one finds, in part, a limited recognition of this view, Tappan gives a conventional presentation of all kinds of psychological, biological, and social variables in delinquency which is not only scientifically confusing but also despairing to the layman. Less than five pages, for example, is devoted to the all-important problem of delinquency as an outgrowth of definitions of situations acquired from other children, despite the fact that Tappan admits that "delinquencies are usually committed by gregarious boys and very frequently in groups of two or more" (p. 146). There is increasing theoretical and empirical evidence that human behavior, including attitudes and social roles, is derived from associations with other persons and through the culture and subculture, in which context even the possible influence of other factors must be largely interpreted. It is still regrettable that many persons studying delinquent and criminal behavior continue, to a considerable extent, to resist the importance of this obvious social psychological fact.

A book of this type was greatly needed, and Tappan's work represents the best volume available on the problem of juvenile delinquency. It should be in the library of every judge, social worker, or other person working with juveniles, in the library of the intelligent citizen, and should be widely adopted in university courses dealing with this subject.

MARSHALL B. CLINARD
University of Wisconsin

LEIGHTON, ALEXANDER H. *Human Relations in a Changing World.* Pp. 354. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1949. $4.50.

Using his experiences as chief of the Government's Foreign Morale Analysis Division during World War II as the starting point of his discussion, Leighton analyzes the differences between the scientific approach and the policy approach, and shows how they can supplement each other. This he accomplishes by demonstrating how some of the principles and methods of social science, especially cultural anthropology, sociology, and psychiatry, were applied to the wartime analysis of Japanese morale, and then proceeds to make definite suggestions as to how past experience may be used in the future.

The book is much more than Leighton modestly claims it to be. In the first place, it is one of the most penetrating analyses of America's psychological warfare, showing how decisions are made to embark upon certain policies, what are the mental attitudes of the executives, and how persistent are the tendencies of such executives to retain their convictions in spite of experience or the facts offered by social scientists. It is also one of the most readable and popularized presentations of the interrelations between social action and the methodological problems of social science. And it is also a sober and factual study of the vital role of the science of human relations in a changing world.

All in all, the book will doubtless make no small stir among those (especially college teachers) attempting to correct a mass of parrot thinking without shallow debunking. Leighton has done a magnificent job, although at rare intervals he has slipped into some minor inaccuracies. For instance, his claim that Switzerland and Sweden did not struggle for power is contradicted by historical evidence (see J. Christopher Herold, *The Swiss Without Halos,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). But these points are probably the only ones for which Leighton can be criticized. The result is a book which is timely because it concerns the current problems, readable because it is well written, and important because it supplies the background of a great debate in the social science field.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

TAYLOR, CARL C., *et al. Rural Life in the United States.* Pp. xviii, 549, xii. New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Trade, $6.75; text, $5.00.

The eight authors are, or at one time were, affiliated with the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, of which Dr. Carl C. Taylor is head, in the United States Department of Agriculture. This joint authorship is undoubtedly responsible for the creation of a comprehensive survey of rural sociology and at the same time an authoritative, empirical analysis and description of rural society in the United States.

Part One provides the theoretic framework, with two chapters devoted to a discussion of rural society and rural sociology; Part Two is a descriptive analysis of rural organization and the institutions of rural society; Part Three concerns rural people; Part Four discusses rural regions; and Part Five is a socio-psychological analysis of farmers in a changing world.

The authors have produced a valuable, documented textbook in rural sociology. The unique contribution of the authors is that contained in the chapters on American rural regions. The most scholarly analysis, however, is contained in Parts Two and Three. It is in these areas that the authors, in common with most rural sociologists, have concentrated their research, and consequently these are the areas in which they have the greatest amount of verified empirical knowledge. It is perhaps inevitable that a joint undertaking with eight authors would produce some conflicting notes in the total symphony. One example of this is the discarding of the cultural contribution of foreign nationality groups in building rural America, as is done by the author of Part One, and the somewhat contrary position taken in Part Two when a different author describes the same subject. Such differences are not serious, however, and have their place in a group undertaking where "each [is] a specialist in the particular field or fields with which he deals."

It is unfortunate that the publishers selected the type and the paper used, which make the work difficult to read. There are unpardonable errors in printing which could have been eliminated by more careful editing on the part of the publishers. Finally, since all of the thirty-three plates, including the jacket photograph, are made from photographs borrowed by the authors from public agencies, the reviewer cannot understand the unusually severe and restrictive copyright imposed by the publishers. Undoubtedly, *Rural Life in the United States* will receive enthusiastic and widespread adoption in college classes in the United States.

GEORGE W. HILL
University of Wisconsin

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

April 9, 1949

Dear Dr. Sellin:

My attention has been called to Dr. Haney's review of the American Economic Association's *Survey of Contemporary Economics* in THE ANNALS, March 1949, in which it is stated that I "reject Keynes as being clearly opposed to private enterprise."

This is a serious misunderstanding of my position and I should like to correct it. I do not reject Keynes, but only certain extreme versions of his doctrine as developed by some of his disciples. My interpretation of Keynes will be found in my "Future of Keynesian Economics," *American Economic Review,* June 1945. The general argument of that article had the written approval of Keynes himself.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could publish this letter.

Yours very truly,

DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT

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